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Abstract 
The right to health is often seen as being in enduring ‘crisis.’ On the one hand, 
social rights supporters see the pervasiveness of  unsatisfied health needs as 
evidence of  widespread violations of  the right. On the other hand, social rights 
sceptics see the resource-conditional nature of  the right as reason for its 
unenforceability. As a result, there is no tangible sense of  where along the line 
between promising everything and delivering nothing the obligation to fulfil the 
right to health sits. This thesis suggests, however, that the right to health can be 
rescued. But the rescuer will require multi-disciplinary tools. 
The contribution made by this thesis is the development of  a methodological 
framework for measuring right to health compliance. The contribution is two-fold. 
Firstly, through a public health-devised measurement of  avoidable mortality, the 
thesis provides a methodology for describing what type of  health the right to health 
guarantees. And secondly, through an econometric estimation of  efficiency, it 
provides a methodology for determining what level of  this type of  health the right 
guarantees for individuals under resource scarcity as well as for offering a signal 
with respect to the degree to which this standard is in fact being met. It is argued 
that compliance with the obligation to fulfil the right to health is a function of  the 
duty-bearer’s ability and willingness to provide for health. The results suggest that 
not all unmet health needs signal a violation of  the right to health. Some duty-
bearers are doing as well as they can with the maximum resources available, 
notwithstanding the relatively low levels of  health sometimes being achieved. At the 
same time, the results also reveal many instances where the actual level of  health 
achieved falls well short of  the level expected. But, on the basis of  the willingness 
indicators used in this thesis, whether these shortfalls systematically characterise 
unwillingness is unclear. Instead, this question requires a more nuanced, qualitative, 
investigation. In the case of  Brazil, the hypothesis of  unwillingness appears to hold. 
The methodology can be used efficiently for signalling compliance. 
1 
Introducing the problem 
Introduction 
Consider two new lives. The first enters the world in Swaziland, the other in 
Switzerland. The Swazi newborn is 20 times more likely to die before reaching her 
fifth birthday than her Swiss counterpart. If  she lives to childbearing age, she is 52 
times more likely to die during pregnancy or childbirth. Overall, being born in 
Swaziland means she can expect to live 30 fewer years than if  she was born in 
Switzerland, and the disease she will eventually die from could most likely otherwise 
have been avoided.  On witnessing the real life tragedy of  those around the world 1
afflicted with early mortality and preventable, recurrent disease, it would intuitively 
seem that a violation of  human rights, the human right to health, has occurred. But, 
whilst framing life and death tragedies within the notion of  rights leads one to hope 
that some improvement to the ill-fated situation could be made, the mere labelling 
of  an unsatisfied health need as a human rights violation is unsatisfactory. 
 WHO Global Health Observatory Data Repository. (Data on child and maternal mortality refers to 1
2013 and data on life expectancy at birth refers to 2012.)
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Determining precisely when and under what conditions the identification of  an 
unsatisfied health need indeed signals a violation requires further investigation.  2
Economic and social rights in general, and the right to health in particular, are 
dependent on the availability of  resources. And, given that the capacities of  
different countries vary in significant ways, the expectation that some countries have 
a duty to deliver the same standard of  health as others may be unrealistic, just as the 
Swaziland/Switzerland example illustrates. An answer to the question of  whether a 
human right has been violated needs therefore to take into account the ‘resources 
problem,’ which essentially requires answers to the following three questions: i) 
whose resources count as being available, that is, who are the duty-bearers?; ii) what 
level of  resources are available?; and iii) are these resources sufficient for fulfilling 
the right to health? This is not to say that when these three questions are answered, 
the content of  the right to health will automatically be known. Indeed, further 
questions, such as what is the substantial and recurrent threat from which the right 
to health protects?; which aspects of  health does the right to health guarantee; and 
what standard of  feasibility should be adopted when considering resource-
sufficiency against other practicalities? are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. However, 
what it is to say is that without answers to these three resource questions, any 
conclusion as to whether the right to health has been violated could be naively 
presumptive.    
 The concept of  ‘violation’ is used here, and throughout the thesis, as a way of  describing an 2
unjustified breach of  the right. It is not used to describe an infringement, i.e. a justified breach of  the 
right. As will become clear in Chapter 2, implicit in my argument is the distinction between the 
human right to health and the human interest in health. The level of  health to which the right guarantees 
is determined by the duty to fulfil it, which is determined with reference to the duty-bearer’s ability. 
The fact that some health interests are not met does not necessarily signal a violation of  the right in 
the unjustified sense because meeting those needs may be outside of  what is required of  the duty-
bearer. If, however, meeting those needs has been deemed to be within a duty-bearer’s ability, the 
right can be said to have been unjustifiably breached.  
2
This thesis attempts to make progress in the pursuit of  finding those answers. It 
starts from the premise that an assessment of  compliance requires not only an 
assessment of  the degree to which health, as a human interest, is enjoyed but an 
assessment of  the duty-bearers’ capacity to provide for health also.  It is structured 3
around the central hypothesis that compliance with the obligation to fulfil the right 
to health is a function of  the duty-bearer’s ability and willingness to provide for 
health.  The challenge set out in this thesis is therefore to distinguish between those 4
deprivations that come about as a result of  factors beyond a duty-bearer’s control 
(an inability to provide for health) and those in which a duty-bearer’s action or 
inaction is a major contributing, if  not causal, factor (an unwillingness to provide 
for health).  
Before heading straight for the trees, however, this chapter takes a look at the wood. 
Since the notion of  compliance expresses the connotation of  something that is 
capable of  being monitored and assessed, international law, as the ostensible 
monitor and assessor of  the right to health across countries, is a reasonable place to 
 Whilst it could be argued that what is needed for measuring a duty-bearer’s performance with 3
respect to its human rights commitments is a measure of  ‘conformity’, (i.e. the degree to which the 
duty-bearer acts in accordance with the duty) rather than a measure of  ‘compliance’, (i.e. the degree 
to which the duty-bearer acts in accordance with the duty by reason that there is a duty to do so) in 
accordance with the existing literature, the language of  ‘compliance’ is used throughout the thesis to 
investigate the relationship between duty-bearers and the fulfilment of  the right to health. See, in 
particular, Chapman, A.R. “A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1996); UN OHCHR. Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to 
Measurement and Implementation, 2012; and Fukuda-Parr, S., T. Lawson-Remer, and S. Randolph. 
Fulfilling Social and Economic Rights, 2015
 This is essentially how Cingranelli and Richards define the ‘efforts’ made by states in realising 4
economic and social rights. Cingranelli, D.L., and D.L. Richards “Measuring Government Effort to 
Respect Economic and Social Human Rights: A Peer Benchmark.” In Economic Rights: Conceptual, 
Measurement and Policy Issues, Hertel, S., and L. Minkler (eds.) pp. 214-232
3
start.  Section I outlines the way in which the right to health is articulated by 5
international law and discusses the constituent parts of  the obligation to respect, 
protect and fulfil the right to health. Because the ground, which traces the history 
of  the right to health, is already well-trodden, going through its provisions with the 
finest of  fine-toothed combs is unnecessary.  Instead this Section will offer an 6
introduction to the right to health as it appears in international law with a focus on 
the way in which it gives rise to the central resources problem. Section II outlines 
the thesis’ overarching method for approaching the resources problem, and Section 
III then returns to the central hypothesis, setting it out in more detail before finally 
outlining how it will be developed throughout the thesis. 
I. The right to health in international law 
A. Aspects of  the right 
Internationally, the right to health was first articulated in 1946 in the Constitution 
of  the World Health Organisation (WHO), whose preamble states, “the enjoyment 
of  the highest attainable standard of  health is one of  the fundamental rights of  
every human being without distinction of  race, religion, political belief, economic or 
social condition.”  Subsequent international instruments have recognised health as a 7
 See, e.g., the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12 (UN 5
ICESCR from here on); the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination 
against Women, Articles 11(1f), 12, and 14(2b); the 1989 Convention on the Rights of  the Child, 
Article 24; the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of  the Rights of  All Migrant 
Workers and Members of  Their Families, Articles 28, 43(e), and 45(c); and the 2006 Convention on 
the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities, Article 25.
 See, e.g., Toebes, B., R. Ferguson, M.M. Markovic, and O. Nnamuchi. “The Right to Health: A 6
Multi-Country Study of  Law, Policy and Practice” (2014); Langford, M., A. Sumner, and A.E. Yamin. 
Millennium Development Goals and Human Rights: Past, Present and Future, 2013; Tobin, J. The Right to 
Health in International Law, 2012; Wolff, J. The Human Right to Health, 2012; Farmer, P.E. “Challenging 
Orthodoxies: The Road Ahead for Health and Human Rights.” (2008); and Farmer, P.E. Pathologies of  
Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor, 2004
 WHO Constitution of  the World Health Organisation, Preamble (1946)7
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human right in various ways,  the most important being the International Covenant 8
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),  which opened for signature in 9
1996 and sets out, in Article 12, an elaborate statement of  the human right to 
health: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of  everyone 
to the enjoyment of  the highest attainable standard of  physical and mental 
health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realisation of  this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of  the stillbirth-rate and of  infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of  the child; 
(b)The improvement of  all aspects of  environmental and industrial 
hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of  epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases; 
(d)The creation of  conditions which would assure to all medical service 
and medical attention in the event of  sickness.   10
Since then, the human right to health has come far out from the shadows and is 
now eminent in all kinds of  contexts — whether academic, legal, economic, social 
or political. According to John Harrington and Maria Stuttaford, it “has moved to 
the centre of  political debate and social policy across the globe … It features 
prominently in the output of  the United Nations and regional human rights bodies, 
as well as national courts and legislatures; national constitutions increasingly include 
explicit recognition of  the right to health.”  11
 See n. 58
 There are currently 164 Parties to the ICESCR. However, it is also worth noting here that some of  9
the states that have not ratified the Covenant are rather important in terms of  size and economic and 
political power, such as the USA and Cuba. UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Status of  Treaties as at 17/05/2015
 Ibid, Article 1210
 Harrington, J., and M. Stuttaford. Global Health and Human Rights, 2010 p. 111
5
In 2000, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted its 
General Comment on the right to health.  In it, the right to health is detailed as an 12
inclusive right, extending not only to timely and appropriate health care, but also to 
the underlying determinants of  health, such as access to safe and potable water and 
adequate sanitation, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and access 
to health-related information, including on sexual and reproductive health. It 
contains both freedoms and entitlements. Freedoms include “the right to control 
one’s health and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom and the right to 
be free from interference such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual 
medical treatment and experimentation.”  Entitlements include the right to a 13
system of  health protection (i.e. health care and the underlying determinants of  
health) that provides equality of  opportunity for individuals to enjoy the highest 
attainable standard of  health. 
It is worth noting here that there is some unease as to whether the protection of  
freedoms, such as those concerning physical security, religion, and privacy, amongst 
others, really belong as constituent parts of  the right to health. After all, there is no 
textual basis in the ICESCR for them.  Although it is obvious that these freedoms 14
do serve health in important ways — for example, to be free to choose if  and how 
often to have children, or the freedom to withhold consent for undergoing medical 
procedures — it does not follow that they automatically become components of  the 
right to health by means of  this fact since that would practically equate the right to 
health to a right to wellbeing. This is what Tasioulas and Vayena refer to as “radical 
inclusivity.” As they put it: “health is just one of  several elements of  wellbeing, not 
 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “General Comment No. 14. The Right 12
to the Highest Attainable Standard of  Health.” 2000 (UN CESCR from here on)
 Ibid, para. 813
 Tobin, J. Supra n. 6, p. 13314
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the whole of  it.”  As such, insofar as there are rights to these freedoms, they seem 15
to more plausibly belong as part of  other, more specific, rights.  
The nature of  the entitlements included under the right to health has been distilled 
by the Committee into four essential principles: availability, accessibility, 
acceptability, and quality; otherwise referred to as the AAAQ framework.  The 16
principle of  availability requires duty-bearers to make available, in sufficient 
quantities, “functioning public health and health care facilities, goods, and services, 
as well as programmes, … [which] will include the underlying determinants of  
health, such as safe and potable drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities, 
hospitals, clinics and other health-related buildings, trained medical and professional 
personnel receiving domestically competitive salaries, and essential drugs, as defined 
by the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs.” The principle of  accessibility 
requires that these health facilities, goods and services be accessible for all without 
discrimination, both in terms of  physical accessibility (i.e. be “within safe physical 
reach”) and economic accessibility (i.e. be affordable). Accessibility also implies the 
“right to seek, receive and impart health-related information in an accessible 
format.” The principle of  acceptability requires that all health facilities, goods and 
services be “respectful of  medical ethics” and be “culturally appropriate.” And 
finally, the principle of  quality means that not only must health facilities, goods and 
services be provided (in a way that meets the AAA part of  the framework) they 
must also be of  good quality, i.e. hospitals must be safe and clean, medicines must 
be scientifically proven, and health professionals must be skilled and well-trained.  17
 Tasioulas, J., and E. Vayena. “Getting Human Rights Right in Global Health Policy.” (2014) p. 215
 UN CESCR. Supra n. 12, para. 1216
 Ibid, para. 12(a-d)17
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Together, alongside Article 12, these four principles make for rather demanding 
entitlements. Indeed, looking at them in the abstract terms in which they are stated, 
one would be forgiven for being filled with a sense of  hopelessness. What would it 
mean to guarantee all of  the people in the world the highest attainable level of  
AAAQ health? How could that be achieved? However, in setting out these guiding 
principles, the Committee has also recognised that their precise application “will 
depend on the conditions prevailing in a particular State party,”  the most limiting 18
of  these conditions being the availability of  resources.    
B. Aspects of  the obligation 
Certain rights must be realised immediately: that there must not be discrimination in 
implementation of  the rights; and that steps must be taken immediately with a view 
to the progressive realisation of  these rights. However, in recognition of  the 
difficulties resource constraints pose, the obligation specified by international law 
with respect to economic and social rights, to which the right to health belongs, 
provides that: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of  available resources, with a view 
to achieving progressively the full realisation of  the rights recognised in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of  legislative measures.   19
The shorthand statements in Article 2(1) of  “progressive realisation” and 
“maximum available resources” introduce flexibility to the obligations pertaining to 
economic and social rights and have been described as the “linchpin of  the whole 
 Ibid, para. 1218
 UN ICESCR. Supra n. 5, Article 2(1)19
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Covenant”  since ‘oughts’ without ‘cans’ have the potential to render obligations 20
null and void. According to former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Paul 
Hunt: 
Both phrases — progressive realisation and resource availability — have two 
crucial implications. Firstly, they imply that some (but not necessarily all) 
States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant may vary from one State to 
another. Second, they imply that, in relation to the same State Party, some 
(but not necessarily all) obligations under the Covenant may vary over time.  21
With respect to the right to health, the language in Article 2(1) recognises that 
immediate achievement of  the highest standard of  health is not what is required of  
the right but that instead the duty-bearer has an obligation to make planned and 
targeted steps towards this goal. It also recognises that the pools from which 
resources can be drawn for realising the highest attainable standard of  health will 
vary. But herein lies the difficulty. The formulation of  this obligation is vague and 
imprecise. On the resource issue particularly, Robert Robertson observed more than 
20 years ago that “it is a difficult phrase — two warring adjectives describing an 
undefined noun. ‘Maximum’ stands for idealism; ‘available’ stands for reality. 
‘Maximum’ is the sword of  human rights rhetoric; ‘available’ is the wiggle room for 
the state.”  And, despite the considerable amount of  literature that has been 22
dedicated to the progressive and resource-dependent nature of  economic and social 
 Alston, P., and G. Quinn. “The Nature and Scope of  States Parties’ Obligations under the 20
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” p. 172
 Hunt, P. “State Obligations, Indicators, Benchmarks and the Right to Education.” (1998) para. 421
 Robertson, R.E. “Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the ‘Maximum 22
Available Resources’ to Realising Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”(1994) p. 694
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rights since,  very little progress in the clarification of  these concepts has been 23
achieved. 
Adding further complexity to the resolving-the-resources-problem task is the 
inclusion in Article 2 of  the obligation, which refers to “international assistance and 
cooperation.” Do the resources counting as ‘maximum available’ compose of  those 
not solely belonging to a country but also of  those that a country might receive 
from overseas? In an attempt to shed light on this question, the nature of  an 
international-type obligation is dealt with in detail in Chapter 3. At this point, it is 
sufficient to note that, with respect to the ways in which progressive realisation and 
maximum available resources give rise to the resources problem, further gravity to 
the problem is all that the international dimension adds.  
C. The obligations to respect, protect and fulfil 
In addition to the specific obligations under Article 2(1), there are three general 
obligations within the economic and social rights framework: the obligations to 
respect, to protect, and to fulfil these rights. Henry Shue first explicitly defined the 
notion underpinning these obligations.  Shue proposed that, “every basic right, and 24
most other moral rights as well, could be analysed using a very simple tripartite 
typology of  interdependent duties of  avoidance, protection and aid.”  The respect, 25
protect, fulfil framework that has been adopted by the Committee is a variation on 
Shue’s typological scheme. In a similar way to Shue’s treatment of  duties, the 
 See, e.g., Eide, A., C. Krause, and A. Rosas. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 2012; 23
Sepulveda, M. The Nature of  the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 2003; Chapman, C., and and S. Russell (eds.) Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 2002; and Craven, M. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Perspective on its Development, 1995 
 Shue, H. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy, 198024
 Shue, H. “The Interdependence of  Duties,” In The Right to Food, Alston, P., and K. Tomasevski 25
(eds.) 1984
10
obligation to respect the right to health is essentially a negative obligation that 
requires the duty-bearer to refrain from acting in ways that deprive individuals of  
their health, for example, through ensuring that access to health services and/or 
information is not restricted arbitrarily both in general or for particular 
communities. The obligation to protect the right to health requires the duty-bearer 
to ensure that third parties do not deprive individuals of  their health, for example, 
through passing and enforcing laws and regulations governing environmental and 
public health. The obligation to fulfil the right to health is a positive obligation that 
requires duty-bearers to establish systems for the effective delivery of  health 
services, for example, through providing primary health care.  
Importantly, the vagueness and imprecision of  the specific obligations incumbent 
on the duty-bearer — to achieve progressively the full realisation of  economic and 
social rights to the maximum of  its available resources — are likely to affect these 
general obligations in rather different ways. Although it is almost certain that 
resources will be required to comply with each of  the general obligations 
individually, clearly many more resources will be required for the fulfilment of  the 
right to health than for its respect or protection.   26
To take the UK as an example, in 2014-2015, the Treasury resource budget for 
justice and law officers’ departments (combined) was £8,151 million. This 
represents 2.4% of  the total budget. Meanwhile, the Treasury resource budget for 
health in the same period was £110,555 million, around one third of  the overall 
resource budget.  Whilst protecting human rights (through security, effective law 27
 It is worth acknowledging that protecting the right to health may require more resources than 26
respecting it, though not as many as fulfilling it. 
 HM Treasury Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2015, Cm 9122, 2015 p. 20 (Table 1.3)27
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enforcement, effective regulatory mechanisms, and non-discrimination law, for 
example) evidently requires some resources, the stakes are not quite the same when 
compared to fulfilling the right to health. The obligation to fulfil the right is 
essentially the part of  the obligation that requires the duty-bearer to take 
appropriate measures to secure the effective enjoyment of  the right, which as the 
UK example shows, is particularly resource-heavy. By association, the intractability 
of  progressive realisation and maximum available resources is likely to prove far 
more problematic in deciding when and why a duty-bearer has failed to comply with 
the fulfil dimension of  its obligation. What this means in context is that on the one 
hand there is a right to health, which supporters of  social rights would believe 
includes access to all kinds of  health facilities, goods and services. But on the other 
hand, without specific allocation benchmarks, a duty-bearer can somewhat 
legitimately avoid providing these health facilities, goods and services by reason of  
resource unavailability. This leaves a substantial proportion of  the content of  the 
right as an unknown and, as a consequence, any effort to measure compliance 
would be extremely difficult, if  not impossible. 
So if  the right, and its content, is to have any kind of  meaning in practice there 
must still be some flexibility in the obligation to fulfil it, which respects differences 
in resource availability, but at the same time, discretion to which the duty-bearer is 
entitled must be limited. Any plea of  resource unavailability must remain open to 
some sort of  objective scrutiny. But this, as Tobin rightly notes, is “a deeply political 
project.”  It will at least require an examination of  the existing political structures 28
governing resource allocation and may require a reordering of  those structures if  
the allocation of  resources is found inappropriate, a result that will likely be at odds 
with powerful incumbents with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.      
 Tobin, J. Supra n. 6, p. 19628
12
Dealing with the resources problem to determine the right to health’s content, and 
assessing where along the line between a right to everything and a right to nothing 
the obligation lies, presents the biggest challenge to measuring compliance with its 
fulfilment. But this does not mean that the task is impossible or that it should be 
abandoned. On the contrary. The fact that undertaking such an assessment is 
difficult means that there is an imperative to do so. Given the resources problem is 
the central problem under investigation in the thesis and the problem is most 
problematic for measuring compliance with the fulfilment of  the right, focus on the 
obligation to fulfil the right to health holds the most promise for overcoming the 
central resources problem. It is for this reason that the focus of  this thesis will be 
directed towards producing a better understanding of  the obligation to fulfil the 
right to health, whilst bracketing the obligations to respect and protect the right to 
health, in a bid to better resolve the central resources problem.  
II. An overarching method for approaching the 
resources problem 
By now it is clear that approaching the resources problem is a complex job. Still, it 
has been argued that it is at least approachable. But in making that approach, what is 
required is a set of  multidisciplinary tools. Whilst a growing literature on measuring 
compliance has started to emerge, the application of  quantitative analysis to the 
question of  human rights fulfilment remains relatively underdeveloped. This is 
partly due to an established reluctance in the human rights field to use numbers, to 
quantify and to correlate when thinking about rights, but it is primarily due to the 
major conceptual and empirical challenges creating rights-based measures 
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presents.  This has left much human rights research relatively discourse rich and 29
data poor.  
But statistics, as both numerical data and as the mathematical methods that deal 
with the analysis and interpretation of  numerical data, can be a useful addition to 
the more traditional qualitative approaches to human rights research. Just as the 
economist J.K Galbraith’s famous maxim goes: “if  it isn’t counted, it tends not to be 
noticed.”  So, in terms of  an overarching method for measuring compliance with 30
the obligation to fulfil the right to health, what is desired is something like an 
information pyramid.  The pyramid combines qualitative and quantitative elements 31
and in this case consists of  three levels of  information.  
At its base, the first level of  information includes a qualitative description of  what is 
to be quantified. In order to provide any valid meaningful measure of  the right to 
health, it is obviously first necessary to unravel what in fact the measure should be 
measuring. As Landman insists, quoting Sartori, “the qualitative distinction made 
between and among categories in any attempt to classify social phenomena necessarily 
 Despite the momentum being gathered in the wake of  the “data revolution,” there remain huge 29
gaps in the collection and dissemination of  detailed, objective quantitative socioeconomic 
information and often disaggregated details of  who is benefiting and who is being left behind simply 
do not exist. UN Secretary-General’s Independent Expert Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for 
Sustainable Development. A World that Counts: Mobilising the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development.
 J.K Galbraith cited in UN OHCHR. Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and 30
Implementation, 2012 p. 1
 In the same sense as Isabell Kempf ’s version of  an information pyramid, the pyramid can serve as 31
“a way of  identifying the obstacles to the realisation of  rights and creates a better understanding of  
the measures … which should be taken to overcome them.” But the version of  an information 
pyramid here differs from Kempf ’s in a number of  fundamental ways. Kempf ’s version leaves no 
space for the conceptual reasoning required for identifying rights indicators in the first place, nor 
does it identify a process or method of  analysis for dealing with the maximum available resources 
issue. Kempf, I. “How to Measure the Right to Education: Indicators and their Potential Use by the 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.” (1998)
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precedes the process of  quantification.”  Here, this description will be generated through 32
theoretical reasoning of  the right to health as it is seen in moral philosophy, and 
through an interpretive analysis of  the right to heath as it appears in various human 
rights instruments.  
In the middle, the second level of  information includes the quantitative indicators 
that have been carefully selected based on the information provided by the level 
below, and the resultant quantitative measure of  compliance. Understanding the 
extent to which the right to health is being fulfilled entails not only an 
understanding of  the right-holder’s perspective but an understanding of  the duty-
bearer’s perspective also. A measure of  compliance with the obligation to fulfil the 
right to health must therefore reflect both the state of  human health and also the 
effort being made by the duty-bearer to improve it.  These measures will be 33
generated through quantitative analyses; specifically, through avoidable mortality 
analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis and econometric frontier analysis.  
Finally, at its peak, the third level of  information includes a qualitative description 
of  the compliance environment, i.e. the health, wider-social, geographic, cultural, 
economic, and political environment. Because health can be sensitive to 
environmental changes that may necessarily be outside of  the duty-bearer’s control, 
(e.g. epidemics, famine, war, etc.) a qualitative examination of  the government’s 
policy and budgetary responses to those changes could help either affirm or 
exonerate the measure of  non-compliance. Essentially, qualitative data helps to 
 Landman, T. “Social Science, Methods and Human Rights.” In The SAGE Handbook of  Human 32
Rights: Volume 1, Mihr, A., and M. Gibney (eds.) 2014, p. 195; Sartori, G. “Concept Misinformation in 
Comparative Politics.” (1970)
 Fukuda-Parr, S., S., T. Lawson-Remer, and S. Randolph. “An Index of  Economic and Social Rights 33
Fulfilment: Concept and Methodology.” (2009); Cingranelli, D.L., and D.L. Richards. Supra n. 4
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explain the quantitative data and can be used to test whether it makes sense in 
context. This will be generated through an in-context case study. 
The method for approaching the resources problem undoubtedly matters. Choosing 
the right method maximises the value of  the conclusions and inferences drawn. The 
choosing will be driven firstly by an understanding of  the theoretical foundations 
underpinning the research question, and secondly by the realities of  what can 
practically be achieved. Quantitative analysis can help deal with the complexities and 
intractabilities accounting for the resources problem involves. But the qualitative 
elements of  human rights are too important to ignore.  If, as Landman argues, 34
methods “adhere to the goal of  making inferences from available evidence,”  then 35
the preferred information pyramid approach to measuring compliance, which 
complements the quantitative with the qualitative, means that the conclusions drawn 
will be based on the best evidence available.   
III. The thesis in a nutshell 
From the way that the right to health appears in international law to the ways in 
which assertions of  compliance and non-compliance are made in practice, what 
emerges is a picture of  the right to health that is far more demanding than it may 
initially seem. But its demandingness does not mean that it collapses to zero. Now, 
the overriding challenge is to continue unravelling the conceptual complexities that 
 As, in the words of  former Council of  Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas 34
Hammarberg, “[h]uman rights can never be fully measured in statistics; the qualitative aspects are too 
essential.” Hammarberg, T. “Searching the Truth: The Need to Monitor Human Rights with 
Relevant and Reliable Means.” Conference on Statistics, Development and Human Rights, Montreux, 
04-08 September 2000
 Landman, T. Supra n. 32, p. 19535
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are at the root of  the right to health and be brave enough to stick a stake in the 
ground for thinking about how one might go about measuring compliance with the 
obligation to fulfil it. This thesis aims to be a contribution in meeting that challenge.  
In sticking that stake in the ground, this thesis founds itself  upon the hypothesis 
that compliance with the obligation to fulfil the right to health is a function of  the 
duty-bearer’s ability and willingness to provide for health. The hypothesis is 
operationalised on the basis that the various dimensions of  ability can be measured. 
Then, given each duty-bearer’s ability, the level of  health delivery that is expected 
can be predicted. Since the ability element of  the hypothesis is taken care of, any 
shortfall between the level of  health predicted and the actual level of  health 
observed may reveal something about unwillingness, which by association is a good 
starting point for thinking about and measuring non-compliance. In the process of  
determining compliance, what is left to find out therefore is: what kind of  health 
does the right to health guarantee; what level of  this kind of  health do duty-bearers 
owe to individuals; and how well are duty-bearers doing with respect to what they 
owe? It is around these three questions that the thesis is structured.  
A. Unravelling foundations 
An unravelling of  the conceptual foundations of  the right to health is called for 
both for practical and substantive reasons. Despite the human right to health being 
on the international law scene for some time, scepticism over its theoretical 
existence, as well as the possibility of  determining its precise content and of  the 
duties it entails, persists in some philosophical corners. For example, it has been 
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described by Griffin as a “vacuous concept”  that is almost “criterionless,”  and by 36 37
Onora O’Neill as “muddled or vague, or both.”   38
Leading from the reality that the resources problem is yet unresolved, any project 
that presupposes the existence of  the right to health needs to demonstrate that it is 
possible for the right to be acceptably determinate. Indeed, if  this cannot be 
demonstrated measuring compliance with it would be impossible to begin with, and 
therefore the exercise worthless. If  a persuasive argument can be made for the right 
to health’s existence, unravelling its foundations also sheds light on both what shape 
the right to health might take, as well as who bears the associated duties, since the 
definition of  its content inescapably rests on the nature of  the right, which can be 
best explained by its connection to fundamental values. 
The conclusion in Chapter 2 is that the right to health can be justified as a bona fide 
human right. This justification is made based within a general interest theory of  
human rights in that human rights protect against significant threats to universal 
fundamental interests and it is the special nature of  health in protecting against 
threats to these fundamental interests that provides sufficient basis for generating 
obligations on others to fulfil it. Importantly, these fundamental interests need not 
be grounded by one comprehensive theory. They are plural and essentially converge 
upon the things that are required for having and leading a minimally decent life. The 
idea of  minimalism is key to the way in which the right to health takes its shape and 
to allocating the associated obligations. Minimalism imposes limits to the right to 
health. And, it is argued that in order that the duties be minimal it must be possible 
 Griffin, J. On Human Rights. 2008, p. 20836
 Ibid, p. 1437
 O’Neill, O. “The Dark Side of  Human Rights.” (2005) p. 42838
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to identify who the duty-bearers are, and these bearers must not be overburdened 
by the duties: they must be conditional on the duty-bearer’s ability to comply with 
them.     
B. Dealing with conditionality 
The idea of  conditionality deals with the prospect of  ever-inflating duties in the 
alternate case that the right to health goes unchecked. In theory, it links the 
performance expected of  a duty-bearer to its level of  ability, given the particular 
socio-economic circumstances it finds itself  having to deal with. However, the 
theoretical notion of  conditionality on its own does little for the task of  measuring 
compliance in practice; it is the resources problem, just in a slightly different guise. 
In order for the notion to be practically applied, a principled criteria for determining 
what sort of  health the right guarantees and to what level, what share of  resources 
is adequate for satisfying that level, as well as how resources are to be allocated 
amongst different needs when resources are not sufficient to meet them all, remains 
to be specified. This is the task taken up in Chapter 3. 
The chapter discusses existing approaches to dealing with conditionality in practice, 
drawing on the experiences of  the South African and Costa Rican courts. It is 
argued that neither the South African strictly-reasonableness approach nor the 
Costa Rican strictly-substantive approach is satisfactory with respect to the idea of  
the right to health presented in Chapter 2. Rather, it promotes a ‘third way,’ a form 
of  the minimum core concept, as the most meaningful and practical way of  dealing 
with conditionality and the resources problem. A set of  criteria for determining 
how the minimum is to be constructed is presented, which results in what is 
referred to as the ‘minimum health basket.’ It is argued that absolute provision of  
the basket is not what is required for the fulfilment of  the right to health. Instead, 
the right imposes an unconditional duty to provide as much of  the basket of  goods, 
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services and facilities that the duty-bearer is able to. An argument as to what 
constitutes ability is also presented.               
C. Assessing compliance 
After offering a way of  unravelling the nature and shape of  the right to health, the 
first step in assessing compliance with its fulfilment is to define what the basket of  
health goods, services and facilities, to which individuals have a right, precisely 
consists of. Chapter 4 is concerned with defining this health basket through 
operationalising the criteria set out in Chapter 3. The analysis uses techniques 
borrowed from public health to provide a framework for prioritising those health 
issues that are most important with respect to the burden they pose and for 
identifying where the greatest potential for improvement in population health lies. 
The model then uses cost-effectiveness analysis to determine whether interventions 
that have been deemed effective can feasibly be scaled-up to population-level 
coverage in the typical low-income country. Those interventions that are deemed 
scale-upable, constitute the health goods, services and facilities duty-bearers have a 
conditional obligation to provide. 
Remembering that the right to the health basket is conditional on the ability of  the 
duty-bearer to provide it, what remains in assessing compliance is an assessment of  
the degree to which the health basket is ‘affordable;’ Chapter 5 outlines and 
operationalises a methodology for doing just that. The central focus of  the chapter 
is an econometric frontier analysis, which empirically predicts the level of  health 
basket attainment that is to be expected at different levels of  ability and assesses the 
degree to which duty-bearers are meeting, or falling short of, this expected level. 
Returning to the hypothesis that the falling-short (or non-compliance) may amount 
to unwillingness, the chapter investigates the relationship between the estimates of  
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non-compliance and several indicators of  willingness. The results show that the 
general relationship between willingness and compliance is as expected, (the more 
willing the state is, the lower its non-compliance) however, the coefficients suggest 
that the relationship is weaker than might have been anticipated. So, to test the 
hypothesis with greater precision, Chapter 6 presents a qualitative investigation with 
respect to the indicators of  willingness and the indicator of  non-compliance in a 
case study of  Brazil. 
The Chapter assesses the degree to which the right to health is being fulfilled in 
Brazil and, specifically, investigates whether the quantitative measure of  non-
compliance generated by this thesis’ methodology makes qualitative sense. It also 
analyses the implications of  the measure with respect to how right to health claims 
have been dealt with in Brazil, and what light, if  any, the measure can shed on the 
way in which the right has hitherto been interpreted by the Brazilian judiciary. The 
results suggest that the quantitative signal of  non-compliance is reasonably accurate 
in the Brazilian case, if  not underestimated. The hypothesis of  unwillingness seems 
to hold and the methodology can be used efficiently for signalling compliance. 
D. Setting expectations 
The challenge set out in this thesis is an ambitious one. Still, in responding to this 
challenge, the thesis does not claim to have found absolute answers. It makes a 
persuasive case that compliance with the right to health is a function of  the duty-
bearer’s ability and willingness to provide for health and lays a theoretical 
foundation and empirical methodology for testing that hypothesis. However, in so 
doing, it also acknowledges its own limitations. These are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 7.  
21
Specifically, no attempt is made to deal with particular issues that affect health: the 
role of  third parities in access to medicines, public versus private delivery of  health 
care, or the ways in which history may have shaped the current health and/or 
available resources situation, for example. Whilst there is a potential normative 
argument that these factors could alter the degree of  health attainment and/or right 
to health compliance in important ways, any accommodation made for these effects, 
plus or minus the status quo, would be pure simulation. This is not what this thesis 
has set out to achieve. Instead, it provides a base upon which alternative scenarios 
could be developed. Moreover, no attempt is made to situate the analysis of  
compliance with right to health fulfilment within an analysis of  wider economic, 
social and cultural rights fulfilment. Whilst any assessment of  compliance with the 
obligation to fulfil the right to health must be interpreted with respect to the many 
other competing demands with which duty-bearers are faced, obviously, scaling up 
the analysis to encompass all of  these demands would be far too sizeable a task to 
undertake within one project.         
As such, the thesis in no way advocates that the results it has produced pinpoint, 
specifically, where the right to health has been violated. What is offered is a 
methodology for providing a signal as to where some duty-bearers could potentially 
be doing better. The results should be interpreted more as red flags than an outright 
identification of  violations of  human rights. Human rights are by nature complex 
and any analysis of  them deserves, even calls for, a methodology that is sensitive to 
those complexities. Hopefully the information pyramid-type approach presented 





Over recent decades the discourse of  human rights has, according to John 
Tasioulas, been elevated to “the status of  an ethical lingua franca”  and claims of  1
human rights are indeed increasingly, and more widely, being made in the conduct 
of  global affairs through the proliferation of  the international human rights 
regime,  in issues concerning international relations,  and through the practices of  2 3
development more generally.  Whilst the booming industry of  human rights may 4
intuitively be perceived as a ‘good’ thing, Tasioulas offers a cautionary word of  
warning. “If  human rights are not to fall victim to their own popularity, some 
principled way of  distinguishing the genuine articles from the presumed spate of  
counterfeits is required.”  These sentiments are laid out with an air of  implicit 5
 Tasioulas, J. “The Moral Reality of  Human Rights,” In Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who 1
Owes What to the Very Poor? Pogge, T. (ed.) 2007, p. 75
 See Landman, T. Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study. 2005, p. 62 which plots ratification of  2
the main human rights instruments to show the growth of  the human rights system periodised by 
the proliferation of  human rights norms. 
 For example, human rights have been invoked to justify international humanitarian intervention in 3
Haiti (1994), Rwanda (1994), Kosovo (1999), East Timor (1999) and Libya (2011), all of  which were 
initially or ultimately approved by the U.N. Security Council. 
 This is particularly the case with respect to the more recent approach to development adopted by 4
the U.N. “In an increasingly interconnected world... [t]here will be no development without security 
and no security without development. And both development and security also depend on respect 
for human rights.” UN General Assembly. “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All.” (2005) p. 55
 Tasioulas, J. Supra n. 1, p. 755
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scepticism that is not uncommon to the human rights enterprise. The scepticism 
surrounding human rights wholesale often stems from the notion that the central 
idea of  human rights, as being something that people can have unconditionally, 
simply by virtue of  their humanity, is “intellectually frail — lacking in foundation 
and perhaps even in coherence and cogency.”  More specifically, the scepticism that 6
surrounds the right to health, tends to be expressed through the discriminatory 
exclusion of  a particular classification of  rights — usually, the so-called economic 
and social rights — albeit within an accepted general idea of  human rights, where 
rights exist only contingently on the basis of  meeting specific qualification criteria. 
Whether scepticism and/or dismissal of  human rights is expressed in terms of  
human rights comprehensively, or particular rights specifically, the same perennial 
question remains: where do these rights come from? But with respect to measuring 
compliance with the obligation to fulfil the right to health, to what extent is it 
necessary to engage with the conceptual complexities brought about by the 
requirement to derive and maintain such a “principled way” of  distinguishing 
genuine human rights from other things, particularly given that the right to health 
already exists in international law and is increasingly being called upon to address 
the health needs of  groups and individuals around the world? 
Firstly and practically, in order to derive a measure of  compliance with the 
obligation to fulfil the right to health the scope of  the right and limits to obligations 
need to be defined. This definition inescapably rests on the nature of  the right, 
which can be best explained by its connection to fundamental values; indeed it is 
precisely differences in these values which underlie justifications for rather different 
rights claims. Secondly and substantively, limiting the justification for the right to 
 Sen, A.K. “Human Rights and Capabilities.” (2005) p. 1516
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health to the simple assumption that the right is justified on the basis that it is an 
empirical fact does not provide a sufficiently persuasive theoretical grounding for 
the right.  Although legal human rights are generally acknowledged to give effect to 7
pre-existing moral principles, they are not in and of  themselves “morally self-
validating.”  An argument which supposes the existence of  the right to health thus 8
needs to demonstrate, through moral reasoning, that it is meaningful independent 
of  any legal specification incumbent upon it so as to evaluate the legal right that 
exists and flesh out its content. Indeed, if  this cannot be demonstrated measuring 
compliance with it would be impossible. 
To that end, the aim of  this chapter is to determine whether a persuasive account 
of  the conceptual foundations and content of  the right to health can be offered 
within a general theory of  human rights. Section I explores the basis of  that general 
theory and argues that human rights are justified on the basis that they protect 
against significant threats to universal fundamental interests and in so doing allow, 
or in fact provide, for having and leading a life that is minimally decent. It is also 
argued here that in determining which rights we have certain minimalism-type tests 
have to be passed. Firstly, does the object of  the right protect against threats to 
fundamental interests to a significant enough extent? Secondly, can the object of  the 
right be served by an obligation to fulfil it? And finally, are the burdens necessary 
for the realisation of  the right justifiable? Sections II, III and IV go on to address 
these questions with respect to health, respectively. Specifically, it is argued that 
health is so important to the protection of  fundamental interests that it justifies the 
 This is the position advocated by all non-positivist approaches to human rights theory but is found 7
particularly in, for example, Tasioulas, J. “Towards a Philosophy of  Human Rights” (2012); Griffin, J. 
On Human Rights. 2008; Buchanan, A. Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law. 2007; Nickel, J.W. Making Sense of  Human Rights. 2007; and Nagel, T. Concealment and 
Exposure: And Other Essays. 2002
 Tasioulas, J. Supra n. 1, p. 758
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imposition of  obligations on others to fulfil it. Health can be served by an 
obligation to fulfil it and the duty-bearers can be identified. And, by formulating the 
right to health as a minimal rather than maximal standard that is constituted by the 
duty-bearers’ ability to fulfil it, obligations need not be excessively burdensome.  
I. The idea of  human rights 
The idea of  rights, human rights and their conceptual foundations have preoccupied 
philosophical argument for centuries. Whilst the doctrine of  natural law or natural 
rights is one such foundation, indeed one credited with influencing the ideas 
underpinning the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),  since 9
Bentham’s famous criticism that “natural rights is simple nonsense ... natural and 
imprescriptible [inalienable] rights ... nonsense on stilts,”  reaching out to such 10
metaphysical foundations as a theoretical justification for human rights has widely 
been considered less than adequate. Instead, foundational theorists have tended to 
turn to theories which ground human rights in certain ‘fundamental interests.’ This 
is to say that the principal function of  human rights is to respect and safeguard 
fundamental interests, which are considered to be sufficiently important and 
significant for what it means to be a human living today, and indeed sufficiently 
important to justify the imposition of  obligations on others for their respect, 
 The Preambles to the three foundational texts of  the ‘International Bill of  Human Rights’ — the 9
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — all specify 
human rights by reference to “the inherent dignity and ... inalienable rights of  all members 
of  the human family.”
 Bentham, J. “Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of  the Declaration of  Rights Issued 10
during the French Revolution.” In Works of  Jeremy Bentham, Volume 2, Bowring, J. (ed.) 1792
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protection, and fulfilment.  Human rights, in this view, owe their very existence to 11
the way in which they serve these interests.   
According to Tasioulas, fundamental interests are objective: they are interests of  all 
human beings living today independent of  the standards that happen to be 
incumbent upon them, whether or not each individual human being believes them 
to be interests of  theirs, and whether or not each individual human being 
consciously desires their fulfilment.  But the identification of  a universal human 12
interest does not automatically identify a human right. Human rights are not 
universal human interests. The difference between interests and human rights can 
be distinguished by the domains in which these concepts operate; interests occupy 
the domain of  things which make life better, and human rights the domain of  
morality. It is possible that interests may be thwarted in all kinds of  ways without 
there necessarily being any instance of  moral wrongdoing. Several illuminating 
examples already exist in the literature. Nickel’s example of  the universal interest in 
being comfortable during hot weather is a recurring favourite.  13
The interest-based account maintains that it is the extent to which an individual’s 
interests have an obligation-generative capacity that elevates human interests to 
human rights. That is, a human right exists when, in the case of  all people, their 
individual interests — without the additional, cumulative support of  other peoples 
interests — suffice to generate obligations on others to serve their interests by 
 Joseph Raz gives a comprehensive description of  this idea. Raz holds that rights are held to be 11
grounded in interests. “The interests are part of  the justification of  the rights which are part of  the 
justification of  the duties,” Raz, J. The Morality of  Freedom. 1986, Chapter 7, p. 181
 Tasioulas, J. “Discussion of  John Tasioulas’ ‘Or ‘Emet Lecture: Is Dignity the Foundation of  12
Human Rights?” 2011
 Nickel, J.W. Supra n. 7, p. 36. Other examples include the interest in being romantically in love, 13
Tasioulas, J. Supra n. 7, p. 16 and the interest in not being called up regularly at odd hours by despised 
neighbours, Sen, A.K. The Idea of  Justice. 2009, p. 367.
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securing the object of  their right; an idea based on an extension of  the description 
of  rights given by Joseph Raz, amongst others, to provide a description of  human 
rights.  14
So what are the fundamental interests that ground human rights? The divergence 
between theories, which attempt to identify the interest which best gives justification 
for recognising human rights as such is vast and remains hotly contested. For 
example, in James Griffin’s theory of  human rights a right to X can be considered 
worthy of  human right status only if  it fits within his account of  personhood, that 
is the fundamental interest an individual has in autonomy and liberty, and can be 
determined as a constitutive element of  normative agency.  Joseph Raz argues that 15
rights can be held by those for whom wellbeing is of  intrinsic value and that rights 
are based on the interests of  such people, which may be of  both intrinsic and/or 
instrumental value and are sufficiently important to warrant international concern, 
insofar as universal human interests in the case of  each human being generate a 
duty to serve those interests in some way.  Charles Beitz distinguishes human rights 16
as those which institutionally protect “urgent individual interests” against 
predictable “standard threats” within the specific societal context that are a matter 
 “X has a right if  and only if  X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of  X’s 14
wellbeing (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.” 
Raz, J. Supra n. 11, p. 166
 Griffin, J. Supra n. 7, p. 35 (“I single out functioning human agents via notions such as their 15
autonomy and liberty, and I choose those features precisely because they are especially important 
human interests. It is only because they are especially important interests that rights can be derived 
from them.”)
 Raz, J. Supra n. 11. It is important to note here the distinction in qualification Raz makes between 16
what is required to have rights (be a right holder), the fact that right holders have individual interests, 
and what is required for the basis of  a right, which can often be mistakenly confused. Since, for Raz, 
what counts in order to hold rights is the intrinsic value of  wellbeing and not the value of  an 
individual’s interests, it may seem to follow that “...only interests which are considered of  ultimate 
value can be the basis of  rights.” p. 178. However, Raz acknowledges that there are many empirical 
examples where some instinctive rights protect interests, which are of  merely instrumental value. He 
thus concludes, “(apart from artificial persons) those whose wellbeing is intrinsically valuable can 
have rights; but that rights can be based on the instrumental value of  the interest of  such people,” p. 
180.
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of  both national and international responsibility.  And for Amartya Sen, the 17
interests which form the subject matter of  human rights are those freedoms, both 
in terms of  substantive opportunities and freedom of  processes, which enable 
individuals to achieve the combinations of  functionings (beings and doings) to lead 
the kind of  life which he or she has reason to value, the status of  which “must be 
dependent ultimately on their survivability in unobstructed public discussion.”   18
Whilst it is not within the scope of  this chapter to engage in a critical evaluation of  
the successfulness of  each of  these theories, what can be traced from the space they 
occupy is that the interests that are allowed to ground human rights are plural and 
essentially converge upon respect for two overarching fundamental values: wellbeing 
and freedom.  These two values are the things that are required for having and 19
leading a minimally decent life.  
 Beitz, C.R.  The Idea of  Human Rights. 2009 (Beitz suggests an urgent interest is “one that 17
would be recognizable as important in a wide range of  typical lives that occur in 
contemporary societies” and is not necessarily one that is possessed or desired by everyone 
in the society. p. 110. Beitz also constructs a normative division between the responsibilities of  
the State and the international community as the bearers of  primary responsibilities to respect and 
safeguard these urgent interests, and as the guarantors of  these responsibilities, respectively, p. 
137
 Sen, A.K. “Elements of  a Theory of  Human Rights.” (2004)  p. 349; Sen, A.K. Development as 18
Freedom. 1999, p. 87 It is crucial to note here that Sen does not see interests and freedoms as 
coterminous and sees a real distinction between the two. It is argued here, however, that interests can 
and do extend to freedom, indeed freedom can be conceived as an especially important human 
interest insofar as freedom is the interest upon which a vindication of  human rights is made, 
exemplified by Griffin’s interest-based theory of  freedom, characterised by normative agency, as the 
basis of  human rights. The connection between interests and freedom is elaborated in the following 
section.
 My own view is in agreement with Tasioulas’ arguments, in “Towards a Philosophy of  Human 19
Rights,” that human rights are moral standards that perform a plurality of  political functions, but 
that none of  those functions is definitive of  their nature as human rights as is the case with what 
Tasioulas calls the ‘functionalist’ view of  human rights, which sees the essence of  human rights as 
them playing a certain political role, for example, operating as benchmarks for the legitimacy of  
states or triggers for intervention against states that violate them. The aim in the present chapter is, 
however, to indicate that there is some convergence between and across theories in identifying the 
interests that ground human rights rather than defend one theory against others. 
29
Having a minimally decent life is to have freedom from violence and harm.  The 20
claim to have a minimally decent life is constituted both by negative duties not to 
murder, not to use violence, and not to maliciously harm, and positive duties of  
assistance to protect individuals against threats of  murder, violence and harm. But 
being free from these threats is not all that having a minimally decent life is. Rather, 
to have a life that is minimally decent is to be capable of  functioning as a human 
being, which requires the satisfaction of  certain physical needs. Health, for instance.  
Again, the claim to have such capabilities correlate to both negative and positive 
duties: not to actively prevent individuals from realising these capabilities, and to 
assist if  and when individuals find themselves in a position of  incapability. Then 
there is leading a life. Leading a life is to have freedom from being controlled by 
another individual or group of  individuals without consent. The claim to lead a life 
is constituted by negative duties not to interfere with an individual’s choice to lead 
the type of  life they desire, and positive duties to provide assistance, in the words of  
Nickel, “for the creation and maintenance of  social conditions in which the capacity 
for agency can be developed and exercised.”  As the justificatory basis for human 21
rights, the values of  wellbeing and freedom and the principles they produce (having 
a life of  value to the extent that the material conditions of  survival are met, and 
leading a life that has been shaped through each individual’s own plans, efforts and 
decisions) set a modest standard. Specifically, a standard that provides for a life that 
is minimally decent.  
 Freedom here is used in the sense of  freedom of  action, that each individual has control over his 20
or her own choices. It is interchangeable with the ideas of  autonomy and agency. 
 Nickel, J.W. Supra n. 7, p. 6421
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This modesty fits neatly alongside the idea of  human rights advocated by James 
Nickel.  Nickel offers a persuasive account of  why human rights are minimal 22
standards and, as a point of  departure, will be adopted for this project of  measuring 
compliance. Firstly, human rights should be minimal standards because they should 
serve to address the severest of  problems, the solutions to which should take the 
highest priority. If  human rights become more than minimal standards, standards 
for say promoting the highest possible standards of  living, almost any unmet human 
need would become a violation of  human rights. This, echoing Tasioulas’ earlier 
warning, could undermine and devalue the whole human rights enterprise. Secondly, 
human rights should be minimal standards because they should be feasible across 
space.  In the case that human rights are more than minimal standards, feasibility 23
becomes much less likely. Feasibility in this sense takes various forms. Human rights 
as more-than-minimal standards may be politically infeasible; they should leave 
reasonable space for national, democratic decision-making and allow for cultural 
reflexivity with respect to the way in which political, legal, economic and social 
institutions are shaped. They may also be economically infeasible; human rights as 
maximal standards would for many individuals likely remain distant dreams, which 
normatively speaking could, in the words of  Maurice Cranston, “push all talk of  
human rights out of  the clear realm of  the morally compelling into the twilight 
world of  utopian aspirations.”  But asserting that human rights are minimal 24
 “Human rights set minimum standards; they do not attempt to describe an ideal social and political 22
world.” Ibid, p. 10
 Although there are various notions of  ‘feasibility’ used in the literature to test if  and when an 23
interest counts as a human right, here, a Nikel-type notion of  feasibility is used as a point of  
departure. Feasibility as a reasonable burdens test and as an implementability test is discussed further in 
Section IV.  
 Cranston, M. “Human Rights, Real and Supposed.” In Political Theory and the Rights of  Man, 24
Raphael, D.D. (ed.) 1967 Quoted in Nickel, J. Ibid, p. 96
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standards leaves open the question: what is meant by minimal? As Beitz pointedly 
remarks, minimalism too can take various forms; the idea is “hardly univocal.”     25
The idea of  minimalism can apply to very different aspects of  human rights. For 
instance, human rights can be minimal with respect to way in which they are 
justified; in the Cohen sense of  “avoiding imposing unnecessary hurdles on 
accepting an account of  human rights by intolerably tying its formulation to a 
particular ethical tradition.”  They can be minimal in terms of  the urgency and 26
number of  threats they protect against. And they may also be minimal insomuch as 
the bearers of  the duties are few and the burdens given rise to are limited.  27
Whether minimalism is applied to one or a combination of  these aspects will 
potentially produce differences in both what human rights are and which human 
rights we have. The idea of  minimalism presented so far is essentially minimalism 
applied to all aspects of  human rights: their justificatory basis does not have to be 
tied to one ethical tradition; the values that ground them are plural, they are minimal 
in terms of  the urgency and number of  threats they protect against and minimal 
with respect to the burdens that they generate. This distinction is crucial for 
determining whether certain rights exist and provides a basis for justifying which 
ones do. In order to justify that a particular human right exists, the right to health in 
this case, a number of  minimalism-type tests must therefore be passed. 
The first test is to demonstrate how the fundamental interests, wellbeing and 
freedom to have and lead a minimally decent life, are significantly threatened when 
the area the right would provide for, i.e. health, is not fulfilled. This test not only 
 Beitz, C.R. Supra n. 17, p. 14225
 Cohen, J. “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For? (2004) p. 21326
 Ibid27
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reveals whether health itself  is an interest viable for fulfilment by human rights but 
also helps guide what kind of  health the right would guarantee. Since human rights 
are minimal standards, the standard to which ‘significant threat’ is set has to be high. 
For example, take basic sanitation and bariatric surgery to treat obesity as potential 
elements of  the entitlement to which the right to health guarantees. Assuming 
health can be justified as something that poses a significant threat to wellbeing and 
freedom, it is obvious that failure to provide each of  the two health goods threatens 
these fundamental interests to a much varying degree. Whilst it may be reasonably 
argued that the lack of  provision of  basic sanitation poses a serious and significant 
threat to an individual’s ability to live and lead a minimally decent life (access to 
basic sanitation immediately improves the chances of  survival and of  achieving 
physical and mental competence), a failure to fund bariatric surgery does not. 
Although the latter may pose a threat to fundamental interests, it seems to go 
beyond the conditions of  minimalism; it may make life more uncomfortable but it 
doesn’t necessarily pose an immediate threat to life itself  or the ability to lead a 
minimally decent life. Its significance does not fit within the idea of  human rights 
considered presently.       
Passing the first test sets the prospective human right on the right path to 
justification. But justification of  a human right requires not only justification of  the 
entitlement, in accordance with the idea of  minimalism set out above, it also 
requires justification of  the burdens the right will impose. This involves the passing 
of  two further tests: that duty-bearers can be identified and be appropriately 
burdened with the responsibility of  protecting individuals against the significant 
33
threat posed, and that the burdens imposed are not overly burdensome.  With 28
respect to the final two tests, this then begs the question as to whether duties can 
justifiably be imposed on others. Is it possible for each and every right holder to 
serve their fundamental interests through a health duty, and if  it is possible, will the 
duties not pose an unreasonably excessive burden on the duty-bearer, particularly 
given the multiple competing demands bearers are likely to already have placed 
upon them? If  a proposed human right is to make it through to a fully fledged, 
justified human right, a case has to be mounted to clearly demonstrate how the 
interest fulfilled by the proposed right is amenable to passing these minimalist 
“claim-against”  tests.       29
In Nickel’s words, the emergence of  a human right can then be thought of  as “the 
coming together of  the recognition of  a problem, the belief  that the problem is 
very severe, and optimism about the possibility of  addressing it through social and 
political action at national and international levels.”  Justification of  a specific 30
human right, therefore, requires satisfaction of  the foregoing three tests: i) the right 
protects against significant threats to fundamental interests; ii) duty-bearers can be 
identified and the object of  the right can be served by an obligation to fulfil it; and 
iii) the obligations imposed are not overly burdensome. The remainder of  this 
chapter will be occupied with running these three tests with respect to the right to 
health.    
 The set up of  these three tests is a variation on Nickel’s “entitlements plus” and Feinberg’s 28
“claims-to” and “claims-against” theme, which holds that a right cannot be constituted by an 
entitlement alone. Norms that guide the behaviour of  the duty bearer must be added to the 
entitlement to constitute a fully-fledged human right. Nickel, J.W. Supra n. 7, pp. 30-32; Feinberg, J. 
Social Philosophy. 1973, p. 64
 Feinberg, J. Ibid, p. 6429
 Nickel, J. Supra n. 7, p. 3630
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II. Health and threats to fundamental interests 
Though the conceptual foundations of  human rights generally have been the 
subject of  much philosophical debate historically, it is only until relatively recently 
that theoretical accounts of  the right to health have been the explicit subject of  
rigorous discussion.  This newfound focus, however, hasn’t always been kind. To 31
say that the right to health is one of  the slipperiest of  all the human rights (as 
embodied in the main legal instruments) would not be absurd, and differences in 
perspectives on its recognition and justification most certainly remain. With this in 
mind, it is ever more important to mount a strong case for health as a human right.  
One approach to justifying the right to health could offer an account along the 
indivisibility thesis lines,  which starts from having another already justified and 32
accepted right, (that is, without it fundamental interests are significantly threatened) 
and justifies a right to health on the basis that it is either instrumentally or 
constitutively necessary for the enjoyment of  that preceding right. For example, the 
right to participate in society is of  little value and importance for an individual who 
is suffering from severe ill health and is not able to play a full and active part in 
society either economically or politically. This is the kind of  argument provided by 
Henry Shue in his justification of  the right to subsistence.  Indeed Shue goes so far 33
 For example, Tobin, J. The Right to Health in International Law. 2012, Chapter 2; Venkatapuram, S. 31
Health Justice: An Argument from the Capabilities Approach. 2011; Ruger, J. Health and Social Justice. 2010, 
Chapter 5; Sen, A.K. “Why and How is Health a Human Right?” (2008); Griffin, J. Supra n. 7; 
Daniels, N. Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly. 2007; Ruger, J. “Toward a Theory of  a Right to 
Health: Capability and Incompletely Theorized Agreements.” (2006); Sen, A.K. Supra n. 7; Sen, A.K. 
“Why Health Equity?” (2002a); Sen, A.K. “Health: Perception Versus Observation” (2002b); Sen, 
A.K. Supra n. 7; Daniels, N. Just Health Care. 1985; Buchanan, A.E. “The Right to a Decent Minimum 
of  Health Care.” (1984); and Beauchamp, T.L. and R. Faden “The Right to Health and the Right to 
Health Care.” (1979)
 Indivisibility is used here in the sense that the absence of  one certain right makes another right 32
essence-less.
 Shue, H. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy. 1980, pp. 11-8833
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as to say that a right to subsistence is required if  an individual is to have any rights 
at all.  But showing that the right to health exists as a precondition of  another right 34
may be too simplistic a justification. For instance, to take the example above, 
although ill health may reduce the value of  a right to participate in society, it can 
hardly be said that such a right could never be upheld without a general right to 
health. The supportive relationship seems too weak to form the basis for 
justification of  particular human rights. The job here, however, is not to defend or 
discredit Shue’s indivisibility thesis; instead it is to find the justification that is most 
persuasive. Fortunately, the right to health need not be justified solely as a derivative 
of  another right. It may also be justified independently.  
It would not be extraordinary to reason that a lack of  health poses a significant 
threat to wellbeing and freedom, or to have and lead a minimally decent life. Indeed, 
health is one of  the most life-enhancing elements of  human wellbeing and has been 
of  value to humans for as long as there have been humans. The type of  value health 
derives can be said to be both intrinsic and instrumental. The intrinsic value of  
health is “that of  the sense of  physical wellbeing enjoyed by the healthy.”  In this 35
sense, the value of  health is non-derivative; Jack’s being healthy is non-derivatively 
good for Jack, Jill’s being healthy is non-derivatively good for Jill, and so on. The 
instrumental value of  health, on the other hand, is derived from the value of  its 
consequences.  Specifically, health is essential for having and leading a life that is 36
minimally decent and that certainly most, if  not all, forms of  ill-health — that of  
pain, suffering and disability — make fulfilling such a life much more difficult to 
achieve.  
 Ibid, p. 1934
 Raz, J. “Human Rights in the Emerging World Order.” (2010) p. 4535
 Raz, J. Supra n. 11, p. 17736
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Without minimal health, wellbeing as well as life itself  may be threatened. There is a 
risk of  death. Without minimal health, physical and mental functioning will be 
impaired, which in turn poses a significant threat to developing and exercising 
agency and freedom. The link between health and fundamental interests is direct 
and obvious. With respect to passing the first of  the three justificatory tests then, 
the lack of  health surely poses enough of  a significant threat to fundamental 
interests that it justifies the imposition of  obligations on others to fulfil it.  
III. Health as an object of  obligation                                                         
So the threat posed by a lack of  health corresponds to the central idea of  the 
human right to health insofar as it threatens fundamental interests to a significant 
extent. Health passes the first minimalism test. But human rights are not only 
distinguished by the threats they pose to the values that ground them. They also 
need to be minimal in the sense that it is ‘possible’ to serve those underlying values 
through an obligation, the content of  which is generated by the proposed right. Is it 
possible for each and every individual to serve his or her fundamental interests 
through a health obligation? The answer to this question may initially appear to be 
no, given the nature of  ‘health’ as necessarily being something that is subject to 
random luck, determined and influenced by internal biological endowments as well 
as individual lifestyle preferences, choices and behaviours, rather than something 
that is capable of  being under anyone’s control. 
The notion that health cannot be the object of  a right claim, and therefore of  an 
obligation, is the reason why so often the right to health is understood either in 
37
terms of  a negative right, i.e. the obligations generated from the right are 
obligations of  noninterference, to not impede the right holder from enjoying their 
right, and to prevent threats to an individual’s health,  or as simply shorthand for a 37
right to health care.   38
But in providing a rationale for engaging in conceptual inquiry it has been argued 
that the nature of  human rights is best explained by their connection to 
fundamental values and it is differences in these values, which give rise to quite 
different rights claims. The fundamental values that underlie the theory presented so 
far rely, essentially, on the special nature of  health for their defence; specifically, that 
a lack of  health threatens fundamental interests to a significant extent. Because the 
importance of  health in having and leading a life that is minimally decent is the 
essence of  the reasoning for the generation of  obligations to fulfil it, the right to 
health cannot be merely a negative right since claims to such a right would need to 
be defended by more general considerations of, say, equity, and not the special 
nature of  health itself. Rather, a theory which asserts that health is of  special moral 
importance justifies a right to health that not only requires equality in the ways in 
which individuals are able to fulfil the right but also that some level of  health be 
fulfilled.  
Likewise, health needs are broader than health care needs. There are many aspects 
of  health, which are structurally, and procedurally controlled, so explaining health as 
largely determined by access to healthcare, individual behaviours or random luck is a 
fundamental moral error. Rather, social conditions are extremely far reaching; they 
 See, e.g., Kuenzi, D.E. “Health Care, A Right?” (1973) p. 11137
 See, e.g., Buchanan, A., and K. Hessler (2009) “Specifying the Content of  the Human Right to 38
Health Care.” In Justice and Health Care: Selected Essays, Buchanan, A. (ed.) 2009; Daniels, N. Supra n. 
31; Beauchamp, T.L. and R. Faden. Supra n. 31
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act as ‘causes of  causes,’ determining in large part “who is actually born and their 
genetic endowments, how they behave, as well as the surrounding physical and 
social conditions.”  Indeed, this can be shown to be the case through an extension 39
to Drèze and Sen’s entitlement analysis of  famines. 
Drèze and Sen’s entitlement analysis presents a comprehensive analytical model of  
the causation and distribution of  acute malnutrition by investigating the interactions 
between an individual’s endowments, i.e. assets, arable land and labour capacity, and 
the mechanisms through which they are able to exchange these endowments in the 
market for food; that is, earning sufficient wages from these endowments to buy 
sufficient bundles of  food, and the price of  food determined by its supply. Drèze 
and Sen’s findings challenged, and ultimately undermined, the long-held Malthusian 
assertion that famine is determined by food scarcity and is the result of  a positive 
natural check on populations over-stretching the limits of  their resources  by 40
demonstrating that rather, it is the background social or institutional factors and the 
dependent and independent dynamics of  endowment-exchange mechanisms that 
determine whether individuals are realistically able to acquire sufficient bundles of  
food for adequate nourishment.   41
The power of  Drèze and Sen’s analysis lies, however, not only in its explanation of  
the causes and distribution of  malnutrition, but in its potential application to wider 
health issues also. The entitlement analysis of  famines is amenable to transposition 
onto a theory of  the causation and distribution of  health since health can similarly 
be summarised as individual endowments plus social conditions. It is this 
 Venkatapuram, S. Supra n. 31, p. 1139
 Malthus T.R. An Essay on the Principle of  Population. 1798, Chapter VII40
 Drèze, J. and A.K. Sen. Hunger and Public Action. 198941
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construction of  health, and the controllability of  social conditions, that underwrites 
obligations to refrain from impoverishing an individual’s health, obligations to 
protect individuals from health impoverishment and obligations to assist those 
individuals already suffering with severe health deprivation. Such a ‘gloss’ also 
makes clear that the right to health is not a right to be healthy. If  the socially 
controllable factors affecting health have been managed and provided in line with 
the standards set by human rights yet health still fails, there is no instance, 
necessarily, of  a violation of  the right.   42
So the obligations correlative to a right to health must relate to a set of  actions, 
which include provision of  goods, services and facilities related to health care and 
those related to the broader determinants of  health.  These are obligations of  the 43
negative and positive kind. The question that quickly follows is then, who has to do 
what so that these obligations are fulfilled and who will be held responsible if  and 
when they are not? One criticism posed against the justification of  economic and 
social rights, including the right to health, is that they are not claimable with respect 
to precisely formulated correlative obligations. If  human rights are inherently 
claimable there must be specifiable agents against whom the right may be claimed. 
And, whilst it is possible to identify the duties and the duty-bearers in the case of  
so-called negative rights the criticism goes, everyone has a duty not to torture for 
example, this is not the case for positive rights. A right to health, for instance, 
cannot be matched by a universal obligation incumbent upon every individual to 
 Daniels, N. Supra n. 31, p. 14542
 The broader determinants of  health are bracketed to those in the social sphere and do not 43
encompass those of  a more political kind. Whilst it is not feasible to do justice to a discussion on the 
relevance of  politics determinants of  health to the right to health, briefly, it is assumed here that 
political determinants of  health (such as legal equality and protection from mistreatment) doe not 
form part of  the right to health because emphasis on these dimensions seems to be misplaced. For 
example, to protect women from rape certainly has value in a health sense but the primary reason for 
protecting women against rape would not be for health purposes, it would be to protect them as 
human beings; the duties go beyond those that would be health-related.
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provide a minimum level of  health. Rather, as Onora O’Neill has most celebratedly 
suggested, ‘welfare rights’ such as the right to health cannot exist without some 
institutional mechanism defining their correlative obligations and allocating them to 
specifiable duty-bearers. When institutions for allocating and distributing obligations 
have not yet been established and it is unclear against whom claims to welfare-type 
goods and services should be made, according to O’Neill’s critique, such claims 
amount to rhetoric, not entitlement: 
“Unfortunately much writing and rhetoric on rights heedlessly proclaims 
universal rights to goods and services, and in particular ‘welfare rights,’ as 
well as to other social, economic and cultural rights that are prominent in 
international Charters and Declarations, without showing what connects 
each presumed right-holder to some specified obligation-bearer(s), which 
leaves the content of  these rights wholly obscure … Some advocates of  
universal economic, social and cultural rights go no further than to 
emphasise that they can be institutionalised, which is true. But the point of  
difference is that they must be institutionalised: if  they are not there is no 
right.”  44
In responding to O’Neill’s criticism, one immediately obvious problem with her 
argument is its reliance on the normative and empirical notion that negative and 
positive rights are distinct, a notion that has now been convincingly dispensed with 
by a number of  human rights philosophers, but particularly by Henry Shue and 
Alan Gewirth.  All rights, whether negative liberty rights or positive welfare rights, 45
will have corresponding obligations of  both the negative and positive kind. The 
right not to be tortured, to which O’Neill refers, not only gives rise to the obligation 
incumbent on everyone not to torture. For its effective realisation, it imposes an 
obligation to establish prevention, enforcement and punishment mechanisms that 
would, for instance, require the setting up and maintenance of  a police force, 
 O’Neill, O. Towards Justice and Virtue A Constructive Account of  Practical Reasoning. 1996 pp. 131-13244
 Shue, H. Supra n. 33; Gewirth, A. “Are all Rights Positive?”(2001); The collection of  essays in 45
Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? Pogge, T. (ed.) 2007 also speaks 
to this refutation generally, and John Tasioulas’ contribution in Chapter 3, Tasioulas, J. Supra n. 1, 
speaks to O’Neill’s critique specifically, pp. 75-101.
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judiciary and penal system. Likewise, although the right to health has the 
counterpart obligations to aid and assist when there is an acute need, a crucial 
implication of  this right is the obligation not to obstruct others in securing the 
means of  their own health; the obligation not to prevent women who wish to seek 
family planning from doing so, for example. That the right to health and the right 
not to be tortured give rise to negative and positive obligations to a different degree 
may be a persuasive argument. But the claim that the two rights can be distinguished 
from each other by a difference in kind is plainly mistaken. There is no distinction.   
So to return to O’Neill’s argument, in the case of  negative obligations, the bearer of  
the obligation not to interfere is known: everyone. In the case of  positive 
obligations, without an appropriate institutional scheme, the duty-bearer is not 
known. But if  knowing the bearer of  the obligations is a requirement for the 
existence of  a given right, then neither the so-called negative liberty, civil and 
political rights nor the positive welfare, economic and social rights can be human 
rights. They both entail both negative and positive obligations. One response might 
be that the distinction does in fact lie in the degree to which the different kind of  
obligations are correlative of  the different set of  rights rather than the kind in and 
of  itself. The primary obligations associated with liberty rights are negative whilst 
the primary obligations associated with welfare rights are positive, at least as they are 
most commonly understood. But even taken in terms of  degree, is the claim that 
economic and social rights can exist only in the presence of  an appropriate 
institutional scheme really persuasive? Perhaps not. Tasioulas’ view seems the most 
convincing in this regard: O’Neill “exaggerates the significance of  our 
preinstitutional knowledge of  the duties associated with liberty rights and 
downplays what we can know about the deontic implications of  welfare rights. In 
other words, when it comes to discussing liberty rights, the glass looks to her half  
42
full, but when welfare rights are in question, it looks half  empty.”  As Tasioulas 46
eloquently puts it, surely more is known about the obligations generated by welfare 
rights generally, and the right to health specifically, than O’Neill would have us 
believe. So much so perhaps that positive obligations can be allocated through 
“institutionally unaided”  philosophical reasoning.  47
So far, human rights have been discussed in the sense that they are rights of  all 
human beings living today. Implicit in this notion is some sort of  equality principle. 
To take Nagel’s “impersonal standpoint,”  Sidgwick’s “point of  view of  the 48
universe”  or Bilchitz’s “equality premise,”  the principle embodied in fundamental 49 50
human rights is that the fundamental values that underpin them are values of  all 
human beings with personal perspectives, but from the impersonal perspective there 
is no basis upon which to judge the importance of  one human being’s values over 
those of  any other. It is from the impersonal perspective that fundamental rights are 
recognised and as such the rules, which govern the distribution of  benefits within a 
society, are formulated and implemented most appropriately according to this 
perspective. But it is not only the rules, which govern the distribution of  benefits to 
which the perspective applies. It must also apply to the burdens. The importance of  
a fundamental right to health then imposes a responsibility on all human beings, or 
 Tasioulas, J. Supra n. 1, p. 9046
 Ibid, p. 9347
 Nagel, T. Equality and Partiality. 1991, p. 11. Quoted in Bilchitz, D. Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The 48
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more sensibly on societies,  to ensure that the fundamental interests that the right 51
guarantees are in fact guaranteed. To return to O’Neill’s claim that a right to health 
cannot be matched by a universal obligation incumbent upon every individual to 
provide a minimum level of  health, perhaps the right to health cannot be matched 
by such an obligation. But instead what it could be matched by is an obligation 
incumbent on every human being in a given society to, in Sen’s words, “consider 
seriously what one can reasonably do to help the realisation of  another person’s 
[right], taking note of  its importance and influenceability, and of  one’s own 
circumstances and likely effectiveness.   52
Effectiveness is crucial for informing upon whom obligations fall. As O’Neill 
correctly points out, there are numerous candidates that could do the job: 
individuals themselves, the state, family groups, or aid agencies, for example. That 
the obligations cannot be allocated to one or a combination of  these agents without 
an institutional scheme for doing so, however, seems implausible when the 
requirement of  effectiveness is added to the mix. This idea is one advocated by 
David Bilchitz. Bilchitz argues that it is possible to deduce from the abstract right 
the obligation to “adopt effective methods of  realising the right.”  He recognises 53
that there are limits to individual capacities to realise rights and argues that to be 
“maximally effective”  individual capacities will have to be combined. The only 54
 For example, Bilchitz argues that there is an implicit assumption of  ‘society’ in his justification of  51
fundamental rights, particularly with regards to upon whom the benefits and burdens generated from 
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really feasible way of  realising the right to health for all is if  all individuals cooperate 
and coordinate with each other and, most likely in the long term, establish an 
institutional structure through which health is provided for. In this sense, a structure 
that looks to allocate correlative obligations from the right itself  does not directly 
identify where the obligations lie. But a more flexible structure based on 
effectiveness does. As Bilchitz concludes, “it will be a matter of  empirical 
determination as to what the most effective allocation of  responsibility is.”  55
Currently, in accordance with both the contemporary philosophical idea of  human 
rights and the right to health in international human rights law, it is primarily with 
states.  56
IV. Justifying the burden 
If  the right to health is a positive right to those aspects of  health that are socially 
controllable, it could still be reasonably argued that the costs to secure the right for 
each and every individual would bear excessively on duty-bearers, particularly within 
their capacity to meet other human rights obligations and other important human 
interests. This view is one expressed, notably, by James Griffin. Griffin argues that 
the right to health cannot be a right, literally, to health, and that neither can it be a 
right to health care. He agrees that the right to health must be “a right to the sorts 
of  welfare provision that supports health.”  However, it is precisely this 57
formulation of  the right, which he finds problematic. For Griffin, such a 
 Ibid, p. 9255
 Nickel, J.W. Supra n. 7, pp. 10, 38-41; Beitz, C.R. Supra n. 17, p. 128; Griffin, J. Supra n. 7, pp. 56
101-104; and Raz, J. “Human Rights without Foundations.” In The Philosophy of  International Law, 
Besson, S. and J. Tasioulas (eds.) 2010, p. 336. Also, UN International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (UN ICESCR from here on), Article 2 
 Griffin, J. Supra n. 7, p. 9957
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formulation gives rise to obligations that are “ridiculously lavish”  since they do not 58
appear to set limits to what is required by the duty-bearer, particularly given 
necessary expenditure on other important, worthy social goods. If  justification of  
the burdens is to be an existence criterion of  human rights, then the right to health, 
according to Griffin, would fail as such.   
The critique that the right to health cannot be a true human right because it is 
overly burdensome is by now very familiar. But whilst it is accepted in the idea of  
human rights so far presented that a burdensomeness constraint must be satisfied as 
a condition to endorsing a human right, is Griffin’s assertion that the burdens 
generated by the right to health are ridiculously lavish still convincing when applied 
to the right to health in a minimal sense? There are several bases upon which this 
kind of  critique can be challenged.      
Firstly, the notion that the prevailing human, social and economic constraints faced 
in the world today render the grim fact that there are simply not sufficient resources 
to satisfy even minimal health for all  is, in the words of  Sen, “an empirical 59
observation of  some interest on its own.”  Thomas Pogge, for instance, is just one 60
critic of  such a notion and claims that this kind of  pessimism about the resources 
available to satisfy economic and social needs is unjustified. In justifying a right to 
be free from poverty, Pogge has suggested that “[i]t would not cost us much to 
eradicate the deprivations [such as malnutrition, lack of  access to health services, 
 Ibid, p. 10058
 “Richard Rorty in his UNESCO lecture entertained the prospect that the rich parts of  the world 59
may be in the position of  somebody proposing to share her one loaf  of  bread with a hundred 
starving people. Even if  she does share, everybody, including herself, will starve anyway. So she may 
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and Economic Triage.”(1996) quoted in Tasioulas, J. Supra n. 1, p. 81
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adequate shelter, safe drinking water and basic sanitation] — perhaps around 1 
percent of  the disposable incomes of  the most affluent tenth of  humankind.”  61
Central to Pogge’s argument then is that the needs-deficit is an issue of  global 
justice.  But the kind of  global redistribution Pogge has in mind may still violate 62
the principle of  burdensomeness as it has been presented so far. Inasmuch as all 
individuals are both right holders and duty-bearers, as holders it may be in our 
interests that the right be as extensive as possible, but as duty-bearers (or as 
contributors to whichever system fulfils the right) it may be more desirable to limit 
the burdens, at least to the extent that they do not become, as Nickel puts it, 
“economically destructive.”  Whether the question of  burdensomeness is framed 63
with respect to the economic and social status quo or with respect to a situation 
where resources are [more] equally distributed therefore leaves open the answer. 
Nevertheless, even if  we assume, at least at this point in time, that the kind of  
redistribution required would generate burdens that the majority of  individuals 
would find unacceptable, the test of  burdensomeness does not auto-fail at this 
point.  
Because what is being tested is whether the right to health can exist without 
generating onerous burdens on the duty-bearer, it is useful to compare the right to 
health to other human rights that are standardly accepted to ‘exist.’ How persuasive 
is the argument that the burdens generated by the right to health are so much more 
 Pogge, T. “Human Rights and Human Responsibilities.” In Global Justice and Transnational Politics: 61
Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of  Globalisation, de Greiff, P. and C. Cronin (eds.) 2002, pp. 
151-152 
 Pogge, T. “Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of  the Global 62
Poor.” (2005a) Peter Singer makes a similar argument when commenting on his book: “We need to 
commit ourselves to justice and to righting inequities, whether you’re talking about hunger, climate, 
or global health.” Daar, A. and P. Singer. The Grandest Challenge: Taking Life-Saving Science from Lab to 
Village. 2011
 Nickel, J.W. Supra n. 7, p. 7863
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lavish and excessively burdensome on the duty-bearer than those generated from, 
say the right to liberty (or other civil and political rights), so that the former cannot 
be cogently conceived as a human right whilst the latter absolutely can? Again, this 
argument rests on an assumption about the positivity and negativity of  the primary 
obligations underlying each set of  rights; an assumption made famous by Maurice 
Cranston. Cranston proceeds from the argument that for human rights to be 
coherent they must be accomplishable for all, and even with the best of  efforts, it 
would not be feasible to realise many economic and social rights for all, particularly 
for developing societies, which violates the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ maxim. This, 
according to Cranston, is not the case with respect to civil and political rights, which 
are “not difficult to institute” since “[f]or the most part, they require governments, 
and other people generally, to leave a man alone.”  For Cranston therefore, it does 64
not make sense to regard economic and social provisions as a matter of  universal 
human entitlement.  
Whilst it is not necessary to relay the accounts which convincingly reject Cranston’s 
claims, of  which there are many,  the important point to draw out of  these 65
accounts is that full realisability need not be what a recognised human right must 
demand. Indeed if  full realisability were a necessary condition for any rights, “then 
not just social and economic rights, but all rights — even the right to liberty — 
would be nonsensical, given the infeasibility of  ensuring the life and liberty of  all 
against transgression.”  Leaving ‘a man alone’ has never been particularly easy or 66
inexpensive. But the retort on behalf  of  Cranston may be that, on its own, an 
assertion that “non-realisation does not, in itself, make a claimed right a non-
 Cranston, M. “Are There Any Human Rights?”(1983) p. 1364
 See, e.g., Shue, H. Supra n. 33; and Gewirth, A. Supra n. 4565
 Sen, A.K. Supra n. 13,  p. 38466
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right”  reveals very little about where along the scale between zero realisation and 67
full realisation an obligation to fulfil the right to health should lie. It has been argued 
that the right is a positive right and should provide access to some standard of  
health; the “highest attainable”  standard of  health in its international legal sense. 68
If  the right to health is interpreted as guaranteeing a standard of  health that 
although is not full realisation but something close to it, (which is the connotation 
the ‘highest attainable’ term often acquires) the assertion that full realisation need 
not be what a bona fide human right demands is not a very successful rebuttal to 
the lavishness critique. Admittedly, on this interpretation, Cranston’s argument does 
seem rather credible. However, the right to health does set limits, as all rights do. 
And it is in its interpretation alongside limit-setting that provides the final and most 
persuasive argument as to why the right to health can pass the burdensome test.   
Whilst the right to health entails a responsibility upon the duty-bearer to act in some 
way so that threats to fundamental interests are protected against — health services 
be provided for those who need and lack them — in order for those obligations to 
be justified, the acts of  the duty-bearer must be conditioned on “additional practical 
and normative considerations:”  considerations, which may serve to alter the 69
obligations of  the duty-bearer. Fundamental interests therefore shape the content 
 Ibid, p. 38567
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of  the right to health, which is subject to further relevant considerations. These 
further relevant considerations then shape the content of  the obligations, which are 
now unconditional. They are unconditional because other relevant conditions have 
been accounted for in their determination.  
This scheme obviously has consequences. It could be argued that making an 
account of  these relevant considerations part of  the determining-obligations task 
leaves open the possibility that for some duty-bearers the unconditional obligation 
would be to realise the right to an extent of  zero. Whilst this is theoretically true 
(these further considerations could render any level of  realisation of  the right overly 
burdensome) it is extremely unlikely within the idea of  human rights thus presented, 
specifically, with respect to the importance and minimalist nature of  the interests 
they protect. Nevertheless, these relevant considerations could, and would most 
probably, require that health be realised to a qualified extent. Precisely, they set 
limits. 
So what are the relevant considerations that may set limits to the right to health? 
One of  the main considerations, if  not the main consideration, is the scarcity of  
resources. Whilst resource scarcity would limit the right most acutely in less 
developed societies, health needs will most likely outstrip the resources required for 
meeting them in every society, developed societies included. In determining 
unconditional obligations, it is therefore necessary to have some understanding of  
the resources that are available to duty-bearers for fulfilling the right to health. 
Where along the scale of  zero to full realisability the right to health sits will, 
therefore, be “system relative”  and will be subject to the reasonable resource 70
constraints faced by each duty-bearer. The right to health on this interpretation now 
 Daniels, N. Supra n. 31, p. 14570
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begins to look something similar to its legal form. The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) commits its state parties in Article 
2(1) to “take steps … to the maximum of  its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realisation of  the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant.”  The level of  health to which the right guarantees is then limited by the 71
maximum resources the duty-bearer has at its disposal. The ‘highest attainable’ 
standard isn’t then an absolute standard of  health to which the right guarantees, it is 
instead the highest attainable standard of  health, given available resources. The 
highest attainable standard can and will vary. In response to Griffin’s concerns of  
lavishness, a defender of  the minimalist account of  the right to health can therefore 
demonstrate that the obligations generated by it need not bear excessively on the 
duty-bearer when formulated and constrained appropriately and when framed in 
terms of  the actual, or maximum, resources available. Indeed, this is similar to the 
minimalist conception Griffin proposes himself.   72
V. Conclusions 
There remain many “conceptual doubts”  over whether the right to health can be a 73
true human right, and full consensus on its importance, recognition and justification 
remains to be seen. But within the general aim of  this thesis, which is to determine 
precisely when and under what conditions an unmet health need signals a violation 
of  the right to health, the fundamental question over its existence has to be 
addressed. Amartya Sen makes this point emphatically. “It is critically important to 
 UN ICESCR Supra n. 56, Article 2(I)71
 Griffin, J. Supra n. 7, p. 10172
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see the relationship between the force and appeal of  human rights, on the one hand, 
and their reasoned justification and scrutinised use, on the other.”  If  the right to 74
health is to be invoked at all, it is first necessary to address such conceptual doubts 
by finding and defending its best conceptual grounding. 
In an attempt to do precisely that, this chapter has argued that neither reliance on 
the empirical fact that the right to health is recognised as a legitimate standard 
within international law nor reliance on the metaphysical foundations of  rights is 
sufficiently persuasive to provide justification for the right to health. Instead, it has 
been argued that it is the universal human interests in wellbeing and freedom that 
provide the conceptual foundations for rights, and it is the special nature of  health 
in protecting against significant threats to these fundamental interests that provides 
sufficient basis for generating obligations on others to fulfil it. Critically, this 
justification is made based on the notion that human rights are minimal standards. It 
has been shown that doubts over whether the threats the right to health protects 
against are too far reaching may be misplaced because, in the minimalist sense, the 
right to health sets a modest standard; a standard that provides for living and 
leading a life that is minimally decent. Doubts over whether health is amendable to 
being an object of  duty may be misplaced because the relevant, socially controllable 
factors that affect population health and its distribution can be provided for and 
those with the obligation to provide them can be identified: for now, states. Finally, 
and perhaps most critically, doubts over whether the obligations given rise to by the 
right to health bear excessively on the bearer may be misplaced because the notion 
of  minimalism sets limits. The level of  health the right guarantees is conditional on 
the duty-bearer’s ability to fulfil it so that obligations are determined both by 
 Sen, A.K. Supra n. 18, p. 31774
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reference to the fundamental values that underpin the right and by consideration of  
the economic and social circumstances in which the duty-bearer finds itself.     
The idea of  conditionality deals with the problem of  burdensomeness and scarcity 
insomuch as it identifies the principles and the rules regarding what duty-bearers 
have to do to fulfil the right to health. But as David Bilchitz rightly asserts, 
“ultimately, judgement will be required in translating these into particular actions 
and obligations.”  The idea of  conditionality gives little detail on what kind of  75
health the right guarantees, what share of  resources is adequate for satisfying it, or 
how resources are to be allocated amongst different needs when resources are not 
sufficient to meet them all. It does not resolve the ‘resources problem.’ If  the 
notion of  conditionality is invoked as a defence against the lavishness-type critique, 
it seems there is a duty to provide a principled process through which this notion 
may be practically applied. This is precisely where the discussion now turns. 
 Bilchitz, D. Supra n. 48, p. 10175
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3 
Dealing with conditionality 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter it was argued that the right to health should be understood 
as entailing a conditional obligation on duty-bearers since the achievement of  good 
health outcomes unavoidably requires the allocation of  resources, and resources are 
limited. Indeed, this is one reality that was not lost on those responsible for drafting 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In 
an attempt to specify claims and obligations pertaining to economic and social 
rights that are sensitive to the needs and interests of  both their beneficiaries and 
their duty-bearers, the resultant Covenant states that each state bears the obligation 
to take steps, with a view to progressively realising the rights recognised under the 
Covenant, which includes the right to health, subject to the maximum resources that 
are available.  Though this basic provision has incited many critics to declare that it 1
provides states with a loophole through which to evade their obligation to fulfil 
economic and social rights and as such the motivation of  the ICESCR can be seen 
only as “programmatic and promotional”  rather than “descriptive of  individual 2
rights,”  the consensus amongst the Covenant drafters accepted that “the enjoyment 3
 UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (UN ICESCR from here on) 1
Article 2(I)
 Brownlie, I. Principles of  Public International Law. 1998, p. 57-32
 Vierdag, E.W. “The Legal Nature of  the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on 3
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” (1978) p. 103
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of  economic, social and cultural rights depended in part upon available resources 
and upon domestic and international economic and social conditions over which a 
state exercised only incomplete control and which not only varied from country to 
country but were also liable to sudden change.”  The level of  health to which these 4
rights guarantee is conditional on the state’s ability to provide for it. 
But it is precisely this conditionality, which is the core of  these rights’ complexity. 
With specific reference to the right to health, how is the meaning of  the right to 
health to be determined if  it is allowed to differ across resource contexts, and how 
then is it possible to ascertain violations of  the right to health if  the meaning is not 
determinate? In setting out to answer these questions, the essential challenge rests, 
therefore, on developing an understanding of  how the notions of  progressive 
realisation and maximum available resources are to be operationalised in relation to 
a sufficiently grounded formulation of  the right to health so that it is then possible 
to arrive at a standard by which a judgement can be made as to when and why the 
identification of  a particular unsatisfied health need indeed signals a violation of  the 
right to health. It is argued here that such a challenge could possibly be surmounted. 
Section I sketches out the well-known problem concerning the allocation of  scarce 
resources, and introduces the central dilemma: given that resources will always be 
insufficient to satisfy all health needs, whatever the relative wealth of  society,  what 5
is the role of  the right to health in allocating resources to meet health needs when it 
 Annotations on the Text of  the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, Chapter II, para. 4
24
 The central observation of  economics is that resources are known to be scarce, but there are no 5
known bounds on the quantity of  outputs that is desired. Because health and health care are ‘goods’ 
that are produced, or manufactured, choices must be made about what goods are produced, how 
they are to be produced and who will consume them. Another way to view this is that we cannot 
have all of  the goods that we want and in choosing the basket of  goods that we will have, we have to 
trade off  one good for another.
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is not possible to meet them all? In an attempt to shed light on this question, the 
experiences of  the South African and Costa Rican courts are analysed. It is argued 
that neither approach is satisfactory with respect to the idea of  human rights 
presented in the preceding chapter. Rather, I defend a form of  the minimum core 
concept as the most meaningful and practical way of  giving content to the right to 
health and of  helping to deal with the central resources dilemma. This is the focus 
of  Section II. It is argued that a minimum basket of  health goods, services and 
facilities can be determined but its absolute provision is not what is required for the 
fulfilment of  the right to health. Instead, access to the basket remains conditional 
and imposes an unconditional duty to provide as much of  the basket of  goods, 
services and facilities that the state is able to. An assessment of  compliance with the 
obligation therefore must account for how able a state is to provide the basket and 
by association implies the degree to which it is willing to meet the level of  provision 
that is expected. Section III offers an explanation of  how ability could be 
formulated in such an assessment. 
I. How to allocate resources to meet health needs when it 
is not possible to meet them all 
Understanding that the threat to having and leading a minimally decent life posed by 
poor health is of  sufficient moral importance that it generates obligations on others 
to protect it provides some general guidance as to the type of  actions the right to 
health requires of  the duty-bearer: namely, those actions that promote health to 
meet health needs. However, this understanding is of  little help beyond such general 
guidance since, at the same time, if  health needs are defined as the types of  needs 
an individual must satisfy to lead the kind of  life they have reason to value, 
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resources will always be insufficiently abundant in any given society to satisfy all of  
those needs. Obligations based solely on need would, as a consequence, violate the 
condition of  burdensomeness, as discussed in Chapter 2. There is, therefore, an 
outstanding requirement to specify obligations with respect to a principled 
prioritisation strategy.     
The need for resource prioritisation is necessary, and indeed inevitable,  and is 6
embedded at each and every level of  allocative decision making. At the macro level, 
decisions must be made with regards to the proportion of  resources which are to be 
directed towards satisfying health needs as opposed to satisfying other legitimate 
human needs such as education, housing, security, science and culture, all of  which 
are important for the realisation of  other human rights and other important human 
interests. At the meso level, decisions must be made with regards to the proportion 
of  resources within a health budget that are to be directed towards one disease, one 
treatment, one locale as opposed to the innumerable other diseases, treatments and 
locales that equally call on those same resources. At the micro level, decisions must 
be made with regards to which patients receive the care, whether the young or old, 
or whether those with early or advanced stages of  illness should be prioritised, for 
example.   7
Determining where budgetary lines should be drawn between competing macro, 
meso and micro claims has been a political exercise for as long as there has been 
politics. But unanimity on how various legitimate concerns and values should be 
 Normal Daniels argues that justice requires the setting of  limits since even though health is of  6
special moral importance; it is not the only good that is important in this way. “However important 
health care is, we must weigh it against other goods and other ways of  promoting opportunity.” 
Daniels, N. Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly. 2007, p. 104
 Coulter, A., and C. Ham. “International Experience of  Rationing (or Priority Setting).” In The 7
Global Challenge of  Health Care Rationing, Coulter, A., and C. Ham (eds.) 2000 p. 5
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balanced remains, nevertheless, elusive.  The law as it is currently interpreted, 8
whether international or domestic, fares no better in providing an explicit solution; 
yet it is precisely the question of  where these lines start and finish and whether the 
existing lines are fair and proper that has to be deliberated for the setting of  limits 
to health obligations if  and when claims to health rights are to be judged and/or 
monitored. It is this incompleteness, yet dependence, which gives rise to the central 
dilemma: what is the role of  the right to health with respect to the allocation of  
resources to meet health needs given that it is not possible to meet them all?   9
A. Courts and resource allocation: experiences from South Africa 
The challenge of  engaging the right to health to mobilise resources for health is 
illustrated in two notable cases from South Africa. Section 27(1) of  the South 
African Constitution states that everyone has the right to have access to health care 
services, including reproductive health care, (2) that the State must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of  these rights, and (3) that no one may be refused 
emergency medical treatment.  In 1997, for the first time, the Constitutional Court 10
of  South Africa (SACC) decided upon a case regarding the scope of  obligations to 
fulfil the right to health care in light of  limited resources.  The claimant, 11
Soobramoney, suffered from a terminal illness and alleged a violation of  the right to 
 For example, a libertarian might argue that there is zero duty on the State to provide social goods, 8
such as health; inequalities in health may be unfortunate but not unjust. (Engelhardt, H.T. The 
Foundations of  Bioethics. 1986) A Utilitarian might argue that there is good reason to guarantee some 
level of  health, but only so far as it maximises welfare more generally. (Gauri, V. “Social Rights and 
Economics: Claims to Health Care and Education in Developing Countries.” 2003) Then, the 
egalitarian view is one that understands justice as equality of  opportunity and that good health is 
necessary for the realisation of  most species-typical life plans. (Daniels, N. Supra n. 6)
 This is what Tobin calls “the resource allocation dilemma.” Tobin, J. The Right to Health in 9
International Law. 2012, p. 69
 Chapter Two of  the Constitution of  the Republic of  South Africa, Bill of  Rights, Section 27: 10
Health Care, Food, Water and Social Security
 Soobramoney v Minister of  Health (KwaZulu-Natal), 1998, SA 76511
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health care against the South African health authorities after their refusal to provide 
renal dialysis treatment on the grounds that Soobramoney’s general condition did 
not qualify him for treatment under the criteria set out by the hospital for 
determining eligibility for such treatment. The SACC found that under the 
prevailing resource constraints, and in accordance with Sections 27(1) and 27(2), the 
hospital had adopted guidelines that were not unreasonable and had neither applied 
them unfairly or irrationally when the decision to deny treatment was taken. The 
Court declared that it could find “no reason to interfere with the allocation 
undertaken by those better equipped ... to deal with the agonising choices that had 
to be made.”  The SACC made no attempt to dispute whether the resources 12
available for health generally, or dialysis treatment specifically, were appropriate but 
instead, restricted its role to an assessment of  the rationality of  the methods 
through which budgetary decisions had been made by those responsible for setting 
the health budget. Soobramoney’s claim of  a violation of  his right to health was 
unsuccessful.  
In a second case, a constitutional challenge was made by Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC, a South African non-governmental organisation representing HIV-
positive pregnant women) against the government with regards to restrictions on 
the provision of  Nevirapine to pregnant women to prevent peri-natal HIV 
transmission.  The South African government had announced that it would 13
introduce provision of  the drug for mother-to-child-transmission only in certain 
pilot sites — thus denying most mothers access to treatment — on the basis that 
the efficacy of  the treatment was unproven, and moreover, country-wide provision 
would be too costly in terms of  infrastructural capacity, in particular, capacity to 
 Ibid, Judgment CCT 32/97, para. 5912
 Minister of  Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), 2002, SA 721 (CC)13
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provide counselling and testing. The SACC ruled in favour of  TAC, finding that the 
restriction of  Neverapine to pilot sites excluded those who could reasonably be 
included in the programme and that the government’s policy violated the 
Constitution’s right to health. The SACC issued a positive ruling, which ordered that 
the drug be made available to mothers giving birth in state institutions without 
delay, and that reasonable measures be taken to extend the testing and counselling 
facilities throughout the public health sector. 
It may appear, from the ruling in the TAC case, that the SACC had departed from 
its previous, Soobramoney, position of  non-intervention in resource allocation 
decisions and had made a move towards defining what the right to health guarantees 
in light of  limited available resources. That is, the order would guarantee, for all 
petitioners, access to a particular treatment or intervention. This appearance is, 
however, deceiving. Whilst the difference in ruling between the Soobramoney and 
TAC cases may be of  interest in and of  itself, for purposes here, viz. the role of  the 
right to health in mobilising resources for its fulfilment, what is most important is 
to note the basis upon which each ruling had been made despite the difference in 
outcome. In neither case did the Court intervene in the issue of  appropriate 
resource allocation and prioritisation. In the Soobramoney case, the ruling was 
explicit in its sentiments of  non-interference in resource allocation decisions, and in 
the TAC case, though not explicit, the Court’s decision would not require the South 
African government to either allocate additional resources, or re-allocate existing 
resources, to health since Neverapine was available and the cost of  provision was 
almost zero as a pledge had been given by suppliers to provide the drug for free, 
and where testing and counselling were also available it could be administered 
within the state’s existing resources. Rather, the rulings in both cases were equally 
determined by reference to the procedures through which the respective decisions 
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to provide, or not provide, a treatment had been made. In this sense, the burden 
upon the state reaches only so far as to justify that it has ensured these procedures 
pass the test of  reasonableness,  i.e. are the procedures for deciding whether to 14
allocate, or not allocate, resources for x health need transparent and participatory, 
and does the decision in question adhere to those procedures in a way that is non-
discriminatory and reasonable? As a consequence, the right to health jurisprudence 
of  the SACC has provided little to no guidance as to the substantive content of  the 
right.  
The approach of  the SACC comes as little surprise in the absence of  some 
specified criteria for determining the appropriateness of  resource allocation and 
prioritisation. Indeed, this approach is one that has similarly been adopted by the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), with respect to 
its process for reviewing complaints and assessing the extent to which a state has 
complied with the progressive nature of  its obligations under the Optional 
Protocol, and in recent academic thinking on the right to health also.  But if  the 15
right stops at this type of  reasonableness level, it is merely a right to an outcome 
that reasonably adheres to a procedure for allocating resources towards health, a 
right with necessarily no substantive content? Despite reasonableness being a 
substantive test, it is a weak one. It only identifies the wide range within which the 
right and its associated duties must fall so as not to be deemed ‘unreasonable.’ It 
does not determine the precise content of  the right or the associated duties.  
 Reasonableness used here as a normative standard derived from the values of  the South African 14
Constitution. 
 The OP-ICESCR adopts a methodology for assessing compliance with the progressive nature of  a 15
State’s obligations to fulfil the right to health that is, in essence, a test of  procedural reasonableness. 
UN Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Article 8(4). Authors such as Tobin, J. Supra n. 9; and Gruskin, S., and N. Daniels. “Justice and 
Human Rights: Priority Setting and Fair Deliberative Process.” (2008) have also adopted this view.
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To what extent, then, is this kind of  a right to health useful for actually promoting 
health? This is precisely the question asked by many social rights supporters. If  the 
specific complaint is that there simply isn’t enough health-spending going on or that 
the health-spending that is going on is inefficient, the institutional monitor is 
redundant (failing a grave violation of  due process or a gross misapplication of  the 
principles governing resource allocation) and the health status quo remains. This 
result is particularly disappointing when the type of  health intervention being 
denied is of  the very basic kind. If  the right to health is to have ‘teeth’ it seems 
intuitive that the monitoring body must have in its toolkit the ability to review, more 
specifically, the appropriateness of  the decisions giving rise to the denial of  access 
to particular health goods, services and facilities. This, however, implies a somewhat 
more expansive interpretation as to the scope of  the right. Is this alternative 
interpretation available to the court within what can be deemed as legitimate? 
Analysing the right to health jurisprudence of  other countries provides an 
opportunity to test whether it is. 
B. Courts and resource allocation: experiences from South America 
Though analysis of  the decisions arrived at in the South African cases is one main 
trail in search of  the limits to the right to health, which rightly should be explored, it 
is important that the search not be overly restricted to, reliant on or informed by 
those cases alone. In mapping out how the right to health has been operationalised 
in light of  resource limitations generally, the “wave of  lawsuits”  concerning the 16
right in other countries should not be neglected since the jurisprudence of  those 
other countries, particularly in South America, depicts a somewhat different 
landscape. In South Africa, as already discussed, the Constitutional Court has made 
 Mæstad, O. et al “Assessing the Impact of  Health Rights Litigation: A Comparative Analysis of  16
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, and South Africa,” In Litigating Health Rights: Can 
Courts Bring More Justice to Health? Yamin, A.E. and S. Gloppen (eds.) 2011, p. 273
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clear that it will not intervene in the allocation of  limited resources and that the 
right does not give rise to individual entitlements to specific health goods, services 
and/or facilities. The long and vast experience of  health rights litigation in South 
America, however, points to the contrary. The discussion that follows illustrates this 
point drawing on the right to health jurisprudence of  the Costa Rican 
Constitutional Court.   17
Since the turn of  the 21st Century, the right to health in Costa Rica has been 
increasingly claimed before the Sala Constitucional (or Sala IV).  Unlike many of  18
its South American counterparts, however, the right to health in Costa Rica is not 
constitutionally protected. So why and how has this increasing caseload been dealt 
with before the Court? A 1989 constitutional amendment, which saw the very 
creation of  the Sala IV, made an amendment to Article 48 to provide every 
individual with the right to present recursos de amparo  to the Sala IV to maintain or 19
re-establish the enjoyment of  rights enshrined in the Constitution as well as those 
fundamental rights established in international human rights instruments to which 
Costa Rica is a party.  Since Costa Rica is a party to the ICESCR, amongst other 20
 The Costa Rican experience is used here as an illustrative example of  the general South American 17
picture. A similar story can be told through the right to health jurisprudence of  the Brazilian courts, 
see e.g. Ferraz, O.L.M. “Between Usurpation and Abdication? The Right to Health in the Courts of  
Brazil and South Africa.” (2009a) and Columbian courts, see e.g. Yamin, A.E., et al. “Colombia: 
Judicial Protection of  the Right to Health: An Elusive Promise?” In Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts 
Bring More Justice to Health? Yamin, A.E. and S. Gloppen (eds.) 2011
 The number of  health and medicine cases filed with the Sala IV has risen from fewer than 50 18
between 1989 and 1999 cumulatively, to over 500 in 2008 alone. Wilson, B.M. “Costa Rica: Health 
Rights Litigation,” In Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts Bring More Justice to Health? Yamin, A.E. and S. 
Gloppen (eds.) 2011, p. 140
 Remedy for the protection of  constitutional rights19
 Translation from the Constitution of  Costa Rica, (Constitución Politíca de la República de Costa 20
Rica) Titulo IV Derechos y Garantias Individuales, Artículo 48
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international human rights instruments containing the right to health,  the 21
amendment to Article 48 permits individuals to file claims to the right to health 
with the Sala IV.  
Notwithstanding this change, during the earlier years of  the Sala IV’s existence, the 
Court’s approach to cases concerning the right to health was, without exception, 
one of  deference. To illustrate, a case in 1992 was filed by the Association of  the 
Fight against AIDS (Asoción de Lucha contra el SIDA) claiming a right to the 
provision of  an antiretroviral drug which the Caja (the incumbent institution 
governing state-funded health goods, services and facilities) had denied access to on 
grounds that the particular drug did not form part of  the government’s list of  
official medicines, was too costly to provide and was not a cure for the disease. The 
Court ruled against the petitioner, accepting the Caja’s arguments that “the cost of  
acquiring the medications implies a very large sacrifice for socialised medicine [and] 
the scientific data presented indicates that [the medicine] is not a cure for the 
patient.”  In this case, the Court played a highly non-interventionist role with 22
respect to the allocation of  resources and supported the notion that such decisions 
be left the domain of  the incumbent governing institution, the Caja.  
In an instance almost of  déjà vu, in 1997 three individual HIV patients claiming a 
right to the provision of  an antiretroviral medicine, which had been prescribed, filed 
a case against the Caja. Since, as in the 1992 case, the prescribed drug was not on 
the government’s list of  official medicines, the Caja made the same cost and non-
curative-based argument for denying state-funded access to it. The decision of  the 
 For example, Costa Rica is party to the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  21
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of  the Child, and the American 
Declaration of  the Rights and Duties of  Man, all of  which contain protections of  the right to health 
in articles 12, 24 and 11, respectively.
 Resolution 280-92, quoted in Wilson, B.M. Supra n. 18, p. 14222
64
Sala IV in this case, however, was an about-turn on that of  1992. The Court argued, 
“[w]hat good are the rest of  the rights and guarantees ... [or] the advantages and 
benefits of  our system of  liberties, if  a person cannot count on the right to life and 
health assured.”  The Court ordered the Caja to fund provision of  the medicine. 23
The justification given by the Court in its ruling on this case has been particularly 
influential on the jurisprudence that has followed and also explains, in large part, the 
significant rise in cases filed and won concerning not only state-funded access to 
antiretroviral medication but state-funded access to health goods, services and 
facilities, more generally also.  In continuing to make its rulings along such 24
justificatory lines the Sala IV has effectively declared its lack of  faith in the Caja’s 
ability to make responsible resource allocation decisions and only through fulfilment 
of  the Court’s orders can this misallocation be rectified. To this end, the Court has 
defined which goods, services and facilities it deems the right to health guarantees 
and the proportion of  resources that should be directed towards providing them, 
which stands in distinct opposition to the South African Court’s, more restricted, 
interpretation of  its role as the gatekeeper for ensuring fulfilment of  the right to 
health.  
But whilst the Sala IV’s correctional role to widen access to such goods, services 
and facilities may be seen as generally favourable for improving health — 
particularly in the eyes of  those social rights supporters who hold the SACC's 
reasonableness approach so belligerently in contempt — it has been equally 
criticised for its ignorance as to the budgetary implications such widening may have 
had. Critics of  the Sala IV argue that in its ignorance it has overstepped its role in 
 Resolution 5934-97, Ibid, p. 14323
 For example, Wilson asserts that the justification given for the ruling in this case “is frequently 24
cited in subsequent health rights decisions.” Ibid 
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the allocation and prioritisation of  resources and in the process its orders have 
acted to distort health priorities and divert resources away from important health 
interventions towards expensive treatments for uncommon diseases.   25
Though there is not yet a rigorous empirical basis upon which to gauge the 
budgetary impact of  health litigation in Costa Rica, i.e. whether diversion and 
distortion of  resources is indeed taking place, it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
if  the right to health jurisprudence continues along hitherto lines, some form of  
either macro, meso or micro diversion and/or distortion is inevitable. If  all Costa 
Ricans were to turn to the Sala IV to remedy the Caja’s denial to provide state-
funded access to health goods, services and facilities for all ailments — serious or 
non-serious, cheap or expensive — either many more resources would have to be 
directed away from other important human needs towards health or the resources 
allocated for health programmes already prioritised by the state would have to be 
redirected and be completely employed for funding health-through-litigation. Either 
scenario is likely to have undesirable consequences. Resources should serve the 
population at large in all domains of  life, and health only by litigation is likely to 
produce an overall negative distributional effect on health equity, particularly since 
there is evidence from Brazil, Argentina and Columbia to suggest that those who 
reach the courts do not tend to be those who are already most disadvantaged.  This 26
 For example, according to one Caja director “21% of  the Caja’s medicine budget is required to 25
treat just 6,789 patients.” Ávalos, Á. (2005) “Costosa oleada de amparos,” La Nación, 06 June, 
quoted in Wilson, B.M. Ibid, p. 145
 In Brazil, Ferraz finds that the propensity to bring right to health claims to court is closely 26
correlated with socio-economic status. Ferraz, O.L.M. “Brazil: Health Inequalities, Rights and 
Courts.” In Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts Bring More Justice to Health? Yamin, A.E. and S. Gloppen 
(eds.) 2011a, p. 88; In Argentina, Bergallo finds that the majority of  litigants are based in areas of  
higher than average income and are represented by private, rather than legal aid-funded, lawyers. 
Bergallo, P. “Argentina, Courts and the Right to Health: Achieving Fairness Despite ‘Routinization’ in 
Individual Coverage Cases.” In Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts Bring More Justice to Health? Yamin, 
A.E. and S. Gloppen (eds.) 2011, p. 55; In Columbia, Yamin et al. find that those in the contributory 
regime (available only to the better-off) file claims six times more often than those in the subsidised 
regime. Yamin, A.E. Supra n. 17, p. 115
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gives plausibility to an intuition as to the overstepping of  the court’s role in resource 
allocation decision making and indeed validly characterises a charge of  
“usurpation.”  Moreover, the costs generated under such an interpretive scheme 27
would, most probably, be overly burdensome. So then what, if  anything, can be 
drawn from analyses of  the right to health jurisprudence of  the South African and 
South American courts to help deal with the central resources dilemma? Is a right to 
an outcome that reasonably adheres to a procedure for allocating resources towards 
health all that the right to health can be? 
C. Shedding more light on the central ‘resources’ dilemma 
Though a more cautious approach to scoping obligations avoids the perils of  
resource diversion and/or distortion and is, according to Ferraz, better than a 
situation of  being “embarrassed”  it may be ineffectual for the task at stake. That 28
is, fulfilling health. Such being the case, health is perhaps served best not by the 
language of  rights at all but rather by petitioning the goals of  governmental social 
policy. But given that the justification of  the right to health is based on the notion 
that health, or rather the lack of  health, threatens fundamental interests to such a 
significant degree that it justifies the generation of  obligations on others to protect 
it, it follows that health must sit within the human rights domain. This 
acknowledgment then brings us back to the original problem: if  the human right to 
health requires that it be substantive, then there is a necessity to determine its 
substance. So then is the only remaining option one where the right stretches to 
state-funded provision of  particular health goods, services and facilities, the 
determination of  which is to be decided haphazardly by the monitoring institution, 
 Ferraz, O.L.M. Supra n. 1727
 “[I]t is better to be somewhat discredited in the eyes of  impatient rights activists and 28
commentators (the South African Constitutional Court’s predicament) than embarrassed (the 
Brazilian STF situation).” Ibid, p. 21
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as in the South American experience? Or, is the dichotomy between the two 
approaches in fact a false one; is there not a ‘third way’? 
The discussion that follows unfolds on the basis that there is a third way. The third 
way need not see the South African-type and Costa Rican-type conceptions in 
opposition; nor need it require the twisting or distorting of  either conception for 
them to be seen as convergent. Rather, in acceptance of  the limits resource scarcity 
inescapably poses to the determining-parameters-task, it asks whether there is an 
appropriate framework available to determine substantively some minimal level of  
health, which characterises what in fact the right guarantees. The remainder of  this 
chapter is preoccupied precisely with such enquiry.  
  
II. A third way to deal with the resources dilemma 
A. Substantive minimum: concept and justification 
Though the discussion has so far concentrated on grappling with the complexities 
brought about by the obligation to progressively realise the right to health, to an 
undefined level of  health, states party to the ICESCR are at the same time 
committed to “a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of  the rights enunciated in the Covenant.”  In the case of  29
the right to health, the Committee, in its General Comment 14, has identified these 
minimum core obligations as follows:   
 The idea of  minimum obligations was first introduced by the CESCR in its General Comment No. 29
3, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “General Comment No. 3. The Nature 
of  States Parties’ Obligations.” (GC3 from here on) para. 10; and later more fully substantiated the 
concept in its General Comment No. 14, UN CESCR “General Comment No. 14. The Right to the 
Highest Attainable Standard of  Health.” (GC 14 from here on) para. 43
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(a) To ensure the right of  access to health facilities, goods and services on 
a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalised 
groups; 
(b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally 
adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone; 
(c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an 
adequate supply of  safe and potable water; 
(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the 
WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs; 
(e) To ensure equitable distribution of  all health facilities, goods and 
services; 
(f) To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of  
action, on the basis of  epidemiological evidence, addressing the health 
concerns of  the whole population; the strategy and plan of  action shall 
be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of  a participatory 
and transparent process; they shall include methods, such as right to 
health indicators and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely 
monitored; the process by which the strategy and plan of  action are 
devised, as well as their content, shall give particular attention to all 
vulnerable or marginalised groups.  30
Apart from those obligations identified as minimum core, the CESCR has also 
identified the following as “obligations of  comparable priority:”  
(a) To ensure reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal) and 
child health care; 
(b) To provide immunization against the major infectious diseases 
occurring in the community; 
(c) To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic 
diseases; 
(d) To provide education and access to information concerning the main 
health problems in the community, including methods of  preventing 
and controlling them; 
(e) To provide appropriate training for health personnel, including 
education on health and human rights.  31
 Ibid30
 Ibid, para. 4431
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The Committee has stressed that minimum obligations are not subject to 
progressive implementation; they are instead “non-derogable.”  Unlike the implicit 32
resource-conditional element of  the right to health, which is to be progressively 
realised, a state cannot attribute failure to meet its minimum core obligations to a 
lack of  available resources unless it can “demonstrate that every effort has been 
made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter 
of  priority, those minimum obligations.”  Though the standard against which a 33
state has to demonstrate its lack of  available resources may be stricter for the 
minimum core than the progressive element of  the right, it does appear that any 
concession contradicts the Committee’s strong statement of  non-derogability. 
Nevertheless, even this position, as Tobin notes, is a distinct departure from the 
Committee’s former exposition of  minimum core obligations in its General 
Comment No. 3, which states “that any assessment as to whether a state has 
discharged its minimum core obligations must also take account of  resource 
constraints applying within the country concerned.”  Both the exposition of  the 34
list itself  and the subsequent move from resource-sensitivity to a kind of  
implementation-immediacy should (all other things being equal) make the exercise 
of  surmounting the central resources dilemma more practicable. So why hasn’t it 
already been dealt with?     
The Committee’s move to such specificity comes not without controversy. Critics of  
the minimum core concept in General Comment 14 have suggested that its 
foundations are unstable, its practicality questionable and as a consequence 
 “[A] State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the 32
core obligations…, which are non-derogable.” GC14 Supra n. 29, para. 47. This categorical statement 
does, however, only refer to those obligations listed in para. 43 and not those listed in para. 44.
 GC3 Supra n. 2933
 Ibid Quoted in Tobin, J. Supra n. 9, p. 23934
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“pretends a determinacy that does not exist.”  To take the impracticality criticism 35
first, the obligations contained in the Committee’s minimum list are, by nature, 
assumed to be affordable. However, it can reasonably be argued that absolute 
compliance with all of  them may, for some states, still be beyond their ability.  The 36
inflation in the number and nature of  obligations, when compared to the 
Committee’s first articulation of  the minimum, (which simply referred to the 
provision of  basic primary health care subject to affordability)  more greatly 37
dissociates the list of  obligations from any understanding of  whether the state has 
the capacity to comply with them. In the context of  forming the basis of  a 
principled justification for a third way to deal with the central resources dilemma, 
this is particularly problematic. Rather than militate against charges of  ‘usurpation,’ 
this version of  minimum core obligations under resource-constrained conditions 
could in fact serve to exacerbate them.  Otherwise, under such conditions, 38
minimum obligations would simply have to be ignored, defeating the whole 
substantive exercise.  
 Young, K. “The Minimum Core of  Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of  35
Content.” (2008) p. 114
 For example, accepting the global distribution of  resources as given, Benjamin Mason Meier 36
suggests that the minimum obligation to provide essential medicines is an obligation which can be 
fulfilled only by very few States. (Meier, B.M. “Employing Health Rights for Global Justice: The 
Promise of  Public Health in Response to the Insalubrious Ramifications of  Globalization.” 2006, pp. 
735-736) which is based on the note made by Robert Robertson “there is an assumption, though a 
rebuttable one, in the eyes of  the CESCR that every state possesses sufficiency resources for 
subsistence purposes if  they define resources broadly enough and are sufficiently aggressive in 
resource acquisition.” (Robertson, R.E. “Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote 
the ‘Maximum Available Resources’ to Realising Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” 1994)
 GC3 Supra n. 29, para. 1037
 See e.g. Liebenberg, S. “Socio-Economic Rights: Revisiting the Reasonableness Review/Minimum 38
Core Debate.” In Constitutional Conversations, Woolman, S., and M. Bishop (eds.) 2008, p. 313. “The 
concept of  minimum core obligations ostensibly compels the courts to transgress the boundaries of  
their institutional legitimacy and competence, thus undermining the separation of  powers doctrine. 
The process of  defining and enforcing minimum core obligations results in the courts usurping 
government’s policy-making functions.”
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Critics have not only pointed to the impracticality of  realising the Committee’s 
minimum for the highly resource constrained. The criticism that the minimising of  
obligations to an absolute core necessarily jeopardises the full realisation of  the 
right and diminishes the value and applicability of  the right for those facing 
deprivation — albeit beyond the satisfaction of  the minimum — in more resource-
abundant states, is also well established.  In the context of  responding to the 39
central dilemma this could also be problematic. If  obligations are to be sufficiently 
minimised to be of  practical relevance for guiding resource allocation and 
prioritisation in more highly resource-constrained states, they will, as a consequence 
be of  less relevance in those states where resources are more abundant and where 
the dilemma operates at a much higher point on the resources and needs scale. The 
extent to which the minimum core approach deals with the dilemma in order to 
ultimately mobilise resources to improve health beyond the minimal in middle to 
high-income contexts remains a valid question and is one that is discussed in the 
sub-section that follows.   
Both criticisms, however, stem from the same general concern: whether minimum 
obligations can indeed be a universally specified applicable standard. If  minimum 
obligations are to be universal and immediately implementable, they may either 
present an unfeasibly ambitious ‘floor’ for some whilst being reduced to an 
undesirably pessimistic ‘ceiling’ for others. It is arguments such as this which have 
led many sceptics to conclude that minimum obligations can be of  little to no use as 
a practical tool for assessing the extent to which the right to health, or economic 
 For example, Toebes asserts that “States could be encouraged to put the elements not contained 39
by the core into an indefinite,” Toebes, B. “The Right to Health,” In Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook, Eide, A. et al. (eds.) 2001. Quoted in Young, K. Supra n. 35; Also, Craven argues 
that the Committee’s minimum core is primarily focussed on assessing compliance in developing 
States. Craven, M. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its 
Development. 1995, pp. 145-146
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and social rights more generally, have been fulfilled.  Does this conclusion then put 40
the final nail in the minimum obligations coffin? Not necessarily. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that with the Committee’s minimum core approach come particular 
practical problems, a cautious continuation of  the concept may still be warranted. 
If  the progressive realisation of  the right to health requires the taking of  steps, 
which are “deliberate, concrete and targeted,”  minimum obligations provide the 41
pathway. Assuming progression implies the achievement of  “ever higher levels of  
fulfilment of  rights,”  minimum obligations signal to states the initial standard they 42
are required to progress from, rather than progressing (or not) from a starting 
position of  doing nothing. Indeed, this justification seems to be commensurate with 
the Committee’s original justification of  minimum core obligations in which it 
stated that if  omitted the ICESCR “would be largely deprived of  its raison d’être.”   43
However, the initial starting point — although being beyond doing nothing — need 
not be specified so extensively as in the Committee’s list of  six-plus-five obligations. 
This is the case since the methodology for compiling the list is “based on the 
Committee’s experience in examining states parties’ reports over many years:”  a 44
methodology, which as Tobin notes, is “fraught with danger.”  When there is no 45
systematic manner in which states parties refer to specific issues in their reports 
submitted to the Committee, the assumption that such issues can be inductively 
transposed into valid minimum obligations is somewhat tenuous. There is no 
 Young, K. Supra n. 35, p. 164, 174-17540
 GC14 Supra n. 29, para. 3041
 Tobin, J. Supra n. 9, p. 24242
 GC3 Supra n. 2943
 Ibid, para. 644
 Tobin, J. Supra n. 9, p. 24345
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consistent understanding of, or consensus on, the minimum core concept across 
states, whether observed in their reports or in practice.  As a consequence, the 46
Committee’s approach to deriving its minimum list is methodologically and 
conceptually unsound, an unsoundness that necessarily leaves open the possibility 
for a more modest construction of  the minimum: one that is more sensitive to the 
realities of  acute resource scarcity faced by the poorest states, and indeed, to the 
idea of  human rights considered throughout this thesis. 
    
B. A conditional conception of  the minimum 
Only when the assumption that the minimum is guaranteed for all individuals holds 
does it make sense to disregard scarcity as a non-compliance justifier and 
characterise fulfilment of  the minimum as immediately implementable. However, it 
is likely that for many states this assumption does not in fact hold. Accordingly, the 
obligation to fulfil the minimum remains conditional.  47
Deriving obligations along conditional lines is then characterised by a two-step 
process. The task firstly calls for a description of  the ‘goods’ an individual requires 
in order for their fundamental interests to be satisfied (to some minimal level) and 
 Tobin notes “the reality is that states do not refer to their minimum core obligations in their 46
reports in any uniform way.” And, “[s]tate practice simply does not provide any consensus with 
respect to the list of  minimum core obligations identified by the ESC Committee.” Tobin, J. Supra n. 
9. To take just a few examples, the German Federal Constitutional Court has developed the doctrine 
of  the ‘vital minimum’ or ‘minimum level of  existence.’ German Federal Constitutional Court, 
(BVerfGE) 45, 187 (229). The Swiss Federal Court has found that Swiss courts can enforce an 
implied constitutional right to a ‘minimum level of  subsistence.’ E.g. Swiss Federal Court, V. v. 
Einwohrnergemeine X und Regierungsrat des Kanton Bern, BGE/ATF 121I 367, October 27, 1995. 
The Argentine Supreme Court has held that, with respect to the right to health, the duty to provide 
access to medical services requires the provision of  essential medical services in case of  need. 
Argentine Supreme Court, Reynoso, Nida Noemí c/ INSSJP s/amparo, May 16, 2006. Quoted in 
International Commission of  Jurists. Courts and the Legal Enforcement of  Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Comparative Experiences of  Justiciability. 2008, p. 25
 Conditionality applies here in the same sense as it is applied in Chapter 2. The right to the 47
minimum is conditional on “additional practical and normative considerations.” Bilchitz, D. Poverty 
and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of  Socio-Economic Rights. 2007, p. 78
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since receipt of  these goods is, by nature, conditional it secondly requires a test of  
whether full provision of  these goods is possible within the particular community 
given the prevailing contemporary human, social and economic constraints faced. 
By implication, this is a test of  the degree to which scarcity — or any other 
“countervailing consideration”  — may justify ‘impossibility’ in cases where there 48
exists a shortfall in the provision of  the specified goods. Both steps, however, carry 
with them certain complexities. 
Taking the first step first, the minimal description of  health to which individuals 
have a right refers to a basket of  health goods, services and facilities (from here 
onwards referred to as a health basket) that is specified precisely, is conceptually 
valid and empirically appropriate. But the crucial question relates to the sum of  such 
a basket. If  it is not informed by the Committee’s aggregate assessment and 
extrapolation of  state reports, on what basis is its content to be prescribed? The 
answer to this question has so far eluded consensus and, according to Young’s 
damning critique, may even be beyond the discourse’s powers.  However, since 49
what is sought is a prioritising of  temporal targets so that threats to fundamental 
interests are protected against, it should be possible to identify these parts by means 
of  fulfilling an appropriate set of  criteria. To avoid the pitfalls already discussed the 
criteria should allow for the sum of  the basket to change over time, with respect to 
the temporal changes in economic, social and environmental conditions, but would 
nonetheless still satisfy the following abstract thresholds:  50
 It is worth noting here that although there are a number of  constraints identified as possible 48
impossibility-makers - such as the degree of  urgency of  the interest or the level of  sacrifice required 
to realise the right - the most notorious, and the one which is focused upon here, is the scarcity of  
resources. Ibid 
 Young, K. Supra n. 3549
 The criteria are derived from the minimalist conception of  human rights articulated in the 50
previous chapter and represent a broadening of  King’s healthy subsistence threshold in determining 
minimal social rights. King, J. Judging Social Rights. 2012, p. 29
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1. a subsistence threshold meeting basic health needs, physical or mental; 
2. an importance threshold ensuring the health basket is responsive to the most 
urgent health needs; and 
3. a feasibility threshold ensuring the health basket is amenable to population 
scale-up. 
In terms of  moving off  from the first step, the minimal character of  the 
subsistence, importance and feasibility thresholds should not be too contentious as 
reflecting the way in which threats to fundamental interests may be protected 
against.  It is climbing to the second step that is more perilous. This is where the 51
majority of  critics lurk. The basic objection to the conditional conception is that 
with it comes an implicitness that the prevailing contemporary human, social and 
economic constraints necessarily render full attainment of  the health basket 
impossible. According to the impossibility objection, ascribing intrinsic resource 
conditionality to the description of  the right inevitably imposes only a “weak,” duty 
on the state to secure the health basket: a duty with no immediacy, which reduces 
economic and social rights generally, and the right to health specifically, to mere 
rhetoric. So a conditional obligation to guarantee the health basket, in this light, 
fares no better in surmounting the resources dilemma than the South African 
reasonableness approach already criticised. But does conditionality have to equate to 
rights-weakness?  
Notwithstanding the many examples of  existing and generally accepted rights that 
are, at the same time, conditional, (such as the right to freedom of  movement, 
which is conditional on good standing and on certain standards of  overall safety 
 A detailed discussion of  the three threshold criteria (subsistence, importance, and feasibility) will 51
be the focus of  Chapter 4.
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being met) in the case that the condition is resource-based, such a conclusion is 
dependent on the assumption that there is no valid test for determining whether 
resources actually are sufficient to secure the basket of  health goods and as a 
consequence violations could never be adequately ascertained. It could be argued, 
however, that such an assumption may be erroneous.   
Though conditionality may appear to imply that resources are always insufficient to 
realise full attainment of  the health basket, this may not always be the auto-result if  
a valid test for assessing whether “maximum available” resources are sufficient or 
insufficient for achieving it can be specified. Such a test would need to 
operationalise and give precision to the concept of  maximum available resources 
rather than absolve this complex task to the notion of  “progressive realisation.” 
This is crucial. The test is not one of  reasonableness. Specifically, it needs to be a test 
of  extent and could, say, range from 0 (the health basket being perfectly unaffordable 
within the given resource set) to 1 (the health basket being perfectly affordable). As 
such, the closer the result is to 1, the less incomplete-attainment is able to be 
justified by the condition of  resource insufficiency; indeed, whenever the result is 
equal to 1 any instance of  incomplete-attainment of  the health basket cannot be 
justified, which, therefore, would signal a violation.  
The obligation does not then, on this account, exist as an absolute immovable 
threshold across resource contexts and as a consequence conditionality need not 
preclude it from being an immediate one. Rather, states have an immediate 
unconditional obligation to secure the maximum level of  the health basket that is 
affordable and have a progressive obligation to fully secure it as soon as resources 
are sufficient to do so. If  the test is precise enough, then the criticism that 
conditionality creates only weak rights may be rendered invalid.  
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C. Assessment under impossibility and progression beyond the basket’s fulfilment  
Giving meaning to maximum available resources and testing the degree to which the 
health basket is affordable begins to close the hatch through which states can escape 
and analysing the variance between expected and actual attainment provides a signal 
as to compliance or non-compliance. But analysing variance alone may not always 
reveal the full picture. To illustrate, recall the scale of  0 to 1. Hypothetically, the test 
has revealed that for state z full attainment of  the health basket is unaffordable: it 
only has the resources available to fulfil 0.7 of  the basket. According to the 
framework set out above, the unconditional obligation incumbent on the state is 
therefore to ensure that 0.7 of  the basket is fulfilled. This is the expected level and 
is an obligation of  result.  The test has further revealed that state z is in fact 52
fulfilling 0.7 of  the basket, which signals state z has complied with its obligation to 
fulfil the right to health, (the variance between expected and actual level of  
attainment is zero). But this result is just that: a signal.  
When the test reveals full attainment is impossible within the given resource set, (i.e. 
is <1) it is not sufficient to draw full conclusions with respect to compliance or 
non-compliance from looking at the equivalence, or difference, between the 
expected and actual attainment levels only. Rather, the state has an additional 
obligation to justify that its reasoning for prioritising the 0.7 of  its community for 
whom the basket has been attained over the 0.3 for whom it has not, is adequate 
and reasonable. This is an obligation of  conduct.  The question of  whether a state 53
has complied with its obligation of  result under impossibility conditions must 
therefore be examined in light of  the means through which the result has been 
 “The obligation of  result requires States to achieve specific targets to satisfy a detailed substantive 52
standard.” Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 7
 “The obligation of  conduct requires action reasonable calculated to realise the enjoyment of  a 53
particular right.” Ibid
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produced. For example, who are the excluded; are they women, children, persons of  
a certain ethnicity? Are the individual elements within the health basket represented 
fairly or are there some health goods that are over-represented whilst others are 
completely ignored? Below full attainment of  the health basket is where obligations 
of  result and of  conduct must work in tandem. Returning to the hypothetical 
example, if  a further assessment reveals that the 0.7 of  the health basket that state z 
has provided has been provided according to sound criteria, the signal of  
compliance holds. If, on the other hand, the state’s justification for denying access 
to the 0.3 is deemed unreasonable the signal of  compliance folds.    
The reconciling of  both the substantive-type and procedural-type conceptions of  
the right to health provides a response to the criticism that speaking of  health as a 
human right is inapplicable in contexts where resources are highly constrained and 
where the total health basket will always be unattainable. But if  the health basket is 
indeed a minimal standard, how useful is it for dealing with the health claims of  
individuals in wealthier countries? When it is possible to conclude with reasonable 
confidence that a state has sufficient resources to fully provide the health basket, 
and providing it will not result in the redirection of  resources away from other 
equally important beneficiaries and/or have an overall negative distributional effect, 
the state has an unconditional obligation to fully provide the health basket. This is 
likely to be the case in the majority of  middle to high-income countries. But what 
becomes of  the right to health and obligations to fulfil it once the health basket has 
been fully attained? 
One answer might be to impose an additional progressive duty on the state; once 
the health basket has been fulfilled the state has an obligation to move as 
“expeditiously” and “effectively” as possible towards realising ever-higher standards 
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of  health.  But what becomes of  the right if  it is an entitlement to ever-higher 54
standards of  health? It cannot be defined substantively without the likelihood that 
resources will be inappropriately distorted, violating the condition of  
burdensomeness. But if  all it can be is a right to an outcome that reasonably adheres 
to a procedure for allocating resources towards health, the criticism posed earlier 
still applies: it would offer no added value to ‘health.’ It appears inappropriate, 
therefore, for obligations beyond fulfilment of  the health basket to demand that 
they be of  some result, i.e. that certain levels of  health be realised at given levels of  
resource availability, or that they be of  conduct. Obligations with respect to health 
above fulfilment of  the health basket thus collapse to zero. By association, the right 
to health extends only so far as having the health basket fulfilled. It is a right to a 
minimum level of  health.   
The implications of  this difference in ability to give meaning to the right to health 
above and below full attainment of  the health basket is crucial to the normative 
account and the empirical strategy set out in this thesis. Conceptually and practically, 
it makes sense to speak of  health as a human right at the minimal level since at this 
level the right generates an unconditional obligation (of  both result and conduct) to 
fulfil it and compliance with this obligation can be measured systematically. 
However, the innate lack of  substantive specificity within the obligation to 
progressively realise a right beyond fulfilment of  the health basket not only renders 
a measurement of  compliance with it, in any systematic form, impracticable, it more 
importantly renders rights talk impotent for the real promotion of  health beyond 
the minimal standard. This is not to say that individuals living in high and middle-
 Such an obligation would at least be in line with the Committee’s sentiments with regards to the 54
applicability of  the minimum core in richer States. UN CESCR “Poverty and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Statement of  the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights to the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed 
Countries,” para. 18
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income countries — or to be specific in countries where resources are sufficient to 
fulfil the health basket — should not expect to be provided with access to life-
prolonging dialysis treatment or access to life-saving medicines, for example. On the 
contrary. It would not be unreasonable to argue that access to such rudimentary 
treatments should be part of  the state health system in states that can reasonably 
afford them. But what it is to say is that efforts, which seek to challenge the denial 
of  particular health goods specifically, or the non-enjoyment of  health beyond 
fulfilment of  the health basket, more generally, are best served by seeing these 
deprivations not as violations of  the human right to health but either as a violation 
of  some kind of  citizenship right, as Tasioulas would call it,  or as a more abstract 55
form of  inequality of  opportunity or distributive injustice. On dealing with the 
central resources dilemma above fulfilment of  the health basket, the right to health 
is redundant.  
In defining the right to health as a right to a basket of  health goods, the empirical 
challenge that remains is to distinguish between those deprivations below full 
attainment of  the health basket that exist as a result of  factors beyond the state’s 
control and those in which the state may be a contributing, if  not causal, factor. 
State compliance with the obligation to fulfil the health basket is therefore a 
function of  its ability and willingness to do so.  
 “Towards a Philosophy of  Human Rights.” Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy Colloquia, 55
Institute of  Advanced Legal Studies, London, 14 January 2013 (2013a); and Tasioulas, J. “What is the 
Contribution of  Human Rights to Global Health?” Global Health Lab Discussions, London School 
of  Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, 8 October 2013 (2013b)
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III. Operationalising obligations: ability 
By now, it is clear that the obligation incumbent on each state is determined with 
reference to its ability to fulfil a substantively defined basket of  health goods and 
not according to whether or not it fulfils this basket absolutely. A measurement of  
compliance, therefore, requires an understanding of  what in fact amounts to ability. 
So far, ability and maximum available resources have been used, more or less, as 
interchangeable terms. But what are these available resources: are they financial, 
human, natural, technological? And might it be the case that efforts made on the 
part of  the state to comply with its obligations are a function of  factors other than 
‘resources’? The discussion that follows seeks to put flesh on the ability/resources 
bones in order to identify and set limits to the factors, which may facilitate or 
militate against a state in its fulfilment of  the right to health. 
A. Financial Resources 
It comes as little surprise that the relationship between income and health is a 
positive one. Income is necessary for the provision of  all kinds of  health goods, 
services and facilities. From the very basic (such as basic sanitation, immunisation, 
and health education) to the more advanced (such as medicines, the running of  
specialist health facilities and the recruitment and training of  specialised medical 
staff). As figure 3.1 depicts, using life expectancy at birth as a proxy for health, 
countries with higher incomes tend also to be healthier. Thus the fact that the Swiss 
enjoy better health than do the Swazi (life expectancy in Switzerland is near to twice 
that of  Swaziland) may largely be explainable by the fact that Switzerland’s income 
is eight times greater.  Income plays an important role in determining a state’s 56
ability to fulfil the health basket. 
 UNDP Human Development Index, 201456
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Figure 3.1: Income and health, World 2013 
Source: UNDP Human Development Index 
Importantly, it is a country’s total income that matters for explaining ability, not the 
amount of  the national budget it actually spends on health. Alston and Quinn 
report several examples from the ICESCR’s drafting history instantiating this 
point.  For example, it may be the case that two countries with the same national 57
income, Y, choose to apportion their incomes differently. One country chooses to 
devote 10 percent of  Y to health, whilst the other chooses to devote only 2 percent. 
Where assessing compliance is concerned, the task is not an assessment of  what the 
expected level of  health attainment should be given the employment of  either 10 
percent or 2 percent of  the respective national income. This, as Bilchitz 
convincingly asserts, would “allow the government to avoid realising rights merely 
by virtue of  its allocation of  the budget.”  Rather, it is an assessment of  whether, 58
 For example, the Lebanese representative noted “it must be made clear that the reference [to 57
resources] was to the real resources of  the country and not to budget appropriations.” Mr. Azkoul, 
Lebanon, Quoted in Alston, P., and G. Quinn. “The Nature and Scope of  States Parties’ Obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” (1987) p. 178
 Bilchitz, D. Supra n. 47, p. 22858
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with a national income of  Y, resources that could in principle be allocated to health 
are sufficient to fulfil the health basket, regardless of  what it actually spends.  
Because the state has an unconditional obligation to fulfil the health basket as soon 
as resources are sufficient to do so, there is an expectation that states must mobilise 
the resources within its control so that this level is indeed fulfilled. This, however, 
implies a kind of  principle of  resource distribution over which there may not be 
consensus. To take up the example above, it may be the case that a national income 
of  Y is in principle sufficient to fulfil the health basket. Country i spends 10 percent 
of  Y and fulfils the health basket completely. Country j spends only 2 percent of  Y 
and fulfils only 20% of  the health basket. According to the argument proposed so 
far, Country i is fully compliant with its obligation to fulfil the right to health whilst 
Country j is non-compliant to the tune of  80%. But what if  the population of  
Country i has through a democratic process chosen a national economic system that 
promotes progressive redistributive policies so that the health basket can be attained 
by all, whilst the population of  Country j has through a similar democratic process 
opted for a system that promotes more liberal redistributive policies, at the expense 
of  health basket attainment for all.  Necessitating Country j to reallocate resources 59
to health so that the health basket is fulfilled may impose a more egalitarian 
conception of  resource distribution than the one to which it necessarily subscribes. 
A move, which it could be claimed, violates Country j’s right of  self-
determination.  Can, then, labelling Country j as non-compliant still be done so 60
with legitimacy? I think it can. 
 Liberal here referring to liberalism in the economic sense. That is, an economic system 59
underpinned by the philosophy that supports and promotes laissez-faire economics and private 
property in the means of  production.
 A right of  self-determination in the sense that nations have the right to determine what their 60
domestic standard of  justice is and that it takes precedence over any demands for the achievement 
of  cosmopolitan/transnational justice. Buchanan, A. “Equality and Human Rights.” (2005) p. 86
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In countries where the right to health has been formally recognised (either through 
the ratification of  international treaties or by incorporating specific provisions 
relating to it in domestic legislation) the mere act of  recognition, by association, 
signals a commitment to at least some form of  egalitarian distributive justice.  61
Allen Buchanan argues that human rights norms in the conventional understanding 
(that being the understanding embodied in the main human rights legal instruments) 
carry the moral egalitarian assumption — what he calls moral equality — that “we 
are all obliged to help ensure that everyone has the opportunity for a decent life,”  62
and he goes on to argue that these obligations are not limited to those, which are 
correlative of  rights in the so called ‘negative’ sense.  However, according to 63
Buchanan, the obligation that underpins moral equality despite being greater than 
owing nothing is far from owing everything. Rather, the form of  distributive justice 
embodied in human rights is of  the minimally egalitarian kind.  Thus, if  a state has 64
formally recognised and subscribed to the right to health it is unlikely that the form 
of  distributive justice embodying it will be at odds with that, which is morally 
accepted in the domestic domain. They are both minimal. An obligation that 
requires, for example, Country j to reallocate resources to health until the health 
basket is fulfilled can, therefore, be reasonably defended as legitimate.   
 Human rights documents and discourse routinely connect the aims of  human rights to principles 61
of  egalitarian justice. As Griffin notes, the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights is specified by a 
“wholesale inclusion of  justice among human rights,” and that it “includes not only procedural 
justice, but also distributive justice and fairness.” Griffin, J. On Human Rights. 2008, pp. 186-187.
 Buchanan, A. Supra n. 60, p. 8262
 The reasons Buchanan gives for why these obligations stretch further than the ‘negative rights 63
only’ are similar to those already presented in the previous chapter with respect to the negative/
positive rights divide, Chapter 2, pp. 13-14, 17-19. As such, they need no further elaboration here.
 “Human rights can be both essentially egalitarian and yet limited in their demands.” Buchanan, A. 64
Supra n. 60, p. 77
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The quantum of  financial resources considered available must, therefore, be all of  
those over which the state has control. Yet this formulation still lacks precision. 
Whilst it has been established that “maximum available” financial resources refer to 
the income that has been accumulated by the state, which could in principle form 
part of  the national budget, what about those resources that could in principle be 
received from overseas? Since Article 2(1) of  the ICESCR provides that “Each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation … with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of  the rights recognized in the present Covenant,”  it could indeed be 65
presumed that maximum available resources for the fulfilment of  economic and 
social rights generally, and the right to health specifically, are endowed with an 
international dimension as well as a domestic one. For the purposes of  measuring 
ability, this assumption needs to be examined more closely. Specifically, if  there is 
such an international obligation to provide assistance to fulfil the right to health,  66
what is its nature and scope and what implications does it have for determining a 
state’s ability to fulfil the health basket? 
Though the provision in Article 2(1) is one attempt at making the duty of  
international assistance and cooperation a legally binding one,  its meaning is far 67
from being generally accepted. This is not only the case with reference to the critical 
work that has been done on the use of  the phrase as a result of  the provision but 
also with reference to whether, and how, the provision should have been articulated 
 UN ICESCR Supra n. 1 (emphasis added) 65
 Such obligations are often also referred to as transnational obligations, extraterritorial obligations 66
or as shared responsibilities. Skogly, S. “Global Responsibility for Human Rights” (2009); and 
Salomon, M. Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of  International Law. 
2007
 Similar provisions can also be found in the UN Convention on the Rights of  the Child, Article 67
24(4)
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in the Covenant in the first place.  The central difficulty exposed in discussions of  68
obligations that travel beyond the state border is determining precisely where these 
obligations begin and end. According to Sigrun Skogly, “it would be neither 
pertinent, nor practical, to imply that all states are responsible for all human rights 
enjoyment everywhere. Rather, there has to be a relatively direct link to activities of  
the state across borders.”  Accordingly, those that dismiss the very existence of  69
international obligations do so on the basis that it is nigh impossible to establish 
causal, moral responsibility between a state’s action or omission in a foreign 
territory on the one hand and a violation of  an individual’s right living in another 
territory on the other.  This difficulty is only exacerbated in the strand of  the 70
tripartite typology that is under investigation presently: fulfilment.  71
To paint an illustrative picture, state parties (assumed wealthier) have an 
international obligation to provide assistance, to the extent that available resources 
allow, to fulfil the right to health for individuals of  other (assumed poorer) states.  72
Even under the unrealistic simplification that there are only two types of  state 
 In discussing the drafting history of  the ICESCR in so far as the provision of  international 68
assistance and cooperation is concerned, Alston and Quinn quote: “consensus did not extend much, 
if  at all, beyond this general proposition.” Alston, P. and G. Quinn Supra n. 57, p. 189
 Skogly, S. “Transnational Human Rights Obligations.” (2002) p. 79569
 The literature analysing the causal role of  many explanatory factors (including international 70
institutions, domestic institutions, history, culture, disease, factor endowments, and much else) is vast. 
Yet, an established causal link between action or omission and deprivation across borders remains to 
be seen. See, e.g. Polly Vizard’s critique of  Pogge’s institutional understanding of  human rights. 
Vizard, P. “Pogge vs Sen on Global Poverty and Human Rights” (2006); Pogge, T. World Poverty and 
Human Rights, 2nd edition. 2008; Pogge, T. “Human Rights and Global Health: A Research 
Program” (2005); and Pogge, T. “Assisting the Global Poor.” In Ethics of  Assistance: Morality and the 
Distant Needy, Chatterjee, D.K. (ed.) 2004, Chapter 13
 The tripartite typology, introduced in Chapter 1, to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health 71
within a State is likewise useful for understanding the nature and scope of  obligations that live 
extraterritorially. Indeed many commentators advocate its use for the purpose of  interpreting 
international obligations. See e.g., Tobin, J. Supra n. 9; Skogly, S. (2006) Skogly, S. Beyond National 
Borders: States Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation. 2006; Craven, M. The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development. 1995
 GC14 Supra n. 29, para. 3972
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parties: one group (group wealthy) that has the resources available to provide 
assistance, and another group (group poor) that requires that assistance if  it is to 
provide health for its community, still, a ‘direct link’ cannot be attributed. The 
obligation does not reveal precisely what group wealthy ought to do in order to be 
compliant. Neither does it reveal if  all members of  group wealthy are under an 
obligation to assist group poor. Likewise it does not reveal whether group wealthy 
ought to assist every member of  group poor or only a selection, and if  only a 
selection, on what basis this selection be made. This, as Tobin notes, “is a perfect 
example of  an imperfect obligation.”  73
Though imperfectness does not wipe international obligations clean of  any moral 
significance, what it does generate is an obligation with limited strength. Under this 
scheme an international obligation to provide (financial) assistance for the 
fulfilment of  the right to health requires only that a state “give genuine 
consideration to its capacity to do so in light of  its available resources,”  which 74
along with the sentiments of  some states during the drafting of  the ICESCR, 
represents little more than a moral vision. Whilst is may be possible, eventually, to 
specify the content of  an international obligation,  grappling with the debates 75
concerning global social justice is too complex a task to be attempted here. For this 
reason, and for the purposes of  explaining ability in this analysis, a state’s maximum 
available resources are deemed to be only those that are owned and controlled within 
the domestic state. 
 Tobin, J. Supra n. 9, p. 341 (using the notion of  imperfect obligations in the Kantian sense that 73
imperfect obligations are grounded by the notion that everyone has a duty to be beneficent; leaving 
discretion as to what, to whom and how often assistance be provided.)
 Ibid, p. 34274
 The Health Impact Fund, pioneered by Thomas Pogge, could be one such way to operationalise 75
an international obligation. “Human Rights and Global health: A Research Program.” In Global 
Institutions and Responsibilities: Achieving Global Justice, Barry, C., and T. Pogge (eds.) 2006
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Figure 3.2: Similar income and differing health, World 2013 
Source: UNDP Human Development Index 
Without financial resources, making any significant advancements in domestic 
population health will be difficult. As seen in terms of  a bivariate correlation, more 
income indeed relates to better health outcomes. However, the fact that 
advancements in population health may not be possible without income does not 
necessarily mean that it is guaranteed if  and when more income becomes available. 
There are, for instance, many countries with similar (low) levels of  income that at 
the same time have significantly different levels of  health. As Figure 3.2 illustrates, 
whilst Switzerland has both a higher income and higher level of  health compared 
with Swaziland, Nicaragua has almost precisely the same income as Swaziland, yet 
Nicaraguans can expect to live more than 25 years longer. Why then is the level of  
health so much better in Nicaragua if  the financial resources available to the state 
are more or less the same? There must be more to ability than the level of  national 
income alone. 
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B. Beyond financial resources: the rest of  ability explained  
An explanation of  the level of  health each state should be able to achieve requires 
more than considering only the financial resources available to it. The degree of  
explanation can be, and for purposes here needs to be, increased by introducing 
more variables to the equation. One important variable is the number, mix, quality 
and distribution of  human resources, or human capital. Without a sufficient number 
of  adequately funded and trained health professionals it is unlikely that states would 
be able to achieve the health-related MDGs, address key health problems such as 
HIV, TB and malaria, or indeed fully provide the health basket.   76
Whilst the degree of  importance attributed to human capital as a requirement for a 
healthy health system is by no means controversial, it may still seem that in an 
assessment of  a state’s ability to fulfil the health basket its presence as an additional 
variable is superfluous. It could instead be argued that the availability of  financial 
resources instrumentally encapsulates a state’s ability to provide human resources 
also: the more financial resources it has the more doctors, nurses and other health 
professionals it is able to recruit, train and employ. In a perfectly operating market 
for health workers, this would indeed be the case. There would be no need for an 
additional human capital variable for explaining ability; income would be a good 
enough proxy. However, the market for health workers is far from perfect. There is 
an estimated shortage of  almost 4.3 million doctors, midwives, nurses and support 
workers worldwide and that shortage is felt most acutely in countries where health 
workers are needed most. A situation that has been described by the WHO as a 
“global crisis.”   77
 Mercer, H. et al. “Human Resources for Health: Developing Policy Options for Change,” In 76
Towards a Global Health Workforce Strategy, Ferrinho, P., and M.R. Dal Poz (eds.) 2003
 WHO “The World Health Report 2006 - Working Together for Health,” (2006) p. 1277
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An understanding of  the factors that contribute to the shortage is important for 
explaining ability. The shortage may be due to, for instance, the increasing incidence 
and prevalence of  disease; the fact that people are living longer and need more care 
in later life; or that the economic and social incentives to train, work and live as a 
health professional in certain countries are simply not sufficiently strong, often 
resulting in migration from already resource poor states to more developed states, 
coined the brain drain/brain gain.  In each of  these cases, or indeed a mixture of  78
all three, it would be unrealistic to assume that a state’s ability to fulfil the health 
basket is a matter of  money alone. If  a state has the financial resources to provide 
access to certain medicines and treatments, which in principle could satisfy full 
attainment of  the basket, yet despite employing the maximum human resources it 
has available there are still too few health workers to administer those medicines or 
operate the equipment to give the treatment, it cannot necessarily be expected to 
fulfil the basket entirely in the short to medium term. Once again, it is important to 
note that the level of  human capital available to the state is not the number of  
health workers it actually employs. In the same vein as the problems using actual 
rather than potential spending of  financial resources generates, it could be the case 
that sufficient (or at least more than is currently being employed) human capital 
exists within the state, but it is underemployed. The measure of  human capital 
therefore needs to be a measure of  the human resources that in principle are 
available to the state. That is, a measure of  the long run potential of  the state’s 
ability to fulfil the health basket.         
In determining the expected level of  health attainment, it is possible to increase the 
explanatory power of  ability further. Beyond financial and human resources, there 
 Ibid, p. 10178
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are many other variables that may influence a state’s capacity to fulfil the health 
basket, some, over which the state has little to no control. The nature and density of  
the population, the political situation of  neighbouring countries, favourability of  the 
physical environment to the delivery of  health services, to name but a few. If, for 
instance, states with highly dispersed populations are revealed to have systematically 
lower health attainment than would be expected given their respective levels of  
income and human capital, the inclusion of  a variable that captures a state’s relative 
population density would make the expected attainment indicator more sensitive to 
the geographic realities faced by those states in fulfilling the health basket. However, 
with an explanation of  ability down to its atomic level come some obvious practical 
difficulties. If  the measure of  ability is to include everything that could potentially 
provide a reason for not doing better, the list of  explanatory variables would be 
unwieldily long. It is, therefore, practically necessary to limit the number of  
explanatory variables to those which, theoretically and empirically, are most 
significant. 
The trade-off  between creating an indicator of  expected health attainment that is as 
sensitive as possible to the micro functions of  ability and creating an indicator that 
is feasible, useful and informative across states would be more difficult to reconcile 
should the significance of  factors other than those identified be substantial. These 
are, however, likely to be small in terms of  their respective explanatory power.  For 79
these combined reasons, ability here is determined to be a function of  income, 
human capital, population density and the mortality environment. 
 Studies on the impact of  micro environmental factors on health are relatively scarce. However, 79
from what we do know, the evidence seems to suggest that the impact is as expected: positive, 
(higher quality environments are associated with better health outcomes) but it is very small when 
compared to the strength of  other socio-economic determinants. See, e.g. OECD. Determinants of  
Health Outcomes in Industrialised Countries. 2000 which shows that the explanatory strength of  physical 
environmental factors, such as water and soil quality, as well as noise and air pollution, are 
outstripped to the tune of  7 times by financial resources and 16 times by human capital.  
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IV. Conclusions 
The obligation articulated in Article 2(1) of  the ICESCR that each State Party is to 
progressively realise the right to health to the maximum of  its available resources 
provides a pragmatic solution to the problems applying a blanket, absolute duty 
gives rise to. It is concessive. It acknowledges that economic and social conditions 
can, and do, differ from state to state and therefore what can be expected from 
states in terms of  health outcomes must be relative to the maximum resources at its 
disposal. Reiterating the idea presented in Chapter 2, the obligation to fulfil the right 
to health is conditional. However, this conditionality is both a virtue and a curse. 
Once it has been acknowledged that the obligation to fulfil the right to health is 
determined with reference to a state’s maximum available resources, the questions 
that quickly follow are then: what resources are potentially available to a state for 
right to health purposes?  And what level of  resources must be allocated by a state 80
to health as opposed to other worthy social goals?  These questions are key and 81
form the basis of  this chapter: in light of  the fact that resources will always be 
insufficiently available to satisfy all health needs, what is the role of  the right to 
health in mobilising resources to fulfil health needs given that is not possible to 
meet them all? 
Attempts to deal with this dilemma in principle and practice have led to the right to 
health being interpreted either as a right to an outcome that reasonably adheres to a 
procedure for allocating resources towards health, or as a substantive right to all 
kinds of  health interventions provided to whoever steps up to the legal plate. Both 
interpretations are an unsatisfactory response to the central resources dilemma. The 
 Robertson, R. Supra n. 36, p. 69580
 Griffin, J. Supra n. 61, p. 10081
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contribution offered in this chapter, however, is that these two approaches need not 
be considered the only options available. Instead it has proposed a third way. The 
third way suggests that the right to health is a right to the attainment of  a basket of  
minimal health goods, services and facilities but the absolute fulfilment of  the 
health basket is not what is required of  the state. Rather, fulfilment of  the health 
basket is conditional on the state’s ability to provide it.  
The third way offers a framework for determining, substantively, the content of  the 
right to health, which is sensitive to the needs and interests of  both its beneficiaries 
and its duty-bearers: firstly by defining how a basket of  minimal health goods, 
services and facilities might be characterised, and secondly by mapping out how the 
degree to which this basket is affordable might be tested. According to the third 
way, the obligation incumbent upon the state is to provide as much of  the health 
basket as it is able to and therefore measuring the extent to which a state meets or 
falls short of  this level can be a starting point for assessing compliance with this 
obligation. Since ability is taken care of  in the assessment, any shortfall could be 
described as signalling unwillingness on the part of  the state to mobilise its available 
resources for health. Before determining the degree of  meeting or falling short, 
however, the first step is to define precisely what this basket of  health goods, 




Defining the health basket 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I argued that the right to health should be understood as entailing a 
conditional obligation on states to fulfil a minimum health basket. This obligation is 
conditional due to that fact that the resources available for right to health purposes 
are limited. The unconditional obligation is therefore to fulfil as much of  the 
minimum health basket as states are able to. This is the ability condition. Though 
the list of  minimum obligations as defined by the Committee includes the absolute 
provision of  items such as shelter and housing, essential drugs and vaccines as well 
as the taking and making of  preventative and curative measures to curb the spread 
of  disease, it has been argued that this list is vague, extensive and, moreover, is 
founded upon unsound methodological grounds. Instead, unconditional obligations 
must both respond to the most urgent of  health needs faced by the acutely deprived 
whilst also be set sensitively to the ability of  the duty bearer to provide 
interventions for such deprivation. 
It was also argued in the previous chapter that the first step in determining what the 
unconditional obligation is for each state must concern the definition of  a health 
basket and that the contents of  this basket must be determined through the 
fulfilment of  a three-part criteria: (i) that it characterises the meeting of  basic 
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physical health needs: subsistence; (ii) that it is responsive to the most urgent of  
health needs: importance; and (iii) that health interventions exist that can be scaled-
up to the population level: feasibility.  
Any methodological approach to deriving such a basket is likely to be in some part 
contentious. That being so the approach offered here is a stake in the ground; it 
mounts a persuasive case that an appropriate evaluative framework for defining the 
content of  the health basket, which is objective, valid and reliable is available by 
looking to the methodologies of  public health and health economics. Specifically, 
Section I discusses the appropriateness of  filling the basket through a primary 
health care (PHC) strategy. A description of  primary health care in its different 
guises is outlined and a framework for relating the basket of  goods, services and 
facilities to those that are considered essential elements of  a system of  primary 
health care is offered. Section II sets out to identify the health issues that are most 
important at the population level, disaggregated by sex and age. Importance is 
determined through an analysis of  the degree to which mortality resulting from 
different health issues can be avoided; specifically, through calculating ‘avoidable 
mortality.’ Identifying the health issues that carry the heaviest burden is, however, 
only a partial step to specifying the health basket. What remains is to determine 
whether health interventions exist that are both effective and cost-effective and can 
feasibly be scaled up to the population level. This is the task taken up in Section III. 
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I. Subsistence: health for all and primary health care 
More than 30 years after the Declaration of  Alma-Ata, “health for all,”  though still 1
incomplete for many countries, remains the ultimate goal. Picking up the baton for 
the next generation vision of  health-for-all, the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs)  adopted in 2000, and their successor the Sustainable Development Goals 2
(SDGs),  have been backed by the widest constituency in development history,  3 4
underscoring the notion that primary health care is the key to making health-for-all 
a reality.  Whilst acknowledging the obvious overlap between the different layers of  5
health care, (primary, secondary and tertiary) evidence, which tests the health-
promoting influence of  primary health care specifically, suggests that interventions 
at the primary level could deal with up to 90% of  health care demands in low-
income countries,  and in OECD countries, health systems which are primary care-6
orientated are more likely to deliver better health outcomes with more equitable 
 Declaration of  Alma-Ata, International Conference of  Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, 6 - 1
12 September 1978
 The MDGs set out eight specific targets, which include reducing the proportion of  people 2
suffering from hunger, reducing child and maternal mortality whilst increasing reproductive health, 
reducing the spread of, and increasing access to treatment for, HIV/AIDS as well as reducing the 
incidence of  other major diseases. 
 “One of  the main outcomes of  the Rio+20 Conference was the agreement by member States to 3
launch a process to develop a set of  Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which will build upon 
the Millennium Development Goals and converge with the post 2015 development agenda.” UN 
Introduction to the Proposal of  The Open Working Group for Sustainable Development Goals 
(2014) 
 “The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) ... form a blueprint agreed to by all the 4
world’s countries and all the world’s leading development institutions.” Ibid
 Declaration of  Alma-Ata. Supra n. 1, Part V; In her recent address, Margaret Chan, Director 5
General of  WHO, remarked: “When I took office at the start of  last year, I called for a return to 
primary health care as an approach to strengthening health systems. My commitment has deepened. 
If  we want to real the health-related Goals, we must return to the values, principles, and approaches 
of  primary health care.” Margaret Chan, Director General, World Health Organisation Address to 
the 61st World Health Assembly, Geneva (2008)
 World Bank. Better Health in Africa: Experience and Lessons Learned. 1994 p. 566
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distributions of  health in populations at lower costs.  So what is primary health 7
care? 
At Alma-Ata, primary health care was defined as “the first level of  contact of  
individuals, the family, and community with the national health system bringing 
health care as close as possible to where people live and work, and constitutes the 
first element of  a continuing health care process.”  It envisioned: 8
universal coverage of  basic services such as education on methods of  
preventing and controlling prevailing health problems; promotion of  food 
security and proper nutrition; adequate safe water supply and basic sanitation; 
maternal and child health, including family planning; vaccination; prevention 
and control of  locally endemic diseases; appropriate treatment of  common 
diseases and injuries; and provision of  essential medicines.   9
At this time, the way in which services were to be delivered shifted from an 
emphasis on being large-scale and hospital-based to being smaller-scale and 
community-based: “putting the ‘public’ into public health.”  The fundamental 10
focus on equity and on including the excluded, not only in terms of  how the 
benefits from health are distributed but also in terms of  making decisions on how 
those benefits are optimised, set the scene for a new kind of  health planning to 
which social justice became an integral part. Programmes were to be balanced 
towards those with a preventative focus, which sought to deal with the underlying 
determinants of  health such as livelihoods, education and the environment. As 
Lawn et al. assert, primary health care under Alma-Ata “presented a shift in thinking 
 WHO. What are the Advantages and Disadvantages of  Restructuring a Health Care System to be More Focused 7
on Primary Care Services? 2004; Macinko, J., B. Starfield, and L. Shi. “The Contribution of  Primary 
Care Systems to Health Outcomes Within OECD Countries, 1970-1998.” (2003)
 Declaration of  Alma-Ata Supra n. 1, Part VI8
 Hall, J. and R. Taylor. “Health For All Beyond 2000: The Demise of  the Alma-Ata Declaration and 9
Primary Health Care in Developing Countries.” (2003) p. 18
 Lawn, E. et al. “Alma-Ata 30 Years On: Revolutionary, Relevant, and Time to Revitalise.” (2008) p. 10
919
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that saw health not merely as a result of  biomedical interventions but also an 
outcome of  social determinants.”   11
Although all WHO members in Alma-Ata unanimously adopted the comprehensive 
primary health care vision at the time, the Declaration still had its critics. With 
particular exception being taken to its so-called idealism, these critics complained 
that the interventions were specified only in broad terms and the goal of  achieving 
complete population coverage would be too expensive and thus unachievable for 
developing, low-income states.  In spite of  the initial optimism surrounding the 12
Declaration and its potential for giving substance to the right to health, (specifically 
that it linked a rights-based approach to a viable strategy for attaining it)  as far as 13
the framework here is concerned, its provisions do indeed suffer as much from 
vagueness and open-endedness as do those contained in General Comment 14. Just 
as Tobin notes, “this list reflects several of  the elements which are included in the 
heavily criticised list of  minimum core obligations advanced by the ESC Committee in 
its General Comment on the Right to Health.”  As a consequence, a 14
straightforward transplant of  the list of  provisions in the Declaration to a list of  
items to be included in the health basket would be of  limited use; with respect to 
the health basket criteria, the two are inconsistent.   
 Ibid11
 McNamara, R.S. Address to the Board of  Governors by Robert S. McNamara. Presidential speech, 12
Washington DC: World Bank (1980) (“Even if  the projected - and optimistic - growth rates in the 
developing world are achieved, some 600 million individuals at the end of  the century will remain in 
absolute poverty.”)
 Particularly when read in conjunction with other contemporary instruments such as the CESCR’s 13
General Comment 3 and the Programme of  Action of  the International Conference on Population 
and Development. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “General Comment No. 
3: The Nature of  States Parties’ Obligations;” UN Population Fund. Programme of  Action of  the 
International Conference on Population and Development, Report of  the International Conference 
on Population and Development (1995)
 Tobin, J. The Right to Health in International Law. 2012, p. 251 (emphasis added)14
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Though this may be the case, it does not necessarily follow that the elements of  
primary health care are at odds with the health basket in and of  itself. Primary 
health care as “the first level” of  health care remains highly in tune with the notion 
that the basket must contain basic, important and urgent goods and be a standard 
each and every individual can expect to have guaranteed. Rather, in acknowledging 
the vast number of  health issues which may present, even at the primary level, and 
the limitations to the human and financial requirements for dealing with them, what 
is necessary is an assigning of  priorities for instituting control measures of  a 
primary health care kind. Then it is those measures, which use the scarce human 
and financial resources available most efficiently, effectively and equitably that will 
be prioritised, and hence will define how the health basket is comprised. 
Within one year of  the Declaration’s operation, another, more simple approach had 
indeed been proposed, which advocated focus on a selection of  interventions 
justified on the basis of  “epidemiological importance and technological 
affordability, and a more top-down management approach.”  This approach is what 15
would become to be known as ‘Selective Primary Health Care;’  an approach 16
considered more “feasible, measurable, rapid, and less risky.”  Specifically, 17
interventions under the selective primary health care approach were often the 
outputs of  centrally planned vertical programmes, were often directed towards child 
health and discrete individual tropical diseases, and were intended as ‘entry points’ 
into the health care system. Initially, the precise content of  the selective package was 
not wholly consistent. For example, in their seminal paper, Walsh and Warren 
recommended several interventions for inclusion in the package, including 
 Lawn, E. et al. Supra n. 10, p. 92115
 Walsh, J.A. and K.S. Warren “Selective Primary Health Care: An Interim Strategy for Disease 16
Control in Developing Countries.” (1979)
 Lawn, E. et al. Supra n. 1017
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treatment for malaria in children under three years old,  which disappeared in 18
subsequent editions. However, in the years that followed, UNICEF’s child survival 
revolution brought with it some standardisation and the number of  interventions 
reduced to four. These four measurable interventions became known as GOBI: 
Growth monitoring, Oral rehydration therapy, Breastfeeding, and Immunisation.  19
Three more components were then later added: food supplementation, family 
spacing and female education, and GOBI became GOBI-FFF.  20
This ‘entry point’ intention looks to be more reconcilable with the conception of  
the health basket proposed here. So then, does it follow that the health basket 
equates to providing selective primary health care? Unfortunately, the relationship 
between selective primary health care and defining the health basket may not be so 
elegantly direct. The selective primary health care model comes not without 
criticisms of  its own, criticisms which may impede automatic equalisation with the 
health basket. Though GOBI-FFF, according to some, “created the right balance 
between scarcity and choice,”  to others it was a “narrow technocentric approach 21
that diverted attention away from basic health and socioeconomic development 
[and] did not address the social causes of  disease.”  It cannot be denied that major 22
advances in the control of  vaccine-preventable childhood diseases were made under 
 Walsh, J.A. and K.S. Warren. Supra n. 16, p. 97218
 UNICEF. The State of  the World's Children 1982-83. 198219
 UNICEF. The State of  the World's Children 2008. 2007, p. 3120
 Evans, J.R., K.L. Hall and J. Warford. “Shattuck Lecture, Health Care in the Developing World: 21
Problems of  Scarcity and Choice.” (1981) Quoted in Cueto, M. “The Origins of  Primary Health 
Care and Selective Primary Health Care.” (2004) p.1869
 Berman, P.A. “Selective Primary Health Care: Is Efficient Sufficient?” (1982) Quoted in Ibid, p.22
1870
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GOBI strategies.  However, the types of  interventions in question (particularly 23
Oral rehydration therapy), according to critics, were merely short-run solutions to 
health issues that could be more sustainably solved with better access to adequate 
food, safe water and sanitation, for example. Moreover, the vertical nature of  
GOBI-FFF programmes meant that services were losing touch with the 
communities they were supposed to serve and were often ill-coordinated with other 
vertical programmes operating in parallel; such fragmentation often leading to 
inefficiencies in the form of  administrative and specialist duplication, ignorance of  
the co-morbidities experienced by health service beneficiaries and the crowding out 
of  other competing health issues.  24
Notwithstanding the problems the selective model’s narrowness and verticality 
create, the way in which primary health care has been advanced in the recent past 
suggests that still the comprehensive aspirations of  Alma-Ata are beyond what can 
reasonably be expected as ‘minimal.’ The approach to defining the health basket 
must therefore lie somewhere in between these two poles. It must be responsive to 
technical expertise and resource considerations but must, at the same time, be 
holistic, be responsive to the needs of  communities and at least hint towards an 
ideal. Establishing priorities for deriving the health basket “thus requires two 
essential steps: selection of  diseases for control and evaluation of  different levels of  
medical intervention from the most comprehensive to the most selective;”  an 25
approach that appears well suited to the minimalist nature of  the health basket 
criteria proposed in Chapter 3. 
 “By the late 1980s, the push for universal immunisation became the major focus of  child survival, 23
and global coverage of  three immunisations with diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT3) rose from 
20% to 75% in just 10 years.” Lawn et al. Supra n. 10, p. 920
 Briggs, C.J., P. Capdegelle, and P. Garner. “Strategies for Integrating Primary Health Services in 24
Middle and Low-Income Countries: Effects on Performance, Costs and Patient Outcomes.” (2003)
 Walsh, J.A. and K.S. Warren. Supra n. 1625
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In determining which health issues are to be selected for prioritisation in this two-
step process, Walsh and Warren outlined four factors to be considered for the 
assessment: prevalence, morbidity, mortality and feasibility of  control (including 
efficacy and cost).  These four factors still remain the basis upon which later 26
criteria for prioritisation in health care have been built. For example, in Norheim 
and Gloppen’s study, which sets out to assess the impact of  health litigation on 
health outcomes, priority setting is based on “(i) the severity of  disease if  given 
standard care or left untreated; (ii) the effectiveness of  the intervention; (iii) the 
cost-effectiveness of  the intervention; and (iv) the quality of  evidence for items i-
iii.”  According to Norheim and Gloppen, these factors characterise a set of  27
criteria that is generally accepted in the public health and priority-setting literature.  28
As such, the most appropriate criteria for the prioritisation task at stake in this 
analysis is a merging and augmenting of  the two framework variations above. 
Specifically, this includes an assessment of: (i) the burden of  the health issue, that is 
its prevalence and severity; and (ii) the feasibility of  control, that is the effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness of  the interventions available for preventing and/or treating 
the health issue with respect to both individual and population-wide coverage. 
One obvious criticism that could be levelled at such a prioritisation strategy is that it 
is, like the selective model of  primary health care discussed above, essentially a 
technocentric exercise. It makes no room for community participation in the 
process for deciding what goes in and what stays out of  the health basket. A 
prioritisation process that excludes participation, the criticism goes, is problematic 
 Ibid, p. 96826
 Norheim, O.F. and S. Gloppen. “Litigating for Mediciens: How Can We Assess Impact on Health 27
Outcomes?” In Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts Bring More Justice to Health? Yamin, A.E. and S. 
Gloppen (eds.) 2011, p. 310
 Ibid28
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on a number of  levels: specifically, it may be blind to available local knowledge, 
which leaves open the possibility that the resultant health basket does not in fact 
meet the community’s real health needs; and more generally, it may even dissociate 
communities, particularly those already marginalised, from the process of  health 
empowerment, which may in turn lead to worse health outcomes.  In terms of  29
measuring a state’s compliance with its obligation to fulfil the health basket, this 
raises issues of  both a normative and empirical kind.  
Participation places the wellbeing of  individuals and communities at the centre of  
health policy. Normatively, health policy should be based on the priorities of  those 
individuals and communities rather than the priorities of  technical experts. To have 
some say in, and exercise some control over, the ways in which we are treated is an 
essential part of  our humanity. Indeed, the essential requirement that the 
community be active participants in making the health-related decisions that affect 
them has been part of  the mainstream health discourse for many years.  The 30
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has affirmed that a vital 
element of  the right to health “is the participation of  the population in all health-
related decision making at the community, national and international levels.”  31
Provision for participation in the planning and execution of  health policy is one of  
the Committee’s core obligations.  Empirically, if  the health basket is indeed 32
misaligned with real community preferences, any revealed deficiency in its provision 
 See, e.g. de Vos, P., et al. “Health Through People’s Empowerment: A Rights-Based Approach to 29
Participation.” (2013); Manandhar, D.S., et al. “Effect of  a Participatory Intervention with Women’s 
Groups on Birth Outcomes in Nepal: Cluster-Randomised Controlled Trial.” (2004)
 The Preamble to the WHO Constitution asserts, “informed opinion and active cooperation on the 30
part of  the public are of  the utmost importance in the improvement of  the health of  the people.” 
Constitution of  the World Health Organization Preamble.
 UN CESCR (2000) “General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of  31
Health.”
 Ibid, para. 4332
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may not in fact represent a lack of  supply; it may instead be attributable to a lack of  
demand. The measure would not reveal what it is intended to reveal and would not, 
therefore, pass the test of  validity. 
So can a health basket derived without a participation-type element still be valid? 
Absolutely. Because the nature of  the health basket under discussion is so minimal, 
these normative and empirical issues can be addressed. Whilst the health basket 
should indeed embody the priorities of  the community it is supposed to serve, the 
proposed criteria for setting priorities are of  such minimal character that it can be 
reasonably assumed that the vast majority of  communities would by preference 
choose the types of  health goods, services and facilities the criteria is likely to 
produce. The risk of  priority-misalignment is very small. That being said, to resolve 
the empirical issue to a satisfactorily rigorous standard, the risk, however small, still 
needs mitigating. Of  course there may be many demand factors that may bias health 
basket coverage rates downwards, irrespective of  a state’s efforts. But the lack of  
demand can be the result of  a number of  issues other than an outright lack of  want 
or need. For instance, a lack of  awareness of  effective interventions, or physical or 
financial barriers to accessing services where effective interventions are provided: 
them being too far away and/or to costly to get to. The hypothesis that 
misalignment may exist does not, therefore, necessarily invalidate the priority-setting 
framework proposed if  it can be tested. This, however, requires a more finely tuned, 
qualitative investigation; one that is reflective of  the specific country circumstances. 
To this end, a case study of  Brazil will be undertaken in the latter part of  this thesis 
and a test of  the degree to which priority misalignment exists will form part of  the 
focus of  Chapter 6. 
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Nevertheless, that priorities generated by the framework proposed be different from 
those elicited directly from the community is highly unlikely. By means of  the data 
process described above, it is then possible to develop a valid framework for 
assigning priorities and, by association, a valid health basket. Consistent with 
Norheim and Gloppen’s analysis, all criteria carry equal weight and priorities are 
assigned on the basis of  all criteria being satisfied cumulatively. 
II. Importance: measuring the health burden 
A. What kind of  burden 
Though the framework has so far adopted the strategies taken by Walsh and Warren 
and Norheim and Gloppen for establishing the criteria for priority setting, it is at 
the point of  defining how to measure these criteria where the framework developed 
here and these analyses depart. In attempting to measure population health status 
and the overall burden of  specific health issues, the analyses mentioned above use 
measures, which not only take into account years of  life lost to mortality, but 
account for the number of  years of  life lost to morbidity also. The disability-
adjusted life year (DALY) developed in the 1990s is one such measure.  DALYs are 33
helpful since they may help to reveal those health issues, which although may not 
necessarily lead to premature death, can nevertheless be severely debilitating (an 
important consideration for priority-setting in health). Whilst not being ignorant to 
the possible DALY-advantage to the task at stake, according to Nguyen et al., “such 
developments in the assessment of  health status of  a population have not 
 The disability-adjusted life year (DALY) was originally conceptualised by Murray and Lopez in 33
1996 in work carried out by the WHO and World Bank as part of  the Global Burden of  Disease 
Project.
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diminished the usefulness of  mortality as an indicator.”  This assertion is founded 34
on a number of  persuasive bases.  
Firstly, although prioritisation of  health issues with respect to the degree to which 
they contribute to mortality alone may exclude those issues that whilst not being 
life-threatening are nevertheless severely debilitating (those of  a mental or 
physiological kind, for instance) for the majority of  most other major health issues 
the correlation between mortality and morbidity is remarkably strong.  Or, in other 35
words, those health issues that are responsible for the majority of  population 
mortality are also likely to contribute, in large part, to population morbidity. 
Likewise, measures aimed at reducing mortality will also tend to reduce morbidity. 
Secondly, the majority of  the burden of  ill health as measured by more 
sophisticated measures, such as in DALYs, is accounted for by mortality and this is 
only exaggerated in high mortality environments.  Thirdly and finally, mortality 36
data tend to be less prone to measurement error than data on disability, particularly 
in low-income, developing environments. It is for these combined reasons that 
mortality, specifically premature mortality, alone was used by the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) as the method for measuring the burden of  
disease.  In line with this same reasoning the framework that follows adopts the 37
same strategy. This is not to say, however, that those health issues which are 
 Nguyen, S., P. Jha, S. Yu, and F. Paccaud. “Indirect Estimates of  Avoidable Mortality in Low-34
income and Middle-income Countries.” (2001)
 A simple correlation between 2012 global mortality and DALY estimates reveal an R2 value of  35
0.9473, suggesting that almost 95% of  variation in morbidity can be explained by mortality. WHO 
Global Health Observatory Data Repository (2014) 
 For example, when looking specifically at the degree to which the DALY burden is carried by 36
mortality, in Brazil, 65% of  total DALYs lost are lost to mortality, in Botswana the figure is 75%. 
Ibid.
 WHO. Improving Health Outcomes of  the Poor: The Report of  Working Group 5 of  the Commission on 37
Macroeconomics and Health. 2002, pp. 22-23
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burdensome with respect to morbidity but are not with respect to mortality, are not 
important. The strategy to use mortality as the measure of  where a population’s 
health priorities lie has been followed since importance is being discussed with 
respect to a minimal level of  health, which meets basic physical health needs. All 
three of  the reasons for using mortality alone discussed above are relevant in an 
ever-stronger sense when applied to a minimal conception of  health.  
Looking merely to total mortality rates for determining the most important of  
health issues, however, may not reveal where the most important, remediable issues 
in fact lie. For instance, it may be the case that for a given population a certain issue, 
say cardiovascular disease, contributes a great deal to total mortality in that 
population (in later years of  life). But it may not necessarily follow that 
cardiovascular disease be a health issue that gains priority status for that population. 
This is because the mortality-contributing health issues of  the population in 
question need to be prioritised with reference to the degree to which mortality as a 
result of  these issues can be avoided versus the degree to which the resultant 
mortality may simply be an unavoidable part of  the human condition. Rather, what 
is required is a measure of  the extent to which issue-specific mortality could 
reasonably be averted through effective interventions that are generally available. 
This is a measure of  ‘avoidable mortality.’  38
 The concept of  avoidable mortality, as a measure of  the excess risk of  dying, was first introduced 38
by William Farr, a century and a half  ago. Farr’s work is distinguished by his use of  newly available 
statistical mortality data to test social hypotheses. One of  the hypotheses Farr tested was that towns 
in England were more unhealthy than districts in the countryside, and that there was a relationship 
between population density and the mortality rate. Then, using the ‘healthiest districts’ as a standard 
up to which the rest should theoretically be able to rise, he estimated the avoidable loss of  life in the 
‘unhealthy districts.’ “The children of  the idolatrous tribe who passed then through the fire to Moloch scarcely 
incurred more danger than is incurred by children born in several districts of  our large cities … a strict investigation 
of  all the circumstances of  the children's lives might lead to important discoveries, and may suggest remedies for evils of  
which it is difficult to exaggerate the magnitude.” Farr, W. “Letter to the Registrar General.” In Supplement to 
the 25th Annual Report of  the Registrar General for the Years 1850-60. 1864
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By comparing the issue-specific mortality rates of  a maximal high-mortality 
population with those of  a baseline low-mortality population, the difference in 
issue-specific mortality can be deemed as avoidable. “Avoidable mortality (or the 
excess risk of  dying) is thus a measure of  how much the health of  a population can 
be improved, using the lower mortality of  another population as a feasible goal.”  39
So then, how should such a reasonable maximal and feasible baseline be set? In the 
Nguyen et al. study, since what the authors are interested in is avoidable mortality in 
low-income and middle-income countries, mortality patterns in low and middle-
income countries characterise the high-mortality maximal. The study then 
constructs the mortality rates of  non-smokers in a hypothetical high-income 
country and uses these as the low-mortality baseline. This approach was 
subsequently accepted and adopted by the CMH on grounds that “it is not 
unreasonable to think of  this level of  health … as an ultimate aspiration,”  and that 40
such a level seems valid “as the baseline in an attempt to delineate the maximum 
conceivable improvement.”  For the purposes of  the analysis here, this same 41
reasoning has been applied. Specifically, mortality patterns in high-income countries 
have been used as the low-mortality baseline. The setting of  a maximal higher-
mortality population, however, needs a little more thought.  
The analysis here is not, directly, concerned with measuring avoidable mortality in 
low and middle-income countries so it may not necessarily be appropriate to use 
mortality patterns in low and middle-income countries as the maximal as in Nguyen 
et al. Instead, the analysis uses the concept of  avoidable mortality to assess the 
burden of  disease and identify priorities on the basis that those health issues that 
 Nguyen, S., P. Jha, S. Yu and F. Paccaud. Supra n. 34, p. 639
 WHO. Supra n. 37, p. 1940
 Ibid, p. 2041
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are most basic and can most easily be avoided should be prioritised; they are 
deemed most important. That being so, the maximal population needs to be one 
characterised by high-mortality where deaths from the most basic diseases are likely 
to be most prevalent. For this reason, the analysis here uses mortality patterns in 
low-income countries as the maximal population against which avoidable mortality 
will be measured.   
Since avoidable mortality within populations differs over the lifetime, (a reasonable 
proportion of  deaths in later years of  life are unavoidable, whilst the majority in 
childhood are not) the degree of  avoidable mortality must also be specified 
according to appropriate age intervals. Points a, b, c, and d in Figure 4.1 below 
illustrate how avoidable mortality can be calculated at given age intervals. 
Figure 4.1: Avoidable mortality 
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B. Data and methodology 
Estimates of  deaths by cause, age and sex used in the following worked example are 
based on summary estimates of  mortality rates for all WHO Member States  for 42
the year 2011 compiled by the Global Burden of  Disease Project (GBD) of  the 
WHO. The age groupings above age 5 in the GBD project (5 to 14, 30 to 49, 50 to 
69) have been maintained. The age groupings below age 5 (0 to 27 days, and 1 to 59 
months) have been summed to create a new age grouping of  0 to 4 years. Age, sex 
and issue-specific avoidable mortality has been estimated through a comparison of  
the risk of  dying in low-income countries as the maximal population with that of  
high-income countries as the baseline population. Calculating these risks involved 
taking the following five steps: 
Step 1. The number of  cause categories specified in the GBD data have been 
reduced and simplified from 134 specific causes to 29 higher-level key groups, 
(Appendix A.1). This simplification has been undertaken with reference to the 
International Classification of  Diseases (ICD)  and the groupings specified in 43
Nguyen et al.  The first level classifications of  the GBD have been maintained: 44
(Level I) Communicable, maternal, neonatal and nutritional conditions; (Level II) 
Non-communicable diseases; and (Level III) Injuries. 
Step 2. Total mortality rates, (nmx) and issue-specific mortality rates, (nmxδ) were given 
so that death ratios, (nCxδ) by sex and age interval — where n is the length of  the 
 Mortality estimates are based on analysis of  latest available national information on levels of  42
mortality and cause distributions as at the end of  May 2013 together with latest available information 
from WHO programs for causes of  public health importance. Data, methods and cause categories 
are described in a technical paper: WHO. “WHO Methods and Data Sources for Global Causes of  
Death 2000-2011.” (2013e) 
 WHO International Classification of  Diseases (ICD) 43
 Nguyen, S., P. Jha, S. Yu and F. Paccaud. Supra n. 34, p. 1644
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age interval, X is the beginning age of  the age interval, and δ is the specific issue — 
could be constructed as follows: 
       (1) 
Step 3. The risk of  dying (nqx) and the risk of  dying due to a specific cause (nqxδ) by 
age and sex have been calculated for each population based on the multiple 
decrement life table technique as follows:  45
       (2) 
       (3) 
Step 4. Avoidable mortality has been calculated as the difference in q between the 
two populations.  
Step 5. The contribution each health issue makes to overall mortality by sex and age 
has been calculated by dividing the issue-specific avoidable mortality rate by the 
total avoidable mortality rate in the population.   
C. Results 
i) Age-sex avoidable mortality, all causes and first-level causes 
Avoidable mortality by all health issues is greatest in the 50 to 69 age interval, where 
the excess risk of  dying is 16.5% and 15.4% for females and males, respectively, 
(Table 4.1). Avoidable mortality is also greater for females than for males in the 30 
to 49 age interval, however it is lower than that for males in the younger age 
intervals, 0 to 4 and 5 to 14. Though avoidable mortality is lowest for the 5 to 14 
n qX = 1− e−n(n mX )
n qXδ =n qX (n cXδ )






interval, for the relative contribution avoidable mortality makes to the total risk of  
dying, the ranking differs: relative contribution is highest in the 5 to 14 age interval 
where almost all of  the risk is avoidable for both females and males (95.6% and 
94.5% respectively). For the 0 to 4 age interval the results are similar. At the other 
end of  the age spectrum, ages 50 to 69, the results are vice versa. This means that 
the opportunity for improvement is greatest in the lower age intervals. These results 
are consistent with those found in Nguyen et al., specifically that “the proportion of  
avoidable mortality in the risk of  dying thus decreases with age.”  46
Table 4.1: Risk of  dying and avoidable mortality in low-income countries, all causes 
Illustrated in Figure 4.2, by GBD first-level causes, level I causes (Communicable, 
maternal, neonatal and nutritional conditions) are the largest contributors to 
avoidable mortality across all age intervals for males and all but the 50 to 69 interval 
for females. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these causes account for almost all of  avoidable 
deaths in the 0 to 4 age interval (90.7% for females and 91.2% for males) and more 
than two-thirds in the 5 to 14 interval (69.8% for females and 66.1% for males). 
Whilst still making a significant contribution to avoidable mortality in later life, the 
relative threat from level I causes diminishes as age increases for both females and 
Females Males
0-4 5-14 30-49 50-69 0-4 5-14 30-49 50-69
Risk of  dying in Low-income 8.5% 2.3% 11.0% 26.2% 9.5% 2.5% 12.0% 32.5%
Risk of  dying in High-income 0.9% 0.1% 2.0% 9.7% 1.2% 0.1% 3.4% 17.2%
Excess risk of  dying in Low-income country 
(avoidable mortality)
7.6% 2.2% 9.0% 16.5% 8.3% 2.4% 8.5% 15.4%
Relative contribution of  avoidable mortality to 
total risk of  dying in Low-income country 88.9% 95.6% 82.0% 63.0% 87.5% 94.5% 71.1% 47.2%
 Nguyen, S., P. Jha, S. Yu and F. Paccaud. Supra n. 34, p. 1146
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males. From age 30 upwards, the majority of  the reduced threat from level I causes 
is replaced by that from level II causes (Non-communicable diseases). For females 
in the 50 to 69 age interval level II causes are the main contributor to avoidable 
mortality. Full data tables are provided in Appendix A.2. 
Figure 4.2: GDB level-specific avoidable mortality contributions, females and males 
First level causes of  avoidable mortality give initial guidance as to where the 
majority of  the burden of  ill health is carried. However, such aggregation does not 
reveal whether issues within that level category contribute in equal part to avoidable 
mortality or whether there are in fact very few health issues that make up the lion’s 
share of  the excess risk of  dying. In order to determine the degree to which specific 
health issues contribute to overall avoidable mortality, an analysis of  age-sex-issue-
specific avoidable mortality is required. 
ii) Age-sex-issue-specific avoidable mortality 
In the 0 to 4 age interval, over 80% of  avoidable mortality is attributable to only six 
issue-specific contributors with just one issue responsible for one quarter of  
avoidable mortality. The most important contributors are the same for both females 
and males in the age interval with only very minor variation in the degree of  their 
































and vector diseases (17% and 17.2%), respiratory infections (16.7% and 16.9%), 
diarrhoeal diseases (11.9% and 12.1%), nutritional deficiencies (5.5% and 5.6%), 
and Childhood cluster diseases (4.6% and 4.7%), (Figure 4.3). In the 5 to 14 age 
interval, the profile is somewhat different from that of  the earliest years of  life, the 
biggest differences being the entry of  HIV/AIDS (11.8% for females and 11.1% 
for males) and unintentional injuries (11.3% for females and 14.9% for males) to the 
list.  
As age increases, the issue-specific avoidable mortality profile changes markedly. In 
the 30 to 49 age interval HIV/AIDS is by far the greatest contributor, making up 
over one third of  all avoidable deaths for both females and males. Maternal 
conditions are the second most important contributor for females (12%) whilst 
Tuberculosis occupies the same spot for males (11.7%). Interestingly, however, 
other level I causes such as diarrhoeal diseases (5.8% and 5.7%), respiratory 
infections (4.5% and 5.9%), and nutritional deficiencies (3.5% and 3.1%) remain 
important throughout the life-span for both females and males. 
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Figure 4.3: Issue-specific avoidable mortality, females and males 
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D. Implications for prioritising health issues  
The criteria for determining which items make up the health basket includes the 
criterion that the items must relate to health issues that are important with respect 
to their burden. The purpose of  the exercise above is to demonstrate how cause-
specific mortality data can be utilised to measure such importance. One of  the key 
results from the test is that the health issues responsible for the burden are few in 
number, and accordingly, focus on these issues would improve the global mortality 
profile significantly. But it is in the task of  ranking and prioritising health issues 
where the added value of  using avoidable, rather than total, mortality is generated. 
For illustrative purposes, the differences in issue-specific burden rankings between 
total and avoidable mortality rates in females aged 30 to 49 are presented in Table 
4.2.  
The table reveals that differences in relative importance between the two measures 
are many. Maternal conditions, to take just one example, ranks as the 16th most 
important issue with respect to total deaths, however, ranks 2nd most important in 
terms of  deaths that can be avoided. Such a finding indicates that though there may 
be certain health issues which carry with them a relatively high mortality rate within 
the population, the extent to which these issues can reasonably be avoided may be 
relatively small. By the same token, there are then health issues where the potential 
opportunities for improvement are great yet, if  specified only by the total mortality 
rate, would otherwise not be prioritised. Measuring importance by the degree to 
which specific health issues contribute to avoidable mortality therefore sets a more 
achievable standard towards which states have an obligation to aim; a standard that 
is also more consistent with the notion of  minimalism defended throughout this 
thesis. 
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Table 4.2: Issue-specific rankings, females aged 30 to 49  
Returning to the specific task of  health-issue-prioritisation, with this strategy in 
hand, the health issues that are responsible for the majority of  deaths across age and 
sex have been identified as: (i) maternal conditions; (ii) neonatal conditions; (iii) 
parasitic and vector diseases; (iv) respiratory infections; (v) diarrhoeal diseases; (vi) 
nutritional deficiencies; (vii) childhood cluster diseases; (viii) HIV/AIDS; and (ix) 
Tuberculosis. It is worth acknowledging here the omission of  mental health-related 
ailments amongst the items in the health basket. Because the health basket is 
determined with reference to the degree to which health issues contribute to 
mortality, not morbidity, it is unlikely that mental health issues be identified as 




Malignant neoplasms 1 5
Cardiovascular diseases 2 3
Unintentional injuries 3 8
Intentional injuries 4 19
Digestive diseases 5 10
Mental and behavioral disorders 6 29
Neurological conditions 7 18
Other noncommunicable diseases 8 11
Respiratory diseases 9 15
Endocrine, blood, immune disorders 10 16
Diabetes mellitus 11 17
Respiratory infections 12 7
HIV/AIDS 13 1
Other infectious diseases 14 14
Other neoplasms 15 22
Maternal conditions 16 2
Acute hepatitis C 17 28
Tuberculosis 18 6
Nutritional deficiencies 19 9
Diarrhoeal diseases 20 4
Acute hepatitis B 21 21
Meningitis 22 13
STDs excluding HIV 23 23
Parasitic and vector diseases 24 12
Encephalitis 25 20
Neonatal conditions 26 27
Sense organ diseases 27 26
Childhood-cluster diseases 28 24
Intestinal nematode infections 29 25
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important through the framework. Comparing the differences between a health 
basket determined by mortality and one determined by morbidity would be an 
interesting and valuable exercise. However, at least at present, the quality and 
availability of  morbidity data does not make this comparison possible.  
Importance, however, is only one part of  the health basket criteria. The process 
from identification of  an important health issue to its inclusion in the health basket 
is not automatic. Rather what is additionally required is an assessment of  whether 
there are indeed effective and appropriate interventions available that are cost-
effective and can feasibly be scaled-up. Continuing on from the results of  the 
preceding analysis, these two further tests will be explored in the remainder of  this 
chapter.  
III. Feasibility: assessing interventions 
For each of  the health issues identified and prioritised by the process outlined 
above, it is likely that there exist many effective interventions, which, if  applied 
broadly across the population, would significantly reduce their respective burden. 
The literature on testing the effectiveness of  different clinical interventions aiming 
to tackle individual and combined health issues is now vast and, for purposes here, 
will be drawn upon to identify and prioritise which interventions are most effective 
and most capable of  being “scaled-up.”  Feasibility of  delivery at high levels of  47
population coverage is a central element of  the effectiveness criterion. In 
acknowledgement of  the wide variation in what is feasible across different resource 
environments, interventions will be chosen on the basis of  amenability to high 
 WHO. Supra n. 37, p. 25. 47
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levels of  implementation in low-resource environments. Feasibility in wealthier 
resource environments is therefore assumed. 
It is worth being explicit here on the difference between the criterion of  feasibility 
and the condition of  ability. The feasibility threshold is applied at the health basket 
formation stage and essentially helps specify the health interventions that are to be 
included. The feasibility threshold is necessary since the health basket under 
consideration must represent some kind of  minimal standard and as such needs to 
be amenable to population level scale-up across space. For instance, it could be the 
case that a particular health issue falls under the umbrella of  primary health care 
and it has been identified as being important. Cancer could be just one example. 
However, when a diagnosis is made, it will often be made at a late stage of  disease 
when people become symptomatic or when they have been suffering with long-
term disabilities.  At this advanced stage of  the disease, expensive high-technology 48
interventions are required for treatment, such as radiation therapy, chemotherapy 
and even stem cell therapy.  
These interventions are not ‘best buys’ in low and middle-income countries. 
According to the WHO and World Bank criteria for determining cost-effectiveness, 
an intervention is defined as ‘very cost-effective’ if  it is capable of  generating an 
extra year of  healthy life for less than the average annual income per person 
(measured as GDP per capita) in the resource setting where it will be applied. 
Interventions that produce a healthy life year for more than the average annual 
income per person but still cost less than three times average per capita income are 
defined as ‘cost-effective.’ But to be considered a ‘best buy,’ an intervention also 
needs to be “pragmatic and feasible to implement in close to client, non-specialised 
 WHO. Global Status Report on Noncommunicable Diseases 2010. 2010, p. 6248
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health-care settings.”  As such, expensive cancer therapies are not appropriate 49
health basket candidates since they cannot be deemed minimal. This is why a 
feasibility threshold is required.   
Prioritising a set of  important, PHC-type best buys is therefore a pragmatic step in 
defining the content of  a minimal right to health. But whilst a comprehensive set of  
best buy interventions most likely could be implemented universally in high-income 
countries, this may not be the case for low and middle-income countries. It is more 
likely these countries will still have to make choices. What can be expected of  these 
countries in terms of  delivery will depend on competing health priorities and the 
capacity of  the health system to deal with them. This is essentially the condition of  
ability.  
A. Maternal and neonatal health 
Overall, substantial progress has been made towards achieving the fifth Millennium 
Development Goal of  improving maternal health. Many countries have seen the 
number of  mothers and newborns dying from maternal and neonatal conditions 
getting smaller and the coverage rates of  effective interventions getting larger.  50
Though these observations do provide substance for initial optimism, still there 
remain close to 300,000 women who die each year during pregnancy, childbirth or 
soon thereafter,  and around four million babies who die in the first 28 days of  51
life.  Whilst in most cases complications arising due to maternal and neonatal 52
 WHO. Supra n. 37; and Ibid, p. 6749
 Bryce, J. et al. “Countdown to 2015 for Maternal, Newborn, and Child Survival: The 2008 Report 50
on Tracking Coverage of  Interventions.” (2008)
 WHO. Global Health Observatory Data Repository, Global Burden of  Disease, 2011 estimates51
 Lawn J., S. Cousens, Z. Bhutta, G. Darmstadt, J. Martines, and V. Paul. “Why are 4 Million 52
Newborn Babies Dying Each Year?” (2004)
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conditions cannot be predicted or prevented, with the appropriate intervention, 
most deaths arising from them could be.  The question that remains is then what is 53
the most appropriate PHC intervention, or set of  PHC interventions, that have the 
greatest potential for reducing mortality in mothers and newborns?  
Over the past ten years, it has become clear that instead of  thinking about maternal 
and newborn health as separate entities, the focus should be one more characterised 
by a “continuum of  care,”  that is life-cyclical, and begins from before pregnancy 54
and runs through to pregnancy, birth, the postnatal period and even into childhood. 
Starting from the continuum of  care as an initial framework then, the next step is to 
determine what are the essential intervention packages within that frame. 
To begin at the start of  the continuum, pre-pregnancy, the most direct link between 
the use of  contraceptive methods and maternal and newborn mortality is obvious: 
pregnancy is a prerequisite for maternal and neonatal death so to prevent pregnancy 
is to prevent maternal and neonatal deaths. But understanding the degree to which 
maternal and neonatal deaths can be avoided through contraception is a little less 
obvious; widening access to contraception has the potential to reduce maternal and 
neonatal mortality by even more than the revealed relative risk of  dying from 
maternal or neonatal conditions suggests. It has a particular life-saving strength. 
This strength lies in the fact that the risk profile across target groups — women 
 WHO. Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990 to 2010 WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA and The World Bank 53
estimates. 2012a (The majority of  maternal deaths are attributable to haemorrhage, infection, 
conditions related to high blood pressure (e.g. eclampsia), unsafe abortion, and obstructed labour.) 
WHO Global Burden of  Disease, 2011 estimates. (The majority of  deaths amongst newborns are 
caused by preterm birth, infection (predominantly tetanus), and asphyxia.)
 Kerber, K.J. et al. “Continuum of  Care for Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health: from Slogan to 54
Service Delivery.” (2007) The continuum concept has been resoundingly endorsed by the 
Countdown to 2015 movement, (in their associated Lancet Series papers), appears in the 2005 World 
Health Report and provides the framework of  the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child 
Health (PMNCH).
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who wish to have more children and women who do not — differs. Specifically, the 
risk of  maternal and neonatal death is greater in cases where women of  
reproductive age want to avoid pregnancy but are not using a modern contraceptive 
method, or in other words, where there exists an unmet need for contraception.  55
This increased risk of  mortality manifests not only in the form of  unsafe abortions 
but also from giving birth in adolescence or in older age and from shorter intervals 
between births, all of  which could be tempered through a programme of  family 
planning. To illustrate, take the simplified hypothetical case that the total risk of  
death from maternal and neonatal conditions is 1% (0.001/1,000). But for target 
group A (women who wish to have more children) the risk is lower, 0.1% 
(0.0001/1,000) and for target group B (women who wish to avoid pregnancy) the 
risk is higher, 1.9% (0.0019/1,000). Assuming that contraception prevents all 
pregnancies perfectly, provision of  contraception where there is an unmet need (for 
target group B) would reduce the total risk to the target group A level, 0.1%. 
Recent evidence suggests that this logic does indeed hold.  Yet, despite the slight 56
rise in global coverage of  contraception over the past twenty years, (from 54% in 
1990 to 57% in 2012) over half  of  women of  reproductive age in Africa, and more 
than one fifth in Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean still have an acute 
 Singh, S. et al. “Adding It Up: The Costs and Benefits of  Investing In Family Planning and 55
Maternal and Newborn Health.” (2009) (“In 2008, modern contraceptive use prevented 188 million 
unintended pregnancies, 1.2 million newborn deaths, and 230,000 maternal deaths and other negative 
health outcomes that would have occurred in the absence of  any modern method use.”) p. 19
 For example, Ahmed, S., Q. Li, L. Liu and A.O. Tsui. “Maternal Deaths Averted by Contraceptive 56
Use: An Analysis of  172 Countries.” (2012) (estimate that contraceptive use is likely to be 
responsible for preventing more than 272,000 maternal deaths each year and that by satisfying the 
unmet need for contraception globally, a further 30 percent of  maternal deaths could be avoided.) 
Tsui, A.O. and A.A. Creanga. “Does Contraceptive Use Reduce Neonatal and Infant Mortality? 
Findings from a Multi-Country Analysis.” (2009) (present similar evidence, which suggests that the 
use of  contraception significantly improves neonatal and infant survival and does so through two 
pathways: firstly, through preventing unwanted pregnancies, which may have resulted in neonatal 
death and, secondly, through longer intervals between births.) 
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unmet need for modern contraception.  This presents an opportunity for reducing, 57
quite dramatically, mortality in mothers and newborns.  
Beyond adolescence and pre-pregnancy-related interventions, several Lancet Series’ 
have tracked interventions for single periods along the continuum also, such as 
maternal,  neonatal,  and child  survival. Meta analyses published as part of  the 58 59 60
Maternal Survival Series in 2006 suggest that the majority of  maternal and neonatal 
deaths occur during the period of  labour, delivery and the immediate postpartum 
period.  In terms of  prioritising interventions that are most effective for reducing 61
these deaths, these findings provide a persuasive argument for prioritising those 
interventions that focus on skilled care given during labour and delivery. Indeed 
global estimates similarly indicate that a large proportion of  the variance in maternal 
mortality rates between countries can be explained by whether births are attended 
by a skilled attendant or not,  which has led to the joint UN and WHO advocation 62
of  “skilled care at every birth” and the inclusion of  proportion of  births attended 
by a skilled health provider as one of  the two indicators for measuring progress 
toward the fifth Millennium Development Goal.  
Whilst it is acknowledged that where women give birth, who the attendant is and 
the ease of  process to referral-level care (if  and when it is needed) are all crucial 
 WHO. Family planning Factsheet 351, May 2013 (2013d)57
 Ronsmans, C., and W.J. Graham. “Maternal Mortality: Who, When, Where, and Why?” (2006)58
 Lawn, J.E., S. Cousens, and J. Zupan. “4 Million Neonatal Deaths: When? Where? Why?” (2005)59
 Black, R.E., S.S Morris, and J. Bryce. “Where and Why are 10 Million Children Dying Every Year?” 60
(2003) 
 Ronsmans, C., and W.J. Graham. Supra n. 5861
 See e.g. Loudon, I.“The Transformation of  Maternal Mortality” (1992); and De Browere, V., R. 62
Tonglet, and W. van Lerberghe. “Strategies for Reducing Maternal Mortality in Developing 
Countries: What Can We Learn from the History of  the Industrialised West?” (1998)
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parts of  the general effectiveness picture, determining precisely whose skills and 
which type of  equipment dominate the causal pathway from skilled attendants to 
lower mortality is too complex a task to be discussed in any detail here. Instead, it is 
sufficient to note that recent evidence suggests that first-level care given during 
labour and delivery, that is care given in a local health centre by skilled midwives, is 
the strategy most likely to prevent obstetric deaths.  Indeed this has been borne out 63
in the data from historical country studies of  Sweden, the USA, England and 
Wales,  and from more contemporary studies of  Malaysia and Sri Lanka.  64 65
Outside of  the period of  labour and delivery, assuming such first-level health 
centres are “close-to-client”  or close enough for women to give birth in, they are 66
equally close in case of  complications during the antenatal and/or those same 
skilled attendants can resolve postnatal problems quickly. One of  the greatest 
threats to neonatal survival is infection, and more often than not the threat is one 
of  tetanus as a result of  unhygienic delivery.  Yet, tetanus deaths can easily be 67
prevented by cleaner delivery practices and/or by immunising pregnant mothers 
with tetanus. Likewise for mothers living in areas where malaria is prevalent or for 
mothers living with HIV/AIDS, presumptive treatment of  malaria or the rollout of  
antiretroviral drugs “can reduce incidence of  low birth weight, stillbirths, and 
 Campbell, O.M.R., and W.J. Graham. “Strategies For Reducing Maternal Mortality: Getting On 63
With What Works” (2006); Bale, J., B. Stoll, A. Mack, and A. Lucas. “Improving Birth Outcomes: 
Meeting the Challenges in the Developing World” (2003); WHO. The World Health Report 2005 - Make 
Every Mother and Child Count. 2005
 Loudon, I. “Death in Childbirth: An International Study of  Maternal Care and Maternal Mortality 64
1800-1950.” (1992)
 Pathmanathan, I., J. Liljestrand, and J.M. Martins. “Investing in Maternal Health: Learning from 65
Malaysia and Sri Lanka.” (2003)
 WHO. Supra n. 3766
 Bryce, J. et al. Supra n. 5067
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neonatal and maternal mortality.”  When considered under the continuum of  care 68
umbrella, the relationship between skilled attendants at birth and falling maternal 
and neonatal mortality may not, therefore, only be direct (in the sense that deaths 
are averted at the time of  childbirth) but it may also operate indirectly as a means 
for distributing other services, which likewise save lives. Antenatal interventions can 
be administered effectively on time and/or postnatal problems can be resolved 
quickly by those same skilled attendants. This evidence challenges previous 
conventional wisdom, which advocated strategies focussed on antenatal screening 
and the training of  traditional birth attendants, both of  which have since been 
found to be neither the most effective nor cost-effective means for reducing 
maternal and neonatal mortality.  69
Analysing the cost-effectiveness of  interventions with respect to the prevention and 
treatment of  maternal and neonatal conditions is a challenging task, not least due to 
the number of  conditions that may present and therefore the vast number of  single 
or combined interventions it is possible to compare, but due to the difficulty of  
separating the costs and effectiveness of  services that have mutual relationships 
with respect to joint costs and co-morbidities. Attempts to systematically specify the 
content of  intervention packages aimed at preventing and/or treating these 
conditions that are most cost-effective, are therefore, relatively few. Amidst the 
dearth, however, from the studies that have attempted the task, a picture of  
consensus has emerged.  
 WHO. Supra n. 63, p. 8668
 Ibid, Chapter 4 and 5; Campbell, O. “What are Maternal Health Policies in Developing Countries 69
and Who Drives Them? A Review of  the Last Half  Century.” (2001); Rooney, C. “Antenatal Care 
and Maternal Health: How Effective Is It? A Review of  the Evidence.” (1992); Sibley, L.M., and T.A. 
Sipe. “What Can Meta-Analysis Tell Us About Traditional Birth Attendant Training and Pregnancy 
Outcomes?” (2004)
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As part of  the Disease Control Priorities Project (DCP) in 2004, Doherty and 
Govender conducted a systematic review of  studies that had, up until that point, 
attempted to measure the cost-effectiveness of  primary care services in developing 
countries. Whilst acknowledging methodological differences in measuring cost-
effectiveness, the review revealed that in all studies where maternity-related 
interventions were considered, skilled birth attendance and antenatal care (including 
tetanus toxoid vaccination and routine malaria prophylaxis) are both cost-effective 
ways of  reducing the burden of  maternal and neonatal conditions.  Similar results 70
were found in a study conducted for the Neonatal Survival Series in 2005.  Later, in 71
2006, the DCP also analysed the costs of  scaling-up access to modern 
contraception and the benefits with respect to reductions in maternal and neonatal 
mortality and morbidity from increasing the length of  birth intervals and reducing 
the number of  pregnancies taking place in adolescence.  The study revealed that 72
meeting the need for modern contraception would cost from as little as $30 per 
DALY averted in South Asia to a maximum of  $60 per DALY averted in East Asia 
and the Pacific.  By international standards, and the criteria used here, this is very 73
cost-effective. As such, the DCP considers meeting the need for contraception as 
one of  global public health’s “best buys.”  74
 Doherty, J. and R. Govender. “The Cost-Effectiveness of  Primary Care Services in Developing 70
Countries: A Review of  the International Literature.” (2004)
 Darmstadt, G.L., Z.A. Bhutta, S Cousens, T. Adam, N. Walker, and L. de Bernis. “Evidence-Based, 71
Cost-Effective Interventions: How Many Newborn Babies Can We Save?” (2005)
 Cost-effectiveness in the DCP study is expressed as the cost per disability-adjusted life year 72
(DALY) averted through the implementation of  interventions in U.S. dollars for the year 2001. The 
DALY measure used includes years of  life lost (YLL) for both maternal and neonatal outcomes plus 
maternal years lived with morbidity. Though the focus of  the analysis in this chapter is an assessment 
of  the degree to which interventions reduce mortality specifically, the morbidity element in this study 
(and others referred to throughout the chapter) is likely to be very small and therefore is a reasonable 
enough proxy for assessing costs per year of  life lost.
 Levine, R. et al., “Contraception.” In Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries, Jamison, D.T. et 73
al., (eds.) 2006, pp. 1193–1209.
 World Bank. Why Contraception is Considered a Best Buy: Family Planning Saves Lives and Spurs 74
Development. 2007
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B. Child health 
Like maternal and neonatal mortality, around the world, childhood mortality is 
falling year-on-year. The rate of  under-five mortality is now almost 50 percent lower 
than it was only twenty years ago. Yet, it is still the case that more than six and a 
half  million children do not live to see their fifth birthday. The biggest concerns 
underlying these statistics are, however, that just shy of  two thirds of  these child 
deaths are a result of  infectious diseases, the vast majority of  which are easily 
preventable or treatable,  and that the burden is increasingly being carried by the 75
most marginalised children living in the poorest regions of  the world.  76
Improvement in reducing the rate of  child mortality is clearly linked to 
improvements in wealth and economic development more broadly. And again, 
looking within the continuum, child health is also linked to improved maternal 
health and progress against maternal mortality. But there are also child-specific 
interventions, which have an unrivalled track record when it comes to the speed at 
which progress has been achieved, even in the presence of  economic 
underdevelopment. 
In their contribution to the Child Survival Series, Jones et al., estimated that by 
increasing current coverage levels of  evidence-based interventions that are available 
today to universal coverage (specified at 99%), up to 63% of  all child deaths could 
be averted.  These interventions include those that are preventative, (e.g. 77
 WHO Global Health Observatory Data Repository, Global Burden of  Disease, 2011 estimates. 75
(Pneumonia, diarrhoeal disease and malaria (in that order) are the prime causes of  mortality in 
children aged from one month to five years old.)
 UN Millennium Development Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality Factsheet, September 200876
 Jones, G., R. Steketee, R. Black, Z. Bhutta and S. Morris. “How Many Child Deaths Can We 77
Prevent This Year?” (2003) (The measure and specification of  interventions that are effective and 
evidence-based were determined through both systematic reviews by the authors of  the Child 
Survival Group and from published articles with respect to the causal effect on reducing mortality 
from the major causes of  under-five deaths.) pp. 66-68
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immunisation including measles, BCG, polio, DPT, and Hib; insecticide-treated nets 
for prevention against malaria; adequate nutrition to prevent diarrhoea, pneumonia, 
malaria and measles; and water, sanitation and hygiene for the prevention of  
diarrhoeal disease)  and those which are treatments (e.g. oral rehydration therapies; 78
antibiotics for pneumonia and dysentery; antimalarials; zinc and vitamin A 
supplementation). 
So far as child health is concerned, the preventative and therapeutic interventions 
aimed at specific childhood diseases, as noted by Jones et al., are now widely 
accepted in the literature as both effective and cost-effective ways of  preventing 
childhood disease, and therefore mitigating child mortality, particularly when 
delivered through an Integrated Management of  Childhood Illness (IMCI) 
strategy.  However, there remains some disagreement with regards to the more 79
wide-ranging preventative interventions, such as water and sanitation. Though it is 
acknowledged that these interventions are effective for reducing the burden of  
most childhood illnesses, particularly diarrhoeal disease,  their respective cost-80
effectiveness, in terms of  the direct benefits specific to health, is contested. Indeed 
Walsh and Warren concluded that the cost per death averted for providing water 
supplies and sanitation is much greater than that of  curative measures.  This is, in 81
 This package of  interventions has since been reiterated in the Lancet Childhood Pneumonia and 78
Diarrhoea Series, for example in, Bhutta, Z.A. et al. “Interventions to Address Deaths from 
Childhood Pneumonia and Diarrhoea Equitably: What Works and at What Cost?” (2013)
 See, e.g. Bryce, J., C.G. Victora, J.P. Habicht, R.E. Black, and R.W. Scherpbier. “Programmatic 79
Pathways to Child Survival: Results of  a Multi-Country Evaluation of  Integrated Management of  
Childhood Illness” (2005); Bryce, J., C.G. Victora, J.P. Habicht, J.P. Vaughan, and R.E. Black. “The 
Multi-Country Evaluation of  the Integrated Management of  Childhood Illness Strategy: Lessons for 
the Evaluation of  Public Health Interventions.” (2004)
 “An estimated 94% of  the diarrhoeal burden of  disease is attributable to the environment, and 80
associated with risk factors such as unsafe drinking water, lack of  sanitation and poor hygiene.” 
Prüss-Üstün, A., and C. Corvalán. “Preventing Disease Through Healthy Environments: Toward an 
Estimate of  the Environmental Burden of  Disease.” (2006) Quoted in Clasen, T.F., and L. Haller 
“Water Quality Interventions to Prevent Diarrhoea: Cost and Cost-Effectiveness.” (2008) p. 1
 Walsh, J.A. and K.S. Warren. Supra n. 16, p. 97181
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essence, the traditional selective vs. comprehensive primary health care debate in 
repeat. However, it may be too hasty to dismiss water and sanitation as viable 
candidates for the health basket based on these early studies since cost-effectiveness 
estimates of  interventions aimed towards the underlying determinants of  health for 
reducing mortality (e.g. investments in water and sanitation) are likely to be 
underestimated for a number of  important reasons.  
Firstly, the benefits tend only to be calculated in terms of  reduced mortality from 
very few diseases, albeit diseases known to be precipitated, in large part, by a lack of  
access to water and sanitation, e.g. diarrhoeal diseases. But if  reduced mortality 
from conditions other than these are taken into account, the additional benefits may 
be substantial.  The reduced risk of  mortality from nutritional deficiencies provides 82
a good example.  
In 2011, Fink et al. conducted a comprehensive study based on over one million 
children across 70 countries, which analysed the associations of  access to drinking 
water and sanitation with child diarrhoea, stunting and mortality. Controlling for as 
many of  the potentially confounding factors as possible, the study suggests that the 
provision of  water and sanitation infrastructure has a strong protective effect across 
all of  the child health outcomes measured. What is particularly interesting about this 
study, however, is that whilst the results correspond to what is generally already 
 The seminal study by Esrey et al. found that “the median reduction in morbidity for diarrhoea, 82
trachoma, and ascariasis induced by water supplies and/or sanitation was 26%, 27%, and 29%, 
respectively; the median reduction for schistosomiasis and dracunculiasis was higher, at 77% and 
78%, respectively. All studies of  hookworm infection were flawed apart from one, which reported a 
4% reduction in incidence.” Esrey, S.A., J.B. Potash, L. Roberts, and C. Shiff. “Effects of  Improved 
Water Supply and Sanitation on Ascariasis, Diarrhoea, Dracunculiasis, Hookworm Infection, 
Schistosomiasis, and Trachoma.” (1991) Access to improved water and sanitation also lowers the risk 
of  severe infection with other (non-fecally-transmitted) diseases, reducing the risk of  child mortality 
from these diseases. Clasen, T. et al. “Cost-Effectiveness of  Water Quality Interventions for 
Preventing Diarrheal Disease in Developing Countries” (2007); Caulfield, L.E., et al. “Undernutrition 
as an Underlying Cause of  Child Deaths Associated with Diarrhea, Pneumonia, Malaria, and 
Measles.” (2004)
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known in the literature with regards to water, sanitation and diarrhoea (the study 
suggests that access to high quality sanitation and a high quality water supply 
reduces the probability of  child diarrhoea by 13% and 8%, respectively) the effect 
of  water and sanitation on malnutrition is even greater. The risk of  stunting is 
reduced by 9% and 27%, respectively.  The study suggests that the trend in 83
mortality from these diseases is likely to be similar. 
Secondly, the costs are estimated on the basis of  being generally sufficient for all 
contexts. However, in more favourable contexts it may be possible to implement 
water supplies and sanitation at lower-than-estimated cost. And thirdly, the 
economies of  scale from combining implementation of  water supplies and 
sanitation may also be substantial. For example, sanitation combined with hygiene 
promotion and/or water pipe laying combined with sewerage pipe laying is likely, in 
total, to cost less and be more effective than the sum of  each of  the individual 
parts.    84
Bearing these limitations in mind, a more recent study, conducted under the 
auspices of  the World Bank, estimates the average cost per life-year saved from 
improved access to water and sanitation to be significantly below the international 
benchmark for deeming an intervention “very cost-effective.” On average, the 
results reveal the cost per life-year saved is between 0.65 and 0.72 times GDP per 
 Fink, G., I. Günther, and K. Hill. “The Effect of  Water and Sanitation on Child Health: Evidence 83
from the Demographic and Health Surveys 1986–2007.” (2011) It is also worthwhile noting that the 
results of  one of  the first systematic reviews of  causal links between water, sanitation and hygiene 
(WASH) and nutritional status suggests that “WASH interventions confer a small benefit on growth 
in children under five years of  age.” The study acknowledges, however, that all of  the studies 
reviewed suffer in some way from study size and/or methodological quality issues and therefore the 
results should be treated as tentative until more rigorous large-scale results are reported. Dangour, 
A.D. et al. “Interventions to Improve Water Quality and Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene Practices, 
and Their Effects on the Nutritional Status of  Children.” (2013)
 Cairncross, S., and V. Valdmanis “Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene Promotion.” In Disease 84
Control Priorities in Developing Countries, Jamison, D.T. et al., (eds.) 2006, Chapter 41
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capita in Sub-Saharan Africa and between 0.75 and 0.82 time GDP per capita in 
other developing regions.  It is also worth noting that still, these estimates are likely 85
to underestimate the true cost-effectiveness of  water and sanitation for reducing 
child mortality. The estimates should be viewed as “lower-bound” since the 
estimated benefits do not account for any of  the “positive spillovers”  generated 86
from improved access to water, and in particular sanitation, whilst the costs have 
been estimated at the “upper-bound,”  which is likely to overestimate the true 87
financial commitment required for their provision. Based on this more sensitive 
evidence, the provision of  water and sanitation infrastructure does fit within what 
can be deemed as feasible given the criteria of  effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. 
C. Adult health 
Of  all the health issues responsible for avoidable deaths in the adult population 
analysed earlier, HIV/AIDS is by far the most important. Though the annual 
number of  people dying from AIDS-related causes has been steadily decreasing 
worldwide, from a peak of  2.3 million in 2005 to an estimated 1.6 million in 2012,  88
1.6 million deaths is still an alarming statistic particularly when disaggregated by 
 Günther, I., and G. Fink. Supra n. 83, p. 2785
 The mortality estimates used in the study “only capture the direct child mortality effects of  water 86
and sanitation infrastructure, that is, the private mortality benefits that accrue at the child or 
household level, without taking into account any positive externalities, and without taking into 
account morbidity effects.” It is not unreasonable to assume, however, that improved water and 
sanitation are associated with considerable improvements in morbidity and overall wellbeing.
 The study uses the “upper-bound” estimates of  costs from Hutton and Haller (2004) to avoid an 87
underestimation of  the true costs of  proving water and sanitation infrastructure. Hutton, G., and L. 
Haller. “Evaluation of  Costs and Benefits of  Water and Sanitation Improvements at the Global 
Level.” (2004) 
 Estimates [2.1–2.6 million] in 2005 and [1.4–1.9 million] in 2012. WHO (2013) Global Health 88
Observatory Data Repository
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location: the bulk of  the burden being carried by those living in countries where 
resources are most constrained.  89
The HIV/AIDS epidemic is a special health case. A panacea does not yet exist. But 
there is still reason for optimism. Recent breakthrough scientific findings have 
completely shifted the orientation of  the discussion about how best to manage the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Arguments about the relative virtues and flaws of  prevention 
strategies versus treatment strategies are now outdated. Instead, what has become 
clear is that the discussion needs to be one focussed on treatment as prevention, 
through the implementation of  antiretroviral therapy (ART).  The life-saving and 90
life-prolonging benefits of  ART are manifestly evident.  According to the Global 91
Plan, the scaling up of  ART had already averted 4.2 million deaths in low and 
middle-income countries by the end of  2012.  Moreover, ART not only ultimately 92
saves lives but also allows those individuals living with HIV to live longer, healthier 
lives. Recent studies confirm that people living with HIV in both high-income and 
low and middle-income countries who are in receipt of  ART can expect to see 
improvements in their life expectancy to a level close to that seen in the general 
 The mortality rate from HIV/AIDS in Sub Saharan Africa is 114 per 100,000 population 89
compared the rest of  the world where rates range between 4 per 100,000 population in Eastern Asia 
to 12 in South-Eastern Asia. 
 “Treatment as prevention is a term used to describe HIV prevention methods in which people 90
living with HIV use ART, independent of  CD4 cell count, to decrease the chance of  onward HIV 
transmission.” WHO. Global Update on HIV Treatment: Results, Impact and Opportunities. 2013b p. 43
 Mahy, M., et al. “Estimating the Impact of  Antiretroviral Therapy: Regional and Global Estimates 91
of  Life-Years Gained Among Adults.” (2010) (An estimated 14.4 million life-years have been gained 
among adults globally between 1995 and 2009 as a result of  ART.)  
 WHO. Global Monitoring Framework and Strategy for the Global Plan Towards the Elimination of  New HIV 92
Infections Among Children by 2013 and Keeping their Mothers Alive. 2012b. Also, at the country level, the 
WHO’s Global Update on HIV shows that for Brazil, whilst non-AIDS-related mortality has 
remained generally static over the past three decades, AIDS-related mortality has fallen dramatically 
from 9.2 deaths per 100 person-years in 1986 to 1.4 deaths per 100 person-years in 2007-2009. This 
follows the trend in Brazil’s increased political (and legal) commitment to providing access to ART.
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population.  For example, in one South African study of  almost 40,000 people 93
living with HIV, the authors report “patients starting ART have life expectancies 
around 80% of  normal life expectancy.”  Between 2009 and 2011 overall life 94
expectancy at birth in South Africa has increased from 56.5 to 60 years, which 
according to the South African Medical Research Council, has been due, in large 
part, to the rollout of  ART.   95
Notwithstanding the life-saving and life-prolonging benefits of  ART the most 
remarkable finding to come out of  the latest research, from both clinical trials and 
programme settings, is confirmation of  the preventative benefits of  ART.  The 96
landmark HPTN 052 trial in 2011, which reported that early initiation of  ART 
lowers the probability of  HIV transmission between couples with mixed HIV status 
by 96%,  has been closely followed by validation that ‘treatment as prevention’ also 97
works at the population level. Evidence of  substantial reductions in the rate of  new 
HIV infections at the population-level has most recently come from studies of  
South Africa with, for example, one study reporting a 38% decline in the likelihood 
of  new HIV-acquisition in communities where ART coverage is high (30 to 40% of  
all treatment-eligible individuals receiving ART) compared to communities where 
 Nakagawa F., M. May, and A. Phillips. “Life Expectancy Living with HIV: Recent Estimates and 93
Future Implications.” (2013)
 Johnson, L.F., et al. “Life Expectancies of  South African Adults Starting Antiretroviral Treatment: 94
Collaborative Analysis of  Cohort Studies.” (2013) p. 5 (The average life expectancy of  men starting 
ART varied between 27.6 years at age 20 and 10.1 years at age 60. For women the estimates were 
between 36.6 at 20 and 14.4 years at 60.)
 Bradshaw, D., R.E. Dorrington, and R. Laubscher. “Rapid Mortality Surveillance Report 95
2011.” (2012) 
 Karim, S.S. and Q.A. Karim. “Antiretroviral Prophylaxis: A Defining Moment in HIV 96
Control.” (2011) p. 24 (“There is now no doubt that antiretroviral drugs also prevent HIV 
infection.”)
 Cohen, M.S. et al. “Prevention of  HIV-1 Infection with Early Antiretroviral Therapy.” (2011)97
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fewer than 10% of  treatment-eligible individuals were receiving therapy.  And 98
another showing that between 2004 and 2011 the proportion of  individuals with 
suppressed viral load increased by 84% and 79% in Cape Town and Johannesburg, 
respectively, as ART was scaled up.  These developments have informed the 2013 99
WHO guidelines on the use of  ART for treating and preventing HIV infection,  100
which if  fully implemented, could prevent close to an additional 3.5 million new 
infections between 2012 and 2025 in low and middle-income countries.  101
The recommendations flowing from this new evidence suggest that to maximise the 
benefits of  ART individuals living with HIV should be diagnosed as early as 
possible, should be enrolled in care and should initiate ART in the early stages of  
the disease (or initiate ART immediately if  the individual is pregnant or has both 
HIV and TB) so that viral load suppression is achieved and maintained. The steps in 
this continuum of  HIV care comprise what has become known as the HIV 
“treatment cascade.”  According to the WHO, fully implementing the 2013 102
guidelines with respect to the treatment cascade framework would expand the global 
pool of  those eligible for ART to 25.9 million people: over 9 million more than 
those eligible under the 2010 guidelines, and almost 16 million more than current 
coverage.  Therein lies the most complex challenge generated by these new 103
findings. The scaling up of  HIV testing in contexts where people living with HIV 
 Tanser, F. et al. “High Coverage of  ART Associated with Decline in Risk of  HIV Acquisition in 98
Rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.” (2013)
 Carmona, S. et al. “A Decline in Community Viral Load in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South 99
Africa between 2004 to 2011.” (2013)
 WHO. Consolidated Guidelines on the Use of  Antiretroviral Drugs for Treating and Preventing HIV Infection. 100
2013a
 WHO. Supra n. 90, p. 11101
 Ibid, p. 53102
 Ibid (2013 guidelines 25.9 million, 2010 guidelines 16.7 million, current coverage 10 million)103
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are often marginalised and hard to reach could be expensive. Extending access to 
ART for both treatment and prevention in contexts where the health system has 
been designed, in the first instance, with acute care in mind — and where often the 
health system is already struggling with providing just that — could be expensive. 
The success of  ART therefore depends hugely on an increase in funding. So, in 
terms of  constituting the health basket, can ART really be deemed feasible given the 
prescribed health basket criteria?     
There is no doubt that the scale up of  ART to close-to-universal coverage would 
demand a significant increase in financial and human resources. However, it is 
completely conceivable that the returns generated, particularly in the long run, 
would be even greater.  Epidemic impact is critical for assessing the cost-104
effectiveness of  ART for both treatment and prevention and the evidence already 
presented suggests these effects are potentially very large.  
Although cost-effectiveness of  ART for prevention analyses are still in their infancy, 
two notable studies, again from South Africa, have recently taken up the 
challenge.  The first of  these studies, conducted by Granich et al., tests the cost-105
effectiveness of  ART for prevention according to four eligibility scenarios: the 
 Long run costs are likely to reduce since over time, the scaling-up of  ART would result in lower 104
HIV-acquisition and thereby reduce the number of  people eligible for, and requiring access to, ART. 
The accumulated benefits from lower transmission would therefore mean that the ART resource 
requirement would quickly begin to plateau and would ultimately decline.
 Whilst only population-level analyses will be discussed here, other studies have been conducted, 105
which investigate the cost-effectiveness of  ART for prevention within specific groups. For example, 
Gomez, G.B., et al. “The Cost and Impact of  Scaling Up Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis for HIV 
Prevention: A Systematic Review of  Cost-Effectiveness Modelling Studies.” (2013); Walensky, R.P., et 
al. “Cost-Effectiveness of  HIV Treatment as Prevention in Serodiscordant Couples” (2013); Fasawe, 
O., et al. “Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of  Option B+ for HIV Prevention and Treatment of  Mothers 
and Children in Malawi” (2013); and Hallett, T.B., et al. “Optimal Uses of  Antiretrovirals for 
Prevention in HIV-1 Serodiscordant Heterosexual Couples in South Africa: A Modelling 
Study.” (2011)
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current scenario, the 2010 guidelines, the 2013 guidelines, and universal eligibility.  106
Based on a 90% adult testing coverage rate and a reduction in transmission rate of  
92% the study finds that even at the highest ART coverage rate (with associated 
ART and monitoring costs) scaling up of  ART costs less than $200 per DALY 
averted over 40 years; well-below the WHO threshold for an intervention deemed 
very cost-effective.  In a second more recent study, Alistar et al., investigate the 107
population health outcomes and cost-effectiveness of  scaling up ART with respect 
to both the 2013 guidelines and universal coverage, using the current scenario as the 
baseline. The authors show that scaling up ART to the current guidelines and to 
universal coverage are both cost-effective.  Interestingly, however, the latter 108
scenario appears to be more cost-effective over 20 years than over 10 years, despite 
the increase in associated costs. The authors suggest that cost-effectiveness is likely 
to be even greater over longer time periods.  
Both studies recognise their own limitations; the primary one being the assumed 
rate of  HIV testing coverage and the likelihood of  retention versus dropout 
throughout the treatment cascade. According to the WHO, more than 50% of  
people living with HIV in the African region are unaware of  their HIV status, and 
the rate of  attrition throughout the cascade is high: approximately only one quarter 
of  those people testing HIV-positive ever actually initiate ART.  These statistics 109
 Granich, R. et al. “Expanding ART for Treatment and Prevention of  HIV in South Africa: 106
Estimated Cost and Cost-Effectiveness 2011-2050.” (2012) Where the eligibility criteria for this 
current situation is ≤200 CD4 cells/mm3; according to 2010 guidelines is ≤350 CD4 cells/mm3; 
according to 2013 guidelines is ≤500 CD4 cells/mm3. 
 The results show that universal coverage would cost $194 per DALY averted; South African GDP 107
per capita (2012) $7,352, World Bank; WHO threshold for very cost-effective is each DALY averted 
≤1 x GDP per capita.
 Alistar, S.S., at al. “Comparative Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness of  Antiretroviral Therapy 108
and Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis for HIV Prevention in South Africa.” (2014)
 WHO. Supra n. 100, p. 54109
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would have to dramatically improve to see the kinds of  reductions in DALYs 
averted and savings made reported in these studies. Nevertheless, increasing ART 
provision to at least the 2013 guidelines is likely to significantly reduce long run 
costs whilst substantially reducing the long run HIV burden. 
The prevention and control of  HIV/AIDS goes hand in hand with that of  
tuberculosis (TB). Since HIV increases the risk of  progression to active TB, TB 
control is particularly challenging in countries where the prevalence of  HIV 
infection is high. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, TB remains the leading cause 
of  death amongst people living with HIV. However, recent studies investigating the 
opportunistic infection-reducing power of  ART have confirmed “ART is strongly 
associated with a reduction in the incidence of  TB.”  This only adds more weight 110
to the argument for why ART is a viable candidate for inclusion in the health 
basket.  
But what about non-HIV-related TB mortality? In 2012, 8.6 million people fell ill 
with TB and 1.3 million died from the disease.  TB occurs in every corner of  the 111
world. In 2012, the largest number of  new TB cases presented in Asia, accounting 
for 60% of  new cases globally. However, sub-Saharan Africa carried the greatest 
proportion of  new cases per capita with over 255 cases per 100,000 population.  112
Notwithstanding these sombre statistics, TB is treatable and curable. Directly 
observed treatment, short-course (DOTS) remains the key strategy for increasing 
 In low and middle-income countries ART was found to reduce the risk of  TB by up to 65%. 110
Suthar, A.B. et al. “Antiretroviral Therapy for Prevention of  Tuberculosis in Adults with HIV: A 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” (2012) Quoted in WHO. Supra n. 100, p. 47 
 WHO. Tuberculosis Factsheet 104, March 2015 (2015)111
 Ibid.112
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the survival of  those being treated and reducing transmission to others and is 
amongst the most cost-effective of  any health intervention.  The DOTS strategy 113
and its successor (the Stop TB Strategy) involves “treating TB with multiple drug 
therapy in conditions where adherence to the regimen can be supported through 
direct observation, and monitoring the effectiveness of  the treatment.”  It 114
focusses on commitment to a sustained national effort to control the disease and 
maintain its decreasing incidence.  The combination of  increased case detection 115
and improved treatment success under DOTS has resulted in major achievements in 
TB care and control. “Between 1995 and 2012, 56 million people were successfully 
treated for TB in countries that had adopted the DOTS/Stop TB Strategy, saving 
22 million lives.”  116
Nevertheless, the potential to reduce the burden of  TB even further with respect to 
both mortality and transmission is huge. Although the proportion of  countries 
reporting to subscribe to the DOTS regimen covers almost all of  the world’s 
population, (180 countries, including all 22 countries categorised as high-burden) it 
is estimated that 40% of  cases go undetected globally and up to almost 60% at the 
regional level.  The WHO goal is to detect 70% of  cases. In order to reach this 117
target, a concerted formal commitment to the prioritisation of  funding for DOTS is 
required. One type of  formal commitment would be for it to form part of  the 
health basket.  
 Jamison, D.T. et al. Supra n. 73113
 WHO. Supra n. 37, p. 41114
 WHO. Global Tuberculosis Report. 2013c, p. 2115
 Ibid, p. 28116
 The estimated case detection rate for the African region in 2008 is around 42%. Lönnroth, K., et 117
al. “Tuberculosis Control and Elimination 2010–50: Cure, Care, and Social Development.” (2010) p. 
1816 
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It is now clear that maternal and neonatal health, child health and the health of  
those adults inflicted with HIV/AIDS and TB should be prioritised and as a 
consequence be included in the health basket. All issues have been identified by the 
avoidable mortality strategy as being important at the population level and the 
evidence has made clear that effective and cost-effective interventions do exist and 
that widespread delivery of  these interventions is indeed feasible. In terms of  
defining the health basket, what the above review has revealed is that the basket is 
comprised as a kind of  selective primary health care-PLUS, and includes: (i) meeting 
the need for contraception; (ii) having skilled attendants present at births; (iii) 
antenatal interventions (where there is a need) including tetanus immunisation; (iv) 
immunisation against childhood diseases; (v) adequate nutrition; (vi) improved 
access to water and sanitation; (vii) the rollout of  antiretroviral therapy for people 
living with HIV; and (viii) treatment of  infectious cases of  TB. These eight 
interventions are the health goods, services and facilities, which constitute the 
health basket. 
IV. Conclusions 
The aim of  this chapter has been to identify and implement a strategy for defining 
the contents of  a minimal basket of  health goods, services and facilities to which 
the right to health relates. Using the three-part criteria (subsistence, importance, and 
feasibility) as a guide, the health basket amounts to a package of  primary health 
care. But the implementation of  a primary health care package with respect to the 
right to health presents real challenges. No single system of  primary health care can 
be universally applicable. Comprehensive primary health care remains outside of  
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what can reasonably be deemed minimal, whilst selective primary health care 
discounts the virtues of  preventative measures, some of  which are critical 
components of  the right to health. The major challenge is to establish a package of  
interventions that still bears resemblance to the central primary health care ethos yet 
has the potential for population-level scale-up. This chapter has attempted to offer a 
framework to address that challenge.  
Firstly, an analysis of  avoidable mortality has provided a framework for prioritising 
those health issues that are most important with respect to the health burden they 
pose and has identified where the greatest potential for improvement in population 
health lies. The avoidable mortality analysis has shown that very few health issues 
are in fact responsible for the majority of  avoidable deaths and hence has helped 
circumscribe the range of  interventions to be considered as components of  the 
health basket. Secondly, the analysis has used cost-effectiveness analysis to 
determine whether the identified effective interventions can feasibly be scaled-up to 
population-level coverage in the typical low-income country. The health basket is 
then made up of  the health goods, services, and facilities that attend to important 
health issues, and can be feasibly delivered. It has eight components: (i) meeting the 
need for contraception; (ii) skilled attendants present at births; (iii) antenatal 
interventions (where there is a need); (iv) immunisation against childhood diseases; 
(v) adequate nutrition; (vi) improved access to water and sanitation; (vii) the rollout 
of  antiretroviral therapy for people living with HIV; and (viii) treatment of  
infectious cases of  TB. 
Having a description of  the health basket in hand solves the first problem posed by 
the task set out in this thesis: what kind of  health do individuals have a right to? But 
it is important to remember that it does not solve the second problem: what level of  
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this kind of  health do duty-bearers owe to individuals? To recall, fulfilment of  the 
health basket is conditional; even in spite of  its minimalism, full provision of  the 
health basket ‘package’ still may be unaffordable for some states. Duty-bearers 
therefore have an obligation to provide as much of  the health basket as they are 
able. So what remains with respect to assessing compliance with this obligation is an 
assessment of  the degree to which the health basket is affordable. It is this 





To recall the argument made in Chapter 3, conditionality need not preclude 
obligations from being immediate. Rather, states have an immediate obligation to 
secure the maximum level of  health that is affordable and have an immediate 
obligation to fully secure the set of  health goods, services and facilities guaranteed 
under the right to health (the health basket) as soon as resources are sufficient to do 
so. This claim is made on the basis that if  a test of  the extent to which scarcity may 
justify a shortfall in the attainment of  the health basket is precise enough, the 
criticism that conditionality creates only weak rights may be unjustified. So then, how 
is this test of  extent to be specified? Or, to put it another way, how is it possible to 
determine what level of  resources can be deemed “maximum available?”  
To plausibly respond to the rights-weakness objection, the conditional conception 
must through some analytical framework provide an answer to this question. There 
have been, as yet, very few attempts at this enterprise and those that have made the 
attempt have been less than successful. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow 
from the extant situation that providing an answer is impossible or that the 
enterprise be abandoned absolutely. Rather, it may be the case that by looking to 
methodologies from disciplines other than human rights an appropriate framework 
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for determining the highest attainable standard of  health given maximum available 
resources could be defended.  
The purpose of  this chapter is to demonstrate that there is a methodological 
candidate that can do such a job. It is one that is most commonly found in the toolkit 
of  a microeconometrician. Specifically, this chapter uses stochastic frontier analysis 
to empirically study the affordability of  the health basket given different levels of  
ability and assesses the degree to which states are meeting, or falling short of, the 
expected level of  health basket attainment that has been deemed affordable. 
In a bid to situate and distinguish the present analysis within and from methods that 
already exist, Section I starts with a brief  history of  the ways in which compliance 
has been most commonly measured to date, tracing the use of  residual analysis in the 
social sciences more generally, and for measuring human rights in particular. Section 
II outlines the conceptual framework and empirical strategy, showing how the tools 
for measuring efficiency in the microeconomic sense can be applied to the 
measurement of  a state’s compliance with its obligation to fulfil the right to health. 
Section III describes the specific empirical models to be used as the basis for the 
analysis, Section IV outlines the procedures through which the qualitative description 
of  the health basket produced in the preceding chapter is transformed into a 
composite quantitative index, and the data are described in Section V. Section VI 
presents the results, providing point estimates of  the degree to which states are 
meeting or falling short of  their obligations. Returning to the hypothesis that 
compliance with the obligation to fulfil the right to health is a function of  a state’s 
ability and willingness to do so, an assessment of  the correspondence between the 
revealed estimates of  compliance and indicators of  willingness is also conducted in 
this section.       
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I. Methodological provenance 
With respect to measuring compliance with the obligation to fulfil the right to health, 
the most basic approach is to take an estimate of  how much it costs to provide a 
package of  essential health interventions and then make qualitative decision on 
whether this package is reasonably affordable given a country’s income level.  For 1
instance, the Commission for Macroeconomics and Health estimated in 2001 that 
such a package would cost $38 per capita by 2015.  This is equivalent to $50 per 2
capita in 2013 prices.  To use Bolivia as an example, GDP per capita in Bolivia was 3
$2,868 in 2013. Providing the package would therefore cost 1.7% of  GDP, and the 
assessment of  maximum available resources would be concerned with the 
reasonableness of  this cost. Whilst this rule of  thumb-type approach may be useful 
for broaching the discussion of  the resources problem, this is really where its use 
ends. It has no use for assessing compliance when the package is deemed 
unaffordable — indeed if  a threshold below which provision of  the package is 
deemed affordable can even be established — and more importantly, as is now clear, 
fulfilling the right to health requires more than just financial resources. Such a 
sweeping measure is far too insensitive to the complexities involved in solving the 
resources problem.  
 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has used this kind of  approach in its 1
assessments on whether states are using their maximum available resources to fulfil economic and 
social rights. For example through comparing expenditures on health in the state under review against 
international indicators, such as UNDP’s indicator that 5 percent of  GDP should go to human 
expenditures (specified as basic education, primary health care, and basic water.) UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. “An Evaluation of  the Obligation to Take Steps to the 
‘Maximum of  Available Resources’ Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant.” (2007)
 WHO. Improving Health Outcomes of  the Poor: The Report of  Working Group 5 of  the Commission on 2
Macroeconomics and Health. 2002
 Calculated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation calculator available through the U.S. 3
Bureau of  Labor Statistics. (Original estimates were reported in 2001 prices).
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There are, however, ways through which greater specificity on the ability/attainment 
equation can be provided. Quantitative social science methods in particular have 
much to offer in this regard. Towards the more advanced end of  the statistical 
methods spectrum lies multivariate regression analysis. Regression analysis of  the 
multivariate kind can be used to establish the direction, strength and significance of  
the relationship between an outcome variable and two or more explanatory variables. 
In a sense, multivariate analysis helps explain away competing factors that might 
contribute to the outcome of  interest. When applied to measuring compliance with 
the obligation to fulfil the right to health, for instance, it can provide interesting 
insight into the extent to which national income, the availability of  health 
professionals, geographical and other ‘random’  factors individually and/or 4
collectively explain particular health outcomes. In other words, it can be used to 
measure the extent to which ability explains health attainment.  
Of  course, a measure of  the degree to which health attainment is determined by 
ability is valuable in and of  itself. Still, in the words of  Nobel Laureate in Economics, 
Paul Samuelson, “always look back. You may learn something from your residuals.”  5
In estimating the relationship between ability and health attainment, it is unlikely that 
ability will explain all of  the variation in health attainment, i.e. very few countries will 
have health attainment equal to the predicted value. The residual that is produced by 
the regression provides information with respect to the degree to which the actual 
level of  health attainment deviates from the predicted value. The residual is the 
‘unexplained effect’.  
 Random in the statistical sense where values are statistically independent of  other values and are 4
therefore unpredictable, rather than implying true randomness, i.e. objective unpredictability.
 Samuelson, P. “Nobel Economists Lecture Series.” Trinity University, San Antonio, February 1985. 5
Quoted in Cingranelli, D.L., and D.L. Richards “Measuring Government Effort to Respect Economic 
and Social Human Rights: A Peer Benchmark.” In Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement and Policy 
Issues, Hertel, S., and L. Minkler (eds.) 2007, p. 221
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Residual-type analysis is by no means new. Its application has a long tradition in the 
social sciences, from Robert Solow’s treatment of  the residual in explaining 
economic growth through technological innovation,  to Raymond Duvall and Michal 6
Shamir’s propensity of  repression indicator developed through regressing sanctions 
on domestic violence.  Existing efforts that attempt to measure some form of  7
performance with respect to human rights standards have not been blind to the 
virtues of  residual analysis either. For example, David Cingranelli and David 
Richards use the regression residual to estimate a government’s efforts in fulfilling 
economic and social rights, (proxied by the Physical Quality of  Life Index) given a 
country’s GDP per capita level and whether the country is a signatory and/or party 
to the ICESCR.  And similarly, in the civil and political realm, Todd Landman, David 8
Kernohan and Anita Gohdes regress a measure of  a country’s civil and political 
human rights performance on a number of  economic, political, and social factors 
that are commonly understood to influence their protection. Then the residual from 
the regression, the unexplained variance, is used as an indicator of  “over” or “under” 
performance with respect to the protection of  those rights.   9
When it comes to measuring compliance with economic and social rights standards 
specifically, probably the most innovative and sophisticated method that uses residual 
analysis for setting benchmarks to date comes in the form of  the Index of  Social and 
Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF Index), developed by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Terra 
 Solow, R.M. “A Contribution to the Theory of  Economic Growth.” (1956) 6
 Duvall, R.D., and M. Shamir. “Indicators from errors: Cross-national time-serial measures of  the 7
repressive disposition of  government.” In Indicator Systems for Political, Economic, and Social Analysis, 
Taylor, C.L. (ed.) 1980, pp. 155-182
 Cingranelli, D.L., and D.L. Richards. Supra n. 58
 Landman, T., D. Kernohan, and A. Gohdes. “Relativizing Human Rights.” (2012)9
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Lawson-Remer, and Susan Randolph.  The SERF Index measures fulfilment across 10
five economic and social dimensions: education, food, health, housing, and decent 
work. For each of  the dimensions, outcome indictors are selected to reflect the 
enjoyment in the interests to which these dimensions relate, where this enjoyment is 
likely to be influenced by government policy. The SERF Index attempts to deal not 
only with the right-holder enjoyment aspect of  the task of  measuring compliance but 
with the duty-bearer obligation-fulfilment aspect also. Specifically, the innovation in 
the SERF Index methodology lies in its construction of  an Achievement Possibility 
Frontier (APF), which specifies each duty-bearer’s obligation with respect to the level 
of  resources it has available. The feasible level of  rights enjoyment is defined as the 
maximum level of  achievement that has historically been achieved and is set simply 
by plotting each outcome variable against one input variable (GDP per capita, in $US 
PPP) across all countries from 1990-2006, and fitting a curve to the maximum 
boundary observations. Then the SERF Index essentially measures the difference 
between the boundary, representing potential achievement, and a country’s actual 
achievement; that is, the residual.  
It has to be acknowledged that this approach was one of  the first innovations in 
bringing quantitative methodologies to addressing the resources issue; it does more 
reasonably link the performance expected of  a duty-bearer to its level of  ability. 
Indeed the methodology that follows in this chapter has largely been inspired by it. 
It does, however, have numerous flaws.  
 Fukuda-Parr, S., T. Lawson-Remer, and S. Randolph. “Fulfilling Social and Economic 10
Rights.” (2015); Fukuda-Parr, S., T. Lawson-Remer, and S. Randolph. “Economic and Social Rights 
Fulfilment Index: Country Scores and Rankings.” (2010); and Fukuda-Parr, S., T. Lawson-Remer, and 
S. Randolph. “An Index of  Economic and Social Rights Fulfilment: Concept and 
Methodology.” (2009) 
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Firstly, the SERF Index methodology provides very little normative account of  the 
indicators that characterise rights enjoyment. Returning to the methodological idea 
set out in Chapter 1, “the qualitative distinction made between and among categories 
in any attempt to classify social phenomena necessarily precedes the process of  
quantification.”  Whether the indicators that underpin the SERF Index have been 11
selected on the basis of  a careful qualitative unravelling of  human rights concepts or 
instead on the basis of  operational ease is not evident. This lack of  evidence by itself  
could suggest the latter.  
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the SERF Index is methodologically too 
simplistic to deal with the complexities that come with measuring economic and 
social rights fulfilment generally, and right to health fulfilment in particular. Consider 
the heterogeneity of  the countries included in the analysis. Outliers and statistical 
noise are likely. As a result, setting the boundary to the highest level of  health 
historically attained by any country leaves open the possibility — even probability — 
of  it being hinged on very few extreme observations, with the vast majority of  the 
data in fact lying far below it. This could potentially overestimate the degree of  
cross-country non-compliance to a significant extent. For example, the level of  GDP 
per capita, PPP for Kenya in 2013 is roughly the same as that for the Philippines in 
1994.  If  it is assumed, for illustrative purposes, that the Philippines attained the 12
maximum level of  health historically achieved at that given level of  GDP per capita, 
does it make sense that Kenya be expected to achieve in 2013 the level achieved by 
the Philippines in 1994? Obviously the two countries differ in a number of  
 Landman, T. “Social Science, Methods and Human Rights.” In The SAGE Handbook of  Human 11
Rights: Volume 1, Mihr, A., and M. Gibney (eds.) 2014, p. 194. Quoting Sartori, G. “Concept 
Misinformation in Comparative Politics.” (1970)
 GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) was 2,794.98 for Kenya in 2013 and 2,774.84 for the 12
Philippines in 1994. World Bank. World Development Indicators. (2015) 
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significant ways. And these differences may affect the residual, positively or 
negatively, regardless of  the duty-bearer’s action or inaction.  
The level of  health that has previously been attained with the same given level of  
GDP per capita may, then, be too insensitive a target against which to measure 
compliance. Instead, the boundary must be set with a greater degree of  
methodological sophistication, allowing for the entry of  multiple explanatory factors 
and for some sensitivity to statistical noise. The residual analysis that follows builds 
on the SERF Index methodology in an attempt to go some way to meeting that 
demand.  
II. Conceptual framework 
The analysis that follows borrows from the analytical toolkit of  microeconometrics; 
specifically, those tools that are used to estimate production function frontiers. 
According to William Greene, “the frontier production function is an extension of  
the familiar regression model based on the microeconomic premise that a production 
function …  represents an ideal, the maximum output attainable given a set of  
inputs.”  With the setting of  this ideal comes the theoretical proviso that all 13
observations will lie below it. As such, estimation of  the production frontier is 
generally used as a means to another analytical end: the analysis of  technical 
efficiency. Analysis of  technical efficiency in the microeconomic sense refers to the 
degree to which producers are successful in allocating the inputs they have at their 
disposal to produce certain outputs in an effort to meet some specified objective. 
 Greene, W.H. “The Econometric Approach to Efficiency Analysis,” In The Measurement of  Productive 13
Efficiency and Productivity Growth, Fried, H.O., K. Lovell, and S.S. Schmidt (eds.) 2008, p. 92
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This objective could be to minimise the number and level of  inputs to produce a 
given output (input-approach), or to maximise output with a given number and level 
of  inputs (output-approach). By means of  estimating the production function a 
measure of  efficiency emerges since what it corresponds to is the distance between 
the actual observation and the expected estimate of  the ideal.    
Figure 5.1: Output approach to measuring technical efficiency 
The standards against which efficiency is measured are provided by the production 
frontier, f(x) in Figure 5.1. A producer using xa inputs to produce a single output of  
ya is inefficient to the tune of  u since it is operating beneath f(x).  
In the case of  measuring the extent to which a state complies with or falls short of  
its obligation to fulfil the right to health the same notion of  efficiency can be applied. 
Each state can be treated as a decision making unit that produces the health basket 
under the behavioural assumption that it operates to maximise attainment of  the 
basket (output) given its ability to do so (inputs). Maximum expected attainment at 
different levels of  ability can then be predicted and it is these expected values that set 
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the minimum obligation frontier. Compliance, like efficiency, can then be measured 
as the difference between observed attainment of  the health basket and the expected 
level of  attainment, or in other words, the level states have an unconditional 
obligation to provide.  
The standards against which states can be measured are provided by the minimum 
obligation frontier in Figure 5.2. For example, it is expected that for a state with an 
ability level of  a1, attainment of  the health basket should be at level m1; state a1 has 
an unconditional obligation to fulfil m1 level of  the health basket. According to the 
hypothesis proposed throughout this thesis: that compliance with the right to health 
is a function of  a state’s ability and willingness to fulfil it, provision of  the health 
basket at any point below the frontier, such as m-1, may signal unwillingness on the 
part of  the state to mobilise its maximum available resources to fulfil the right to 
health, which in turn signals non-compliance with the obligation to do so. The 
degree of  non-compliance can then be measured as the distance between the 
observed level provided and the level set by the minimum obligation frontier, in this 
example: m-1/(m-1 + m1). 
Figure 5.2: Measuring compliance with the obligation to fulfil the right to health 
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Essentially, there are two main methodologies for measuring efficiency: the 
mathematical (non-parametric) approach, and the econometric (parametric) 
approach. The two techniques have both virtues and limitations in their respective 
bids to envelop data and there is no prescriptive rulebook for which method is best.  14
Though the technical differences between the two methods are many, their relative 
advantageousness can be assessed with reference to two central methodological 
characteristics:  
i. The econometric approach is parametric so the shape of  the frontier has to be 
specified from the very beginning. This could make the model vulnerable to 
functional form misspecification. The mathematical approach, on the other 
hand, is non-parametric so has the advantage that no assumption has to be 
made as to the shape of  the frontier.  
ii. The econometric approach is stochastic, which allows for the model to 
distinguish between the effects of  inefficiency and the effects of  random 
noise. The mathematical approach, however, is deterministic and provides only 
a general measure of  inefficiency, which is likely to hide within it random 
noise, and hence risk being either under or overestimated.  
Deciding when one method should be chosen over the other comes down to an 
assessment of  appropriateness to the individual dataset and the research question(s) 
being asked. Presently, the primary objective of  the analysis is to reveal the presence 
and degree of  non-compliance within and across states. The data involved are, by 
nature, highly heterogeneous, of  widely differing quality, and are therefore likely to 
carry noise. As such, the certain advantages of  a model, which allows for real non-
compliance to be distinguished from random noise must outweigh the potential 
 See, e.g. Greene, W.H. Ibid., pp. 112-11414
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limitations posed by a risk of  form misspecification. It is for these combined reasons 
that this study proceeds along an econometric path. 
There exist a number of  studies that have ventured into some form of  stochastic 
frontier analysis in a health-output-orientated context. The first and most well known 
are the studies by Evans et al.,  presented in the 2000 World Health Report under 15
the auspices of  the WHO,  which presents an assessment of  the relative 16
performance of  national health care delivery systems across the 191 WHO member 
States. Using the production function framework, two health care outcomes were 
used as outputs (disability adjusted life expectancy, and a composite measure of  
achievement across five dimensions: health, health inequality, responsiveness-level, 
responsiveness-distribution, and fair-financing) whilst spending on health care and 
the level of  education were treated as inputs. The study opted for a form of  the 
‘fixed effects’ model based on that proposed by Schmidt and Sickles  and used a 17
five-year panel dataset (1993-1997).  
Though recognised for their innovation in, and evolution of, the measurement of  
inefficiency in health care delivery on a macro scale, the authors of  the WHO study 
soon found themselves at the centre of  critical attention. For example, Williams 
questioned the normative content of  the study, calling it “dangerously opaque;”  18
Gravelle and colleagues re-ran the analysis using different definitions of  efficiency 
and different estimation methods and suggested the WHO’s ranking and efficiency 
 Evans D., A. Tandon, C. Murray, and J. Lauer “The Comparative Efficiency of  National Health 15
Systems in Producing Health: An Analysis of  191 Countries” (2000a); and Evans D., A. Tandon, C. 
Murray, and J. Lauer. “Measuring Overall Health System Performance for 191 Countries.” (2000b)
 WHO. The World Health Report 2000 - Health Systems: Improving Performance. 2000 16
 Schmidt, P., and R. Sickles. “Production Frontiers with Panel Data.” (1984)17
 Williams, A. “Science or Marketing at WHO? A Commentary on ‘World Health 2000.’” (2001) p. 9918
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scores lacked robustness;  Hollingsworth and Wildman found fault in the authors’ 19
choice to use the fixed effects method and presented evidence to suggest more 
flexible panel data techniques would do the job better;  and Greene criticised the 20
study’s failure to accommodate a procedure for distinguishing real inefficiency from 
cross-country heterogeneity.  21
To confront the deficiencies of  the WHO study in a direct way, several of  the 
aforementioned critics reanalysed the WHO data, many of  which produced 
substantially differing results.  Although the aims and the questions asked of  the 22
WHO study — and its descendants — are very different from those under 
investigation here, both are subject to similar methodological issues. Unlike these 
previous empirical works, however, the theory upon which this study is based has 
much more solid and clearly defined foundations. Deciding how output and input 
measures are determined and how possible forms of  heterogeneity should enter the 
model here is, therefore, much less of  an arbitrary, solely statistical, job.   
With its theoretical foundations in hand, this study aims to assess the extent to which 
states comply with their obligation to fulfil the right to health by estimating a frontier 
production function by panel data stochastic frontier models using a longitudinal 
 Gravelle, H., R. Jacobs, A.M. Jones, and A. Street. “Comparing the Efficiency of  National Health 19
Systems: A Sensitivity Analysis of  the WHO Approach.” (2002)
 Hollingsworth, J., and B. Wildman. “The Efficiency of  Health Production: Re-estimating the WHO 20
Panel Data Using Parametric and Nonparametric Approaches to Provide Additional 
Information.” (2003)
 Greene, W.H. Supra n. 5, pp. 216-250; and Greene, W.H. “Distinguishing Between Heterogeneity 21
and Inefficiency: Stochastic Frontier Analysis of  the World Health Organization’s Panel Data on 
National Health Care Systems.” (2004)
 For example, mean inefficiencies for the two output measures, DALE and COMP were reported in 22
the Evans et al. study as 0.220 and 0.174, respectively. This is compared to Greene’s truncation model, 
which produced estimates of  0.196 and 0.153 (Greene, W.H. Ibid., p. 974) The study by Gravelle et al. 
presented inefficiency score correlations, between their estimates and those produced in the WHO 
study, ranging between 0.597 and 0.998 (Gravelle, H., R. Jacobs, A.M. Jones, and A. Street. Supra n. 19, 
p. 16.)
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dataset made up of  health, financial, and geographical data. To this end, it is assumed 
that each state operates in order to maximise attainment of  the health basket and 
produces that health basket according to the following basic stochastic production 
function:  23
         
      (1) 
i = 1, … N and t = 1, … T where N is the state, T is the year, 𝑦it denotes the output 
(Health Basket Attainment) and 𝐱’it is the set of  inputs (financial and human 
resources). Since the production function under consideration is stochastic, the error 
term has two components: 𝒗it is the random component, which represents the 
stochastic noise in the production function, and 𝒖i in this case represents the non-
compliance component, which measures the distance between 𝑦it and the frontier. 
Estimation of  𝒖i is the central focus of  the analysis that follows.  
With estimation of  the basic stochastic model come several assumptions with respect 
to the combined error term, 𝓔i = 𝒗it - 𝒖i: 
1. It is assumed that 𝒗it has a zero mean and is normally distributed. 
2. 𝒖i is constrained to always be non-negative; 𝒖i ≥ 0, and is assumed to be 
distributed independently of  𝒗it and of  the regressors. 
3.  Since in this case the panel is short, 𝒖i is assumed to be time invariant.  
The production function itself  can take various functional forms. However, the most 
commonly used (and the only two to be mentioned here) are the Cobb-Douglas 
 Aigner, D., K. Lovell, and P. Schmidt. “Formulation and Estimation of  Stochastic Frontier Models.” 23
(1977); Meeusen, W., and J. van den Broeck. “Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas Production 
Functions with Composed Error.” (1977) 
yit =α + X /itβ + vit − ui
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(CD) and translog specifications. The CD production function is the simplest and 
has the advantage of  being easy to estimate and interpret since it requires the 
estimation of  few parameters. There is, however, a price to pay for such simplicity: it 
assumes elasticities of  factor substitution are constant, which may be rather 
unrealistic particularly for this analysis since different states are likely to have 
different ‘production’ elasticities and the elasticity of  substitution between inputs is 
likely to ≠ 1. As a result, many analysts have opted for more general, flexible 
functional forms, which relax the restrictions on elasticities of  substitution. In this 
regard, the translog production model is used most often. For the same reasons, this 
study will proceed using a non-separated version of  the flexible translog form where, 
in line with the theoretical assumption that output is optimised, the production 
function has two properties: the marginal products of  inputs are positive and the 
function is concave, i.e. as inputs increase output also increases but at a decreasing 
rate.     24
III. Stochastic frontier models  
A. Fixed Effects model 
The simplest panel data model in an efficiency measurement context is the fixed 
effects model, such as that proposed by Schmidt and Sickles,  and applied by Evans 25
et al.  The time invariant fixed effects model is simple because it requires no 26
assumption with respect to the distribution of  𝒖i nor does it require the assumption 
 That is, the first order derivatives 𝜕y/𝜕𝐱1 and 𝜕y/𝜕𝐱2 are positive, and the second order derivatives 24𝜕2y/𝜕𝐱12 and 𝜕2y/𝜕𝐱22  = β11 and β12 are negative.
 Schmidt, P., and R. Sickles. Supra n. 1725
 Evans D., A. Tandon, C. Murray, and J. Lauer. Supra n. 1526
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that the 𝒖i are uncorrelated with the 𝒗it and the other regressors. The 𝒖i values are 
treated as state-specific constants so that the basic model in (1) becomes  
 
(2) 
where α  represents the frontier intercept and the 𝒖i capture the degree of  non-
compliance. The fixed effects model can be estimated using the ‘within’ estimator, 
which corresponds to the Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) estimator 
where the parameters in (2) are estimated by OLS and the intercept is shifted up to 
the observation of  the best performing state so that all other residuals are non-
positive. Here, the state with the maximum αi is assumed to be fully compliant (when 𝒖i = 0) and every other state-specific αi is measured as a deviation from this 
benchmark. The differences in 𝒖i amongst states should, therefore, be interpreted as 
relative rather than actual non-compliance. 
(3) 
There is therefore an implicit overestimation of  compliance in the fixed effects 
model; it is unlikely that the best performing state in the sample is fully compliant. 
This would not be problematic if  all the analysis was seeking to do was to provide a 
ranking of  all states with respect to compliance. But this is not all that is required. 
What is additionally sought is a more precise estimate of  compliance. Since there is 
no way of  testing the extent of  compliance-overestimation, the revealed fixed effects 
estimates must be interpreted with this limitation in mind.     
Nevertheless, since there is no requirement to make any assumptions with respect to 𝒖i, estimates of  the 𝒖i and the parameters in the fixed effects model are consistent as 
yit = (α − ui )+ X /itβ + vit
yit =α i + X /itβ + vit
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N → ∞ and/or T → ∞.  At the same time however, because the fixed effects model 
creates no space for other time invariant variables to enter it, whatever the model 
may gain in robustness it may well lack in precision. Specifically, the fixed effects, that 
is the αi and ultimately the 𝒖i, will be capturing not only the variation in time 
invariant non-compliance across states but will also be capturing any time invariant 
heterogeneity. A problem emphasised by Greene and others.  The degree to which 27
this problem is indeed problematic is dependent on the nature of  the data under 
investigation: the degree of  heterogeneity. In this analysis the data cover the whole 
world, encompassing quite different disease and population environments. Time 
invariant heterogeneity is, therefore, likely to play an influential role in a state’s ability 
to ‘produce’ health and ignoring it in the modelling process will likely result in 
erroneous estimates of  𝒖i. As a result, the fixed effects model can be treated as a 
base model against which others, that can accommodate time invariant heterogeneity, 
may be compared.    
B. Heterogeneous Random Effects model 
In the foregoing fixed effects model it was assumed that the 𝒖i were fixed but were 
allowed to be correlated with the regressors and with the 𝒗it. In the random effects 
model the alternate assumption is made: the 𝒖i are randomly distributed with a 
constant mean and variance, but are assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors 
and with the 𝒗it. The 𝒗it are assumed to be symmetric, have zero mean and constant 
variance. Pitt and Lee first applied the time invariant random effects model to a panel 
data version of  stochastic frontier analysis.  By assuming that the 𝒖i are random, 28
 Greene, W.H. “Reconsidering Heterogeneity in Panel Data Estimators of  the Stochastic Frontier 27
Model.” (2005); Greene, W.H. Supra n. 21; Kumbhakar, S.C., and K. Lovell. Stochastic Frontier Analysis. 
2000
 Pitt, M., and L. Lee. “The Measurement and Sources of  Technical Inefficiency in the Indonesian 28
Weaving Industry.” (1981)
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rather than fixed, the random effects model provides an entrance for time invariant 
covariates.  
As noted above, with respect to measuring compliance across states worldwide, there 
are important variables, (𝒛’s) besides inputs, (𝐱’s) that could influence the position or 
the shape of  the frontier and/or the efficiency distribution. There are, however, a 
number of  ways in which this heterogeneity (the 𝒛’s) can enter the model: i) as 
additional shift parameters in the production function; ii) in the conditional mean of  
the 𝒖i; and/or iii) in the variance of  either or both parts of  the combined error term, 
σ2𝒗 and/or σ2𝒖. Fortunately, this choice need not be dilemmatic. The previous 
chapters have provided a theoretical basis upon which to make the decision. In 
Chapter 3, it was argued that a state’s ability to fulfil the right to health is not solely 
determined by the inputs it has at its disposal, those being financial and human 
resources. In addition, other environmental factors over which the state has little to 
no control may also facilitate or impede a state in its efforts to do so. These 𝒛’s have 
already been identified as mortality density and population density and, since they are 
additional determinants of  ability, they should appear as shift parameters in the 
production function. As such, the standard stochastic frontier model in (1) becomes 
  
(4) 
where 𝒛’i is the vector of  time invariant environmental variables. These 𝒛’s are state-
specific and can shift the frontier by changing α  or can change the shape of  the 
frontier by influencing both α and β.  
yit =α + X /itβ + z /iγ + vit − ui
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The random effects model can be estimated with estimators based on OLS, which 
require no assumption on the distribution of  the 𝒖i, (although the 𝒖i are still required 
to be non-negative). However, if  an assumption on the distribution is tenable, 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is feasible, which makes estimation more 
precise since it can exploit distributional information which OLS estimators cannot. 
In this case, the distribution of  the error components in (4) remains to be 
determined. Given the non-negativity of  𝒖i the choices are generally limited to half-
normal, truncated-normal, exponential, or gamma. For simplicity, here the normal-
half-normal distribution is applied to the model so that  
1. 𝒗it ~ iid N(0, σ2𝒗) the random error term is assumed to be normally distributed 
2. 𝒖i  ~ iid N+(0, σ2𝒖) the non-compliance term is non-negative and half-
normal.  29
The next step is to obtain estimates of  state-specific non-compliance. Because the 
process for estimating the parameters only produces an estimate of  the combined 
error term, 𝓔i, Jondrow et al.’s conditional mean estimator (JLMS)  is applied to 30
separate non-compliance from the combined error term. 
 Whilst some authors have noted that the assumption in ii. (that the mean value of  𝒖i is zero) is a 29
significant restriction to the stochastic frontier analysis, it is used and treated here as a first-step upon 
which more sophisticated extensions can be built. 
 Jondrow, J., K. Lovell, I. Materov, and P. Schmidt. “On the Estimation of  Technical Inefficiency in 30
the Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model.” (1982)
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IV. The Health Basket Attainment Index 
Before an assessment of  the degree to which the health basket is affordable can be 
conducted, a measurable health basket has to be constructed. A qualitative 
description of  the health basket has already been provided in Chapter 4. What is now 
required is a summing of  the qualitative definition to produce a composite, 
quantitative index. This composite index captures the level of  rights enjoyment with 
respect to the right to health and will, from this point onwards, be referred to as the 
Health Basket Attainment Index (HBAI). The multidimensional approach to 
calculating the HBAI is implemented following a four step sequence that consists of: 
i) determination of  the dimensions and indicators; ii) normalisation of  the indicators; 
iii) weighting of  the indicators and dimensions; and iv) aggregation of  the indicators 
into dimension indices and aggregation of  the dimension indices into the HBAI. 
A. Dimensions and indicators 
The HBAI is three-dimensional and is characterised by (i) maternal and neonatal 
health; (ii) child heath; and (iii) adult health. It is worth restating that although these 
three dimensions have been identified as reasonable candidates for inclusion in the 
index at the present time, this is not to say that the dimensions, or the indicators that 
flow from them, have to be static. On the contrary. The analytical process through 
which dimensions and indicators are identified should be continuously revisited so 
that as population health and responses to it evolve over time, the HBAI can be 
adjusted accordingly. Still, the HBAI methodology allows for measurement of  each 
individual dimension as well as yielding an overall score. 
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Figure 5.3: The HBAI Framework 
Methodologies for constructing indices broadly fall into two categories: input and 
output. Input indices measure the various components used or policy choices taken 
in order to achieve some outcome, on the assumption that these components and/or 
choices are believed or known to generate the outcome. Output indices only measure 
the outcome of  interest. In the interest of  measuring the three dimensions of  the 
HBAI both methodologies are possible: an input index would measure skilled 
attendance at birth, child immunisation rates, and treatment of  infections diseases, 
for instance, whilst an output index would measure mortality rates. Both are 
potentially valid but the choice in this case is straightforward. Because the 
fundamental question at stake is the degree to which the state is fulfilling its 
responsibilities with respect to producing each individual’s health, the index must be 
a measure of  the types of  policy choices the state has taken in order to precisely 
produce each individual’s health. Mortality, on the other hand, can be affected by 
many factors other than those that are controllable by the state. For these reasons the 
indicators that flow from the dimensions in the HBAI are those of  an input kind. 
The HBAI framework in Figure 5.3 reflects this. 
Health Basket Attainment 
Index (HBAI)
Maternal & Neonatal Health Child Health Adult Health
Unmet need for contraception Immunisation HIV/AIDS control
Skilled attendance at birth Nutrition TB treatment
Neonatal tetanus Water and Sanitation
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B. Normalisation 
When combining multiple measures into a composite index it could be the case that 
different indicators are measured in different units. Therefore a transformation, or 
normalisation, of  the data is required in order to adjust for differences in ranges, 
directions, and variances. There are a number of  established methods of  
normalisation used in the construction of  composite indices,  however since all 31
indicators in the HBAI are reported in percentage terms with minimums of  0 and 
maximums of  100, scale invariance is avoided. Accordingly, all values can be easily 
transformed into normalised values between 0 and 1 using the min-max method so 
that: 
(5) 
where minc (xtq) and maxc (xtq) are the lowest and highest accepted values of  the 
specific indicator x across all countries c at time period t. 
C. Weights  
The subject of  weightings seems to perennially fascinate critics in the domain of  
composite index making, whatever the application. In the end, regardless of  which 
method is used, weights are essentially value judgements. But whilst it is obvious that 
weights should not be applied arbitrarily, there will always be disagreement on which 
less arbitrary strategy does the job best. Ideally, weights should either be assigned 
according to revealed individual or social preferences, according to the internal 
structure of  the data, or be traced back to a sound normative argument. In the first 
instance, it may be the case that preferences, values and judgements can be elicited 






from qualitative analyses, (e.g. expert opinion, or public opinion) or in the second 
instance through some empirical exercise (e.g. factor analysis, principal components 
analysis, or cluster analysis). However, both of  these methodological strands come 
with their own shortcomings,  which may explain why so many composite indices 32
that aim to measure some form of  wellbeing revert to using equal weights.  33
The assigning of  equal weights does not imply no weight but rather implicitly implies 
that each indicator carries equal worth. This can be problematic if, normatively, not 
all dimensions and indicators are of  equal importance and should not, as a 
consequence, be equal drivers of  the composite index. This is the standard criticism. 
In the case of  the HBAI, however, equal weights can be justified on the simple basis 
that there is, as in the words of  ul Haq, “no a priori rationale for giving a higher 
weight to one choice than to another.”  For this reason the HBAI will start from a 34
position of  equal weighting within and across dimensions. But it is just that: the first 
step in an “iterative public debate” about what the weights should be.  35
D. Aggregation 
The HBAI is an aggregation of  the three weighted-dimension indices using the 
geometric mean. The geometric, rather than arithmetic, mean is used for the same 
 Since preferences are likely to reflect local conditions, they may not necessarily translate from one 32
place to another. Thus, for making international comparisons, it is likely that weights elicited from 
opinions will deliver inconsistent, contradictory results. And although factor analysis based on 
principal components reduces the risk of  double counting (through grouping individual indicators 
according to their degree of  correlation) the correction does not necessarily produce a measure that 
reveals the theoretical importance of  the associated indicator.
 For example, the Human Development Index (HDI), the OECD Better Life Index, and the 33
Multidimensional Poverty Index
 ul Haq, M. “Reflections on Human Development.” (1995) Quoted in Klugman, J., F. Rodriguez, and 34
H.J. Choi. “The HDI 2010: New Controversies, Old Critiques.” (2011) p. 14
 “Since any choice of  weights should be open to questioning and debating in public discussions, it is 35
crucial that the judgements that are implicit in such weighting be made as clear and comprehensible as 
possible and thus be open to public scrutiny.” Anand, S., and A.K. Sen. “Concepts of  Human 
Development and Poverty: A Multidimensional Perspective.” (1997) p. 6
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reasons that prompted the change in aggregation method of  the Human 
Development Index (HDI) in 2010: the additive form implies perfect substitution 
across indicators and dimensions,  which, as noted by many critics of  the old HDI, 36
is problematic on several counts.   37
Firstly, perfect substitutability implicitly assumes that the indicators within the 
composite index are “mutually preferentially independent.”  To take the indicators 38
in the HBAI as an illustrative example, the arithmetic scheme would assume there are 
no synergies or conflicts between the indicators so would assess the marginal 
contribution of  each indicator separately and add them together to generate a total 
value. The combined impact of  multiple deprivations in, say, access to 
contraceptives, skilled attendance at birth, food, water, sanitation and access to ART, 
on health would be no greater than the (linear) sum of  each of  the parts. Secondly, 
perfect substitutability allows for the situation where poor performance in one 
dimension could be compensated for by a sufficiently good performance in another. 
For example, two countries, one with dimension scores of  0.1, 0.2, and 0.9 and 
another with dimension scores of  0.4, 0.4, and 0.4 would under the arithmetic model 
have the same overall HBAI score despite having hugely different domestic health 
situations. Both of  these results seem antithetical to the task at stake. The three 
dimensions are not mutually exclusive parts, are deemed to be of  equal importance, 
and the HBAI should represent a measure of  all that the right to health guarantees. 
 “There are constant marginal returns to improvements in each dimension, and therefore the 36
marginal rate of  substitution between dimensional achievements is also a constant.” Klugman, J., F. 
Rodriguez, and H.J. Choi. Supra n. 34, p. 12
 For example, Nathan, H.S.K., S. Mishra, and B.S. Reddy. “An Alternative Approach to Measure 37
HDI” (2008); Desai, M.J. “Human Development: Concepts and Measurement.” (1991) 
 Debreu, G. “Topological Methods in Cardinal Utility Theory.” In Mathematical Methods in Social 38
Sciences, Arrow, K.J., S. Karlin, and P. Suppes (eds.) 1960, pp. 16-26. 
166
A geometric scheme of  aggregation can, in part, mitigate these limitations and does 
appear more appropriate. Specifically, at low values, the marginal rate of  substitution 
using the geometric form is lower than that of  the arithmetic form, which is 
constant. This means that countries with low scores in one dimension will require 
much higher improvements in another to improve the overall HBAI. Recalling the 
example above, under the geometric scheme, the first country’s HBAI score would 
be much lower than that of  the second country, (0.26 and 0.4, respectively) which 
already seems more intuitive. Moreover, the marginal utility from an improvement in 
one of  the dimensions is much higher when the absolute HBAI score is low. For 
example, if  both countries in the example were to make improvements in the first 
indicator by 0.1, the first would improve its HBAI score to 0.33 (28%) whilst the 
second would improve to 0.43 (8%). This would therefore provide low-performing 
states with an incentive to focus on improvements in those areas in which people are 
most acutely deprived and where the need is most urgent.  




1/3 )    (6) 
The first step is the geometric aggregation of  the indicators within dimensions to 
produce three dimension indices, and the second step is the geometric aggregation 
of  the three dimension indices into the total HBAI. 
V. Data and descriptives 
The data set used in the analysis is a panel data set observed for 186 countries, 
covering 157 of  the 162 parties to the ICESCR and 186 of  the 194 member 
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countries of  the WHO.  Any country for which data on more than two input and/39
or environmental variables were missing is not included. The panel data are observed 
over a five-year time period (2007-2011), though South Sudan is observed only in 
one year (2011), resulting in an unbalanced panel of  926 observations. The variables 
in the data set can be allotted to three main groups: the output variable, which here 
represents enjoyment of  the right to health; the input variables, which are the inputs 
required to guarantee the right to health; and the environmental variables, which are 
not inputs but nevertheless affect a state’s ability to fulfil the right to health. The data 
are described in Table 5.1 below and all methods of  calculation are summarised in 
Appendix B.1.     
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics, compliance 
A. Output variable, 𝑦it 
The composite index (HBAI) described above is used as the output. The HBAI 
should theoretically be made up of  nine indicators.  However, given data limitations, 40
not all of  the nine indicators are included in the HBAI applied in the analysis that 
Variable Min Max Mean SD
HBAI 23.93 98.96 77.24 15.72
GNIC 103.60 85596.00 11879.07 13271.79
HK 1.10 13.30 7.54 3.03
MORTDEN 1.00 5.00 2.71 1.31
POPDEN 1.77 7405.29 176.65 574.82
CC -1.70 2.45 -0.07 0.99
GE -2.16 2.26 -0.05 0.97
VA -2.17 1.67 -0.09 0.99
 Parties to the ICESCR excluded from this analysis are Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, 39
Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and the State of  Palestine. WHO members excluded are Cook 
Islands, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, and Tuvalu. These countries have been excluded on the basis 
that data for more than two input and/or environmental variables were missing.  
 Maternal Health: unmet need for contraception, skilled attendance at birth, and neonatal tetanus; 40
Child Health: immunisation, nutrition, water and sanitation; Adult Health: HIV/AIDS control, and 
TB treatment.
168
follows. Instead, a reduced form of  the HBAI is used, which includes the following 
four indicators: 
i. Births attended by skilled health personnel 
ii. Measles immunisation coverage amongst 1-year-olds  
iii. Population using improved sanitation facilities 
iv. Successful completion rate for new pulmonary smear-positive tuberculosis 
cases  
where i. represents the maternal health dimension, ii. and iii. represent the child 
health dimension, and iv. represents the adult health dimension. Data for indicators 
i., ii., and iv. have been obtained from the WHO’s Global Health Observatory, whilst 
data for indicator iii. has been obtained from the UN’s Millennium Development 
Goals Indicators database. The HBAI variable enters the model in log form. 
B. Input variables, 𝐱’it 
Two variables are modelled as the inputs to the production process of  health basket 
attainment: Gross National Income per capita (GNIC) and mean years of  schooling 
in the adult population (HK). These indicators are, respectively, proxies for the level 
of  financial and human resources available to the state; both of  which are essential 
components of  a state’s ability to fulfil the right to health. GNIC measures GNI per 
capita converted to current international dollars using PPP rates. Data for GNIC 
have been obtained from the World Bank’s International Comparison Program 
database. HK measures the average number of  years of  education received by people 
aged 25 and older. Data for HK have been obtained from the United Nations 
Development Programme. Both input variables also enter the production function in 
log form. Since the production function is of  the non-separated translog form, the 
squares and cross product terms of  the input variables are also included. 
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C.  Heterogeneity variables, 𝒛’i 
Two further variables are included in the model, which are indicators of  cross-
country heterogeneity: the density of  the population (POPDEN) and the density of  
mortality in the population (MORTDEN). These two variables are added as 
additional conditions placed on a state’s ability to fulfil the right to health. POPDEN 
is measured as the number of  people per km2 of  land area and is included in the 
production function on the basis that for states where population density is low, 
attainment of  the health basket may prove more difficult, precisely because of  its low 
population density status. POPDEN data have been obtained from the World Bank 
and appears in the model in logs. MORTDEN is the WHO’s measure of  the burden 
of  disease by region, which classifies countries by five mortality strata based on their 
respective child and adult mortality rates. The scale of  the variable ranges between 1 
(very low child and very low adult mortality) to 5 (high child mortality and very high 
adult mortality) and the proposition underwriting its inclusion in the production 
function is the notion that the higher the mortality density the more difficult 
attainment of  the health basket would be given the input set; those inputs would 
have to spread more thinly. Since these variables of  cross-county heterogeneity are 
time invariant, they are observed only for 2011.   
D. Willingness variables 
The hypothesis that the non-compliance residual, the 𝒖i,, is unwillingness can be 
tested by correlating the 𝒖i terms with willingness variables. Willingness can be 
revealed through investigating “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised.”  This is how Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón, and later 41
 Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. “Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual 41
Governance Indicators 1996–2008.” (2009) p. 5
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with Mastruzzi, define “governance.”  The types of  traditions and institutions they 42
identify under their governance umbrella include: (i) the processes through which 
governments are selected and monitored; (ii) the capacity of  the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (iii) the respect of  citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them.  To that end, the variables that provide indicators of  this willingness are: the 43
perception of  government effectiveness (GE), the perception of  the extent to which 
citizens have a civil and political voice with which to hold governments to account 
(VA), and the perception of  the extent to which corruption is controlled (CC). Data 
for GE, VA, and CC are obtained from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators database and are all measured on a scale ranging between -2.5 and 2.5 with 
higher values corresponding to a greater degree of  state willingness to mobilise its 
maximum available resources with respect to providing the level of  the health basket 
deemed affordable. All willingness variables are observed only for 2011.  
E. Estimates for missing values 
The proportion of  observations for which data are missing is summarised by year 
and variable in Appendix B.2. Proxies for these missing values have been obtained by 
computing estimated values from a regression of  the respective values on all other 
observed data within the complete data set. For example, if  a country is missing a 
value for the measurement of  births attended by skilled health personnel, all other 
observed data are used as independent variables to predict a value by regressing them 
on births attended by skilled health personnel. Because the degree of  missingness for 
the births attended by skilled health personnel variable, particularly, is very high, the 
 Ibid; Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobatón. “Aggregating Governance Indicators” (1999a); 42
and Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobatón. “Governance Matters.” (1999b)
 Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. Supra n. 4143
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data set for imputing values for it has been extended to include observations 
spanning 2005-2012. The multiple imputation process has been carried out using the 
Amelia II program.  The analysis that follows is, therefore, based on data for all 186 44
countries.     
VI. Results: signalling ability and willingness 
The production model is specified as a full, non-separated, translog stochastic 
frontier model, which includes the squares and cross product terms of  the input 
variables 𝐱’it. Table 5.2 presents the estimated production functions based on both 
the fixed effects model and the heterogeneous random effects model. Both models 
appear to provide reasonable and significant estimations of  the parameters with both 
input coefficients, GNIC and HK, and their squares behaving as expected; that is the 
input coefficients both have positive signs and their squares are negative. This 
suggests that the results are consistent with the theoretical production function 
assumption of  health basket optimisation provided in Section I. In both the fixed 
effects and heterogeneous random effects model, between the two inputs, the role of  
human resources dominates in explaining health basket attainment and does so to a 
very similar degree: (68% and 70%, respectively). The explanatory power of  financial 
resources, however, differs significantly across the two model estimates and the 
specific coefficients appear somewhat counterintuitive.  
 AMELIA II Version 1.6.4. See Honaker, J., G. King, and M. Blackwell. “AMELIA II: A Program for 44
Missing Data.” (2012) for software documentation. 
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Table 5.2. Estimated frontier production models 
The covariates of  cross-country heterogeneity, introduced into the heterogeneous 
random effects model, also have coefficients of  the expected sign: the higher the 
mortality density the lower is health basket attainment, and the higher the population 
density the higher is health basket attainment. This result is reassuring. But the 
reason for including indicators of  cross-country heterogeneity in the model is based 
on the hypothesis that a model that provides no method of  accommodating them 
would capture the heterogeneity in its estimate of  the 𝒖i and, as a consequence, the 𝒖i would be overestimated. In compliance terms, this would mean that the level and/
or degree of  non-compliance is much more widespread than it in point of  fact is. A 
model, which allows for the inclusion of  the 𝒛’s, should therefore rid the 𝒖i of  such 
Variable Fixed Effects Model Heterogeneous Random 
Effects Model
CONSTANT 3.2396 (0.1262)*
GNIC 0.2955 (0.0524)* 0.0866 (0.0369)*
HK 0.6802 (0.1006)* 0.6974 (0.0653)*
HK2 0.1091 (0.0508)* -0.0264 (0.0313)
GNIC2 -0.0091 (0.0087) 0.0090 (0.0064)













MAX 0.8158 0.6777𝒖i Correlation 0.6457
Rank Correlation 0.6704
Estimated standard errors in parentheses
*Indicates significant at the 95% level
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misplaced time invariant heterogeneity and the estimate of  non-compliance should 
be smaller.  
In both models, it is expected that non-compliance exists; 𝒖i is expected to be >0. In 
the fixed effects model non-compliance is measured as deviation from the estimate 
given by the best performing state. In the heterogeneous random effects model it is 
measured by λ  = σ𝒖/σ𝒗. If  all states were fully compliant, σ𝒖 would be zero and 
therefore λ  would be zero. In the presence of  non-compliance λ  is expected to be 
significantly different from zero, indeed the larger the value of  λ  the greater is the 
degree of  non-compliance. The results from the heterogeneous random effects 
model suggest that there is significant non-compliance across countries; the value for 
λ  of  10.8505 is sizeable and is dominated by σ𝒖, (0.2355/0.0217). But it is in the 
comparison between the two 𝒖i estimates where the more interesting result is found. 
Incorporating the 𝒛’s in the model has had the expected result with respect to the 
mean and variation in 𝒖i: the heterogeneous random effects model estimate, which 
accommodates heterogeneity, is three times smaller than the fixed effects model 
estimate, which accords to the hypothesis articulated above. In the fixed effects 
model, time invariant heterogeneity does appear to be masquerading as non-
compliance. 
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Figure 5.4: Non-compliance estimates and state rankings 
The estimates and rankings of  state non-compliance for the two models are plotted 
in Figure 5.4. The estimate correlation of  0.65 and rank correlation of  0.67 show 
that the two models produce markedly different results, which suggests that 
compliance is significantly affected by the density of  mortality in the population and 
the density of  the population itself. Between-model variation in both the estimates 
and the rankings appears to be greatest around the mid-point. With respect to the 
state rankings, there is some correspondence towards the upper end of  the range. 
The full list of  compliance scores and rankings is provided in Appendix B.3. Table 
5.3 shows the between-model differences in state rankings between the top and 





























Table 5.3: Rankings for the top 10 and bottom 10 states with respect to compliance 
As a matter of  interpretation, it is worth remembering that the measure of  non-
compliance is proportional to the actual value of  health basket attainment; it 
represents proportional potential for improvement. The rankings do not, therefore, 
reflect the actual level of  enjoyment of  the right to health in each state. It is in fact 
the case that some of  the top performing states with respect to compliance still have 
relatively low actual health basket attainment levels. For example, using the 
heterogeneous random effects estimates, out of  all 186 states Burundi is the best 
performing and is almost fully compliant with its obligation to fulfil the right to 
health, (98.8%). The level of  the health basket being provided is as much as Burundi 
is able to provide given its maximum available resources. However, the actual level of  
FE State HRE HRE State FE
1 Bhutan 15 1 Burundi 6
2 Gambia 3 2 Oman 4
3 Burkina Faso 38 3 Gambia 2
4 Oman 2 4 Kyrgyzstan 47
5 Cabo Verde 44 5 Myanmar 10
6 Burundi 1 6 Rwanda 8
7 Kuwait 57 7 Malawi 18
8 Rwanda 6 8 Algeria 45
9 Guatemala 54 9 Uruguay 42
10 Myanmar 5 10 Macedonia 32
177 Russia 119 177 Haiti 165
178 Japan 151 178 Togo 174
179 Ghana 173 179 Sudan 147
180 Bahrain 172 180 Madagascar 182
181 Papua New Guinea 184 181 Somalia 186
182 Madagascar 180 182 Nigeria 176
183 Ethiopia 185 183 Timor-Leste 151
184 Chad 186 184 Papua New Guinea 181
185 Gabon 176 185 Ethiopia 183




health basket attainment in Burundi is 0.753, which suggests there is still vast room 
for improvement with respect to overall population health.  45
Figure 5.5: Geographic distribution of  non-compliance estimates (HRE) 
Lower (higher) values represent better (worse) right to health compliance 
This point is particularly important with respect to making cross-country 
comparisons. For example, at the bottom end of  the rankings, the degree of  non-
compliance in Somalia and Nigeria is roughly the same: 52%. However, actual health 
basket attainment in Somalia is just 0.351 whereas it is 0.549 in Nigeria. This means 
that if  both states were fully compliant with their obligation to fulfil the right to 
health, actual attainment of  the health basket would increase to a still modest 0.519 
in Somalia but would increase considerably to 0.812 in Nigeria: a level that is on par 
with current health basket enjoyment in Malta. Comparing Somalia with Nigeria on 
the 𝒖i scores alone may therefore be misleading. Nigeria is perhaps performing 
qualitatively worse than Somalia, despite almost equivalence in the 𝒖i scores. 
 The maximum accepted value of  the HBAI being 1. 45
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Likewise, the same interpretation must be borne in mind at the top end of  the 
rankings. Indeed the 𝒖i scores become less meaningful when actual health basket 
attainment is already close to 1.  
Non-compliance reflects the failure of  some states to provide as much of  the health 
basket as possible, given their available resources. Its measurement is crucial to 
gauging the degree of  poor performance in fulfilling the right to health. But, with 
respect to the goals of  this chapter, the measure of  state-specific non-compliance is 
not enough. In order to test the hypothesis that non-compliance is essentially 
unwillingness on behalf  of  the state to mobilise its maximum available resources to 
fulfil the right to health, the sources of  non-compliance must be investigated. 
Table 5.4: Correspondence of  compliance with willingness  
Simple correlations between the non-compliance estimates and willingness variables 
reveal that the relationship is as expected: negative. That is, states with higher 
willingness values do report lower non-compliance values and, equivalently, non-
compliance is associated with unwillingness. This is the case for all three willingness 
variables as reported in Table 5.4. Although the relationship is as expected in sign, 
the correspondence between the estimates is relatively weak, particularly for the 
indicator of  voice and accountability. Figure 5.6 shows the correspondence 
graphically for all three willingness indicators. 
GE VA CC
Correlation with 𝒖i -0.3275 -0.1867 -0.2796
178
Figure 5.6: Correspondence of  compliance with willingness 
This lack of  strength in the correlation estimates suggests that either a) non-
compliance is unwillingness but there may be more to unwillingness than these three 
indicators are able to capture; b) that non-compliance is made up of  more than just 
unwillingness; or c) the estimate of  non-compliance is not a good measure of  real 
non-compliance. In order to shed light on this uncertainty, a number of  further 
questions need to be investigated. In the first and second instances, more factors that 
may influence non-compliance need to be introduced into the analysis. For example, 
it may be the case that there are factors outside of  the civil and political realm that 
account for unwillingness; disproportionate military spending could be one such 
factor. However, the paucity of  available data on these indicators excludes them as 
viable inputs for a cross-country analysis such as the one presented here. As well, it 















































to fulfil the right to health but there may be demand factors that inhibit its fulfilment; 
cultural preferences towards traditional rather than clinical evidence-based health 
technologies, for instance. The uncertainty as to whether the indicators of  non-
compliance are good ones is more difficult to test; some of  the limitations are known 
whilst others are not.   
One admitted limitation of  the indicators produced is that they do not capture or 
expose anything with regards to how health basket attainment is distributed. This is 
particularly problematic when the actual value of  health basket attainment is below 
full attainment since there is no way of  assessing whether the process for prioritising 
those in the community for whom the basket has been attained, over those for 
whom it has not, is non-discriminatory. Returning to the example of  Burundi. 
Although the indicator has signalled almost full compliance, because the actual value 
of  health basket attainment is below full attainment, hypothetically, it could be the 
case that the remaining 0.247, (1 - 0.753) for whom the health basket has not been 
attained, have been excluded on the basis of  race, ethnicity and/or gender. That 
being so, Burundi would not be compliant at all. Clearly, the indicator needs further 
in-country analysis to assess whether it is in fact a good measure of  compliance.  
VII.Conclusions 
The study presented in this chapter is an innovative attempt to assess the extent to 
which each state is complying with its obligation to fulfil the right to health using 
stochastic frontier analysis. It builds upon previous residual-type methodologies, 
particularly the SERF Index, and in so doing adds methodological value by 
presenting a model that allows for the entry of  multiple ability factors (other than 
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income) and for distinguishing real non-compliance from random statistical noise. It 
shows that by setting obligations to the production frontier, maximum expected 
health attainment at different levels of  ability can be predicted and that compliance 
can be measured as the difference between the observed level of  health attainment 
and that set by the obligation frontier. By virtue of  its compliance-revealing property, 
the methodology gives strength to the notion that conditionality need not preclude 
obligations from being immediate.  
The study used a panel data set, covering almost all of  the world’s countries, to 
estimate the production function using both a fixed effects and a random effects 
model. The results confirm what earlier researchers have found with respect to 
stochastic frontier analysis in a global context: that the fixed effects model, which 
does not allow the inclusion of  time invariant heterogeneity indicators, captures 
heterogeneity in the non-compliance estimate and hence overestimates it. The study 
found that by comparing the basic fixed effects model with no heterogeneity to one 
with heterogeneity in the production function, the sample mean of  estimated non-
compliance falls from 0.47 to 0.16. Preferring the heterogeneous random effects 
model as its platform, the analysis has shown that in addition to financial and human 
resources, both mortality and population density have a significant impact on a state’s 
ability to fulfil the right to health. 
Several indicators of  willingness were correlated with the estimates of  non-
compliance in an attempt to test the hypothesis that if  compliance with the 
obligation to fulfil the right to health is a function of  a state’s ability and willingness 
to do so, then non-compliance is unwillingness. The results show that the general 
relationship between willingness and compliance is as expected (the more willing the 
state is, the lower is its non-compliance.) However, the correlation coefficients 
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suggest that the relationship is weaker than might have been anticipated, which 
throws into question either the indicators of  willingness, the indicators of  non-
compliance, or both.  
There are several limitations to the study and as a result the indicators of  non-
compliance that flow from it need to be handled with due care. The quality and 
availability of  the data is the first and most obvious limitation. To take the indicators 
on successful treatment of  TB as an example, despite these data being collected from 
the most reliable source, some of  the indicators appear intuitively dubious. This is 
most likely due to the low detection rates of  TB in some states, for instance 
detection was estimated in 2013 to be 82% in Brazil but just 57% in Burundi,  46
which may for some states be hiding the scale of  the problem and overstating the 
estimate of  success. Poor quality data and the complete lack of  data for several 
elements of  the fully formed HBAI are likely to have implications as so the fitness of  
the resultant estimates of  non-compliance. This limitation is here mitigated, in part, 
because revealing the quantum of  the estimates in and of  themselves is not the main 
objective of  the project. Rather, it is the methodology through which these indicators 
can be generated that matters. Another crucial weakness to the indicators is that they 
in no way reveal how health basket attainment is distributed within each state, which 
could potentially affect the substantive interpretation as to whether the state is 
compliant or non-complaint to a significant extent.  
At this point, however, with data limitations with respect to alternative indicators of  
willingness and without a general measure of  discrimination that can be applied 
systematically across countries, it is difficult to investigate these uncovered 
 WHO. Global Health Observatory Data Repository, Case detection rate for all forms of  46
Tuberculosis, 2013 estimates
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uncertainties much further using quantitative analysis. They will instead be taken up 
in the qualitative case study that follows in Chapter 6.
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6 
Reviewing the signal 
Introduction 
Non-compliance reflects the failure by states to fulfil as much of  the health basket 
as possible given their ability to do so. The measurement of  non-compliance 
offered in the preceding chapter is crucial to gauging the degree of  poor 
performance in fulfilling the right to health. The analysis has revealed that mean 
non-compliance across all countries in the sample is 0.1625. This means that, on 
average, performance in fulfilling the right to health as defined by the minimum 
health basket defended in Chapter 3 could potentially be improved by around 16 
percent. However, this average is misleading. With a standard deviation of  0.1349, 
the variance in non-compliance across countries is significant. Indeed the room for 
improvement is almost 68 percent at its worst and just over 1 percent at its best. 
The sample average, then, does not provide a very meaningful idea of  cross-country 
non-compliance. The meaning is instead at the country level. In order to really 
understand the existence and degree of  non-compliance the analysis must therefore 
move forward on a per country basis.  
Brazil is one of  the 164 countries that recognises the right to health under 
international law,  and is one of  the 56 countries that also recognises the right either 1
 UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Status of  Treaties as at 1
17/05/2015
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constitutionally, in a bill of  rights, or in another domestic statute.  Brazil has 2
promoted access to health by establishing a unified health system, guided by a 
principle of  universality. Brazil has also been an innovator in the enforcement of  
the right to health through recognising the right’s justiciability; the “judicialisation 
of  health”  has spread throughout the country at every administrative level (federal, 3
state and municipal). Whilst these claims suggest that the right to health is playing a 
prominent role in shaping the development of  health policy and delivery in Brazil, 
at the same time, the country’s health system in some corners remains ‘in crisis.’  4
Out of  this disparity there arises an interesting case to be investigated: in Brazil, to 
what extent are commitments to the right to health in principle being matched by 
commitments to the right to health in practice? This is essentially the question being 
posed in this chapter.  
The chapter has two main aims. The first is to investigate the degree to which the 
right to health is being fulfilled in Brazil and, specifically, to investigate whether the 
quantitative measure of  non-compliance generated by this thesis’s methodology 
does in fact make qualitative sense. The second is to investigate the implications of  
the measure with respect to how right to health claims have been dealt with in 
Brazil, and what light, if  any, can the measure shed on the way in which the right 
has hitherto been interpreted by the Brazilian judiciary.     
 Backman, G., et al. “Health Systems and the Right to Health: An Assessment of  194 2
countries.” (2008)
 Ferraz, O.L.M. “Brazil: Health Inequalities, Rights and Courts.” In Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts 3
Bring More Justice to Health? Yamin, A.E. and S. Gloppen (eds.) 2011a
 The most discernible evidence of  this being in the hundreds of  thousands of  Brazilians who took 4
to the streets throughout the country in 2013 and 2014, demanding better public services and better 
standards of  health care. Open Democracy “Brazil, protest and the World Cup.” 13 June 2014  
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The rest of  the chapter unfolds as follows: as a means of  giving an account of  the 
broader context within which the question of  compliance is to be framed, Section I 
provides a brief  sketch of  the current health status of  the Brazilian population and 
traces the way in which important health indicators have evolved over recent years. 
An account of  how the right to health is protected under Brazilian law is then 
provided and a discussion on the interaction of  the right to health with claims to 
health needs follows. It is revealed that the “judicialisation of  health” in Brazil has 
been equivalent to granting individual entitlements to the satisfaction of  all kinds of  
health needs, which on the surface may look like a right to health success. But the 
measure of  non-compliance offered in the preceding chapter indicates that Brazil 
could be doing more with the resources it has available to the tune of  8 percent. So 
to test whether this indicator is in fact a good indication of  non-compliance, three 
further questions need to be investigated: has the Brazilian government been 
unwilling to use its available resources to fulfil the right to health; has health failed 
due to factors outside of  the state’s control; and/or has the right to health been 
fulfilled fairly, according to human rights principles? These three questions form the 
basis of  Section II, which argues that the signal of  8 percent non-compliance in 
Brazil is reasonably accurate, if  not underestimated. In light of  Brazil’s non-
compliance, Section III discusses what is the court’s responsibility in enforcing the 
right to health. It discusses the limitations of  the courts individualised approach that 
it has up to this point adopted and suggests that structural-type remedies may be 
more successful in addressing health needs where they are most acute. This, 
however, requires considerable political buy-in, which may be outside the bounds of  
possibility given the current Brazilian political context.      
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I. The case of  Brazil 
Brazil is the largest country in South America and has the seventh largest economy 
in the world. It has a multiethnic population of  over 200 million; yet around 32 
million people still live below the national poverty line.  The country’s poorest 20 5
percent earn around 3.4 percent of  Brazil’s income, whilst the richest 10 percent 
earn 41.7 percent, making Brazil one of  the most unequal countries in the world 
with respect to income inequality.  Over the past two decades Brazil has seen rapid 6
improvements in population health with, for example, an increase in life expectancy 
at birth from 63 years in 1990 to 74 years in 2013, an almost halving of  the 
maternal mortality rate from 120 per 1,000 in 1990 to 69 per 1,000 in 2013 and an 
even more impressive improvement in the child mortality rate, which has fallen by 
more than three quarters from 62 per 1,000 in 1990 to 14 per 1,000 in 2013. 
Changes in the nature of  mortality are also suggestive of  general improvements in 
population health, with deaths from acute infectious diseases giving way to those 
from chronic noncommunicable diseases as the main contributors to mortality.   7
These statistics are indeed remarkable. However, they conceal important aspects of  
the Brazilian health picture. There remain vast disparities in access to health care 
and in health outcomes within Brazil; like income, health is not distributed equally. 
To take infant mortality as an example, whilst the average number of  infant deaths 
for every 1,000 born was around 13 for Brazil in total in 2013, the number creeps 
up to 20 for every 1,000 in the state of  Amapá in the Northern Region and is as low 
as 10 for every 1,000 in the state of  Santa Catarina in the Southern Region; twice as 
 UN Statistics Division. Millennium Development Goals Database, 2012 estimates5
 World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2012 estimates6
 WHO. Global Health Observatory Data Repository7
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few. Within these averages, there are even greater disparities at the municipality 
level. The infant mortality rate is as low as 2 in every 1,000 in some Southern 
municipalities, such as Jaraguá do Sul in Santa Catarina and Birigüi in the state of  
São Paulo and climbs to more than 50 in every 1,000 in some Northern and 
Northeastern municipalities, such as Caracaraí in Roraima and Mulungu do Morro 
in Bahia.  This same north-south disparity is revealed across numerous health 8
indicators. Health inequity is therefore the backdrop against which the right to 
health in Brazil must be framed. 
Health as a fundamental human right in Brazil is recognised in both international 
law, for example through Brazil’s ratification without reservation of  the 
International Covenant of  Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR), and domestically 
in Article 6 and Articles 196 to 200 of  the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution: 
Education, health, nutrition, labor, housing, leisure, security, social security, 
protection of  motherhood and childhood and assistance to the destitute, are 
social rights, as set forth in this Constitution.  9
Health is the right of  all and the duty of  the state and shall be guaranteed by 
social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of  illness and other 
maladies and by universal and equal access to all activities and services for 
its promotion, protection and recovery.  10
   
The conception of  health as it is constitutionalised is broad and the measures 
required for its protection and promotion go beyond the provision of  health care. 
Nevertheless, for the first 10 years of  its inception, the Constitution, and the 
 Brazil Ministry of  Health Information System on Mortality (Ministério da Saúde Sistema de 8
Informações sobre Mortalidade) 2014 estimates
 Constitution of  Brazil, Article 6  (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988)9
 Ibid, Article 19610
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provisions therein, was seen as giving rise more to “programmatic norms”  than to 11
individualised rights claims and the judiciary unfailingly interpreted it deferentially. It 
was widely perceived that giving content to its provisions was not the job of  the 
judiciary but rather that of  the political and technical branches of  the state; a 
presupposition that resembles the approach taken by the Constitutional Court of  
South Africa and by the Costa Rican Sala Constitucional (in its early guise), already 
discussed in Chapter 3. The following passage from the court of  appeals in Rio de 
Janeiro is an illustration of  this deference with respect to the right to health:  
Given scarcity of  resources, the State cannot privilege one patient over 
hundreds of  others, also needy, who accept the limitations of  the state 
machinery. The Judiciary cannot, to protect the litigant, intrude in the public 
administration’s policy aimed at attending to the population.  12
However, since the mid to late 1990s, the judiciary’s position of  passivity in giving 
direct orders has changed. Radically. Since the enactment of  a 1996 law, which 
imposed upon the state an obligation to provide state-funded access to medicines to 
all patients infected with HIV or suffering from AIDS, patients left with unfulfilled 
prescriptions turned to the courts for redress. It was in the decisions made with 
respect to these cases that the judiciary’s approach of  deference changed to one of  
assertiveness.  
Positive orders, which granted access to prescribed medicines, first began to 
permeate the lower courts of  several southern states but soon became de rigueur 
throughout Brazil. And, the rationale for the positive order given by one judge in 
1997 in a case that reached the Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), the highest court 
in the Brazilian judicial system for dealing with constitutional rights, has since 
 Trial No. 1998.004.00220, Relator: Des. Antonio Lindberg Montenegro, 17.12.1998. Quoted in 11
Ferraz, O.L.M. “Harming the Poor Through Social Rights Litigation: Lessons from Brazil.” (2011b) 
p. 1654
 Ap. Civ. No. 1994.001.01749, Relator: Des. Carpena Amorim, 20.10.1994. Quoted in Ibid12
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become according to Ferraz “a kind of  de facto binding precedent … upon which 
most of  the subsequent successful cases have been based.”  He quotes the decision 13
as follows: 
The right to health — as well as a fundamental right of  all individuals — 
represents an inextricable constitutional consequence of  the right to life. … 
The interpretation of  a programmatic norm cannot transform it into a 
toothless constitutional promise … Between protecting the inviolability of  
the right to life, an inalienable fundamental right guaranteed by the 
Constitution itself  (art. 5º, caput) or ensuring, against this fundamental 
prerogative, a financial and secondary interest of  the state, I believe — once 
this dilemma is established — ethical and legal reasons impose on the judge 
one single and possible option: unswerving respect for life.  14
From the jurisprudence that has followed, it is clear that this decision marked a 
significant turning point in the history of  the right to health and its interpretation in 
Brazil. Since 1997, judges and courts have consistently followed suit, interpreting 
the right to health as an expansive individual entitlement to the satisfaction of  all 
kinds of  health needs, not only those related to HIV/AIDS. 
The nature of  right to health cases being presented in the Brazilian courts has 
overwhelmingly taken an access to medicines-type shape and the number of  such 
cases being brought has grown exponentially. Between 2003 and 2011, the volume 
of  health litigation at the Federal level in Brazil grew from 387 to 12,811 cases.  15
Importantly, these figures are likely to reveal only the tip of  the iceberg. Given that 
the Brazilian constitution somewhat blurs the lines of  accountability between the 
different units responsible for delivering health services, (that is federal, state, and 
municipal) it is possible for an individual who believes that their right to health has 
 Ferraz, O.L.M. “The Right to Health in the Courts of  Brazil: Worsening Health 13
Inequities?” (2009b) 
 Ibid. Quoting Justice Celso Mello, RE 271.286 AgR- RS (2000), Relator Min. Celso de Mello. 14
(translation)
 Ferraz, O.L.M. Supra n. 315
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been violated to bring a claim against any of  these three units, or indeed all of  them 
at once. Spending on pharmaceuticals by Brazil’s Unified Health System (the 
Sistema Único de Saúde, SUS) has been increasing every year since 1998; 
expenditure on medicines between 2003 and 2007 “for exceptional use,” increased 
by 252%.  As reported in figure 6.1, considering only spending by the Ministry of  16
Health to meet legal demands, costs have increased from R$2.9 million to R$135.4 
million during the five-year period from 2005 to 2010 and approximately 97% of  
these expenditures are accounted for by medicines that do not form part of  the 
SUS list of  official medicines. The fact that there are 26 States and more than 5,500 
Municipalities in Brazil means that the current total number of  right to health cases 
across all three delivery units is likely to stretch into the hundreds of  thousands with 
the associated costs in Reais spiralling into the hundreds of  millions. 
Figure 6.1: Ministry of  Health spending on medicines to meet legal demands, Brazil 
2005-2010 
Source: Políticas Sociais - acompanhamento e análise nº 20, 2012, p. 102 
 Carias, C., F. Vieira, C. Giordano, and P. Zucchi. “Medicamentos de Dispensação Excepcional: 16



















































So what does this ‘judicialisation of  health’ suggest with respect to Brazil’s 
compliance with its obligation to fulfil the right to health? It may appear that the 
Brazilian model is a right to health success story. The many successful cases have 
required that the government expand the provision of  health goods and services, 
delivering them to many more people, which moves Brazil further towards the ideal 
of  universal access. But to make a judgement on the question of  compliance we 
need to look at the profile of  claims with respect to the right to health as it has so 
far been defined in this thesis. Because individuals are claiming their right to health 
in courts and are more often than not having successful outcomes does not 
necessarily mean that Brazil is compliant with its obligation to fulfil the right to 
health. To shed more light on this question the measurement and discussion 
provided in the previous chapter should first be revisited.  
II. Compliance or non-compliance? 
The measure of  compliance calculated in the previous chapter signals that Brazil is 
not compliant with its obligation to fulfil the right to health. It is falling short of  the 
expected level of  health, given its maximum available resources, to the tune of  an 
estimated 8 percent. However, Brazil’s lack of  success in fulfilling the right to health 
is not consistent across its different dimensions. For instance, Brazil has had more 
success meeting maternal health needs and in immunising children against vaccine-
preventable diseases than it has had meeting access to sanitation needs and in 
successfully treating TB.  
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Sanitation remains a challenging issue in Brazil. Despite the fact that the law 
requires the government to provide universal access to sanitation services,  almost 17
half  of  municipalities do not have sewage collection services (44.85%) and there is 
no sewage treatment system in almost three-quarters of  municipalities (71.48%). 
Moreover, even in those municipalities that have access to sanitation services, the 
services are generally less accessible to the poorest communities.  Brazil also has 18
one of  the world’s highest rates of  TB incidence. Although deaths from the disease 
have been declining over the past twenty years, the average TB mortality rate in 
2013 remains comparatively high and the average treatment success rate is just 72 
percent.  But, again, treatment failure and subsequent deaths from TB are not 19
evenly distributed throughout Brazil. Vulnerable groups such as indigenous people, 
prisoners, and the homeless face an increased risk of  4 times, 25 times and 67 times, 
respectively.     20
Still, as has previously been discussed, the non-compliance indicator is just that: it is 
a signal that Brazil could be doing more. To be confident in drawing firmer 
conclusions that Brazil is falling short of  its obligations, the three tests specified in 
the previous chapter need also to be investigated. The first of  these tests is 
 Article 23(IX) of  the Brazilian Constitution provides that all levels of  government have the 17
responsibility to improve sanitation conditions, and Article 30(V) provides that municipalities are 
responsible for delivering sanitation services on a universal basis.
 Brazil Atlas of  Sanitation (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, IBGE,  “Atlas do 18
Saneamento.”) See also, Pan American Health Organisation. Water and Sanitation: Evidence for Public 
Policies focussed on Human Rights and Human Results. 2011. which claims that the largest factor 
contributing to inequity in access to water and sanitation is poverty, with the poorest sector of  the 
population reporting to spend twice as much on these services, as a proportion of  household 
income, as the richest sector, p. 16. (As an aside, this figure is likely to be even greater still in real 
terms, particularly for rural communities, since the estimates do not account for the opportunity 
costs of  time spent collecting water from sources and disposing of  waste to outlets that are both 
often of  poor quality and distant from the home.)
 WHO. Tuberculosis Country Profiles, Brazil 19
 Brazil Ministry of  Health Notifiable Diseases Information System (Ministério da Saúde Sistema de 20
Informação de Agravos de Notificação, SINAN)
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concerned with investigating the association between the non-compliance score and 
the degree to which the Brazilian government appears unwilling to use its available 
resources for fulfilling the right to health. The second test is concerned with an 
assessment as to whether the government has in fact been willing to fulfil the right 
to health but, due to factors outside of  its control, health has failed nonetheless. 
The third and final test is concerned with an assessment as to whether the indicator 
is in fact a good measure of  compliance, specifically, with an assessment of  how 
attainment of  the health basket is distributed. The remainder of  this section will be 
focussed on a discussion of  these three tests with respect to the dimensions of  
health that leave most room for improvement: access to sanitation and treatment 
for TB.  
A. Sources of  unwillingness 
Whilst GDP in Brazil has grown dramatically over the past 20 years, in both 
absolute and per capita terms, the share of  government health spending in gross 
domestic product (GDP) has grown much more slowly (figure 6.2). From a level of  
around 2.8 percent in the mid-1990s, it oscillated at the lower levels for more than a 
decade, only making any notable increase in 2009, to around 4 percent. With respect 
to the indicators of  willingness identified in the previous chapter, (government 
effectiveness, voice and accountability, and control of  corruption) Brazil performs 
comparatively poorly: ranking 98th, 129th and 126th across all countries, 
respectively. From these results alone, the hypothesis that Brazil has been unwilling 
to use its available resources to fulfil the right to health appears rather plausible. 
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Figure 6.2: Growth in GDP and growth in public health expenditure as a 
proportion of  GDP, Brazil 1995-2012 
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators  
Government spending on health in Brazil is low by international standards.  So 21
what does the Brazilian government spend its budget on? In 2014, the Brazilian 
Federal health budget was R$94.1 billion, the education budget R$79.7 billion, the 
defence budget R$70.9 billion, and the social security budget R$ 392.2 billion.  22
Meanwhile, according to the Ministry of  Sports, the total cost to host the FIFA 
World Cup in the same year in Brazil was an estimated R$25.6 billion:  more than a 23
quarter of  the health budget and almost a third of  the education budget. These 
figures underpin the plight of  the millions of  protesters that took to the streets 
throughout Brazil in 2014, all asking, “Copa pra quem?” (“Who is this Cup for?”) 
Demonstrators demanded that public services be a priority, not spending on 
expensive stadiums, which has gone hand in hand with corruption, police brutality 
 Compared to Argentina, Columbia, Cuba, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the US, for example. World 21
Bank. World Development Indicators
 Brazil Federal Budget Senado Federal Execução Orçamentária para o Setor22
 Forbes. “Bringing FIFA To Brazil.” 06 November 2014. This cost includes the costs of  building 23




















































and evictions. This suggests that the government hasn’t implemented those policies 
that are most socially desired. 
But it is not only the shortfall in the quantity of  public financial resources needed 
for the fulfilment of  the right to health that may be the problem; it may also be the 
quality of  how those resources are spent. In a bid to increase accountability, 
coordinate health services with other public services, and tailor the health system to 
local needs, the delivery of  most primary health services and at least half  of  
hospital care in Brazil is the responsibility of  municipalities. However, it is precisely 
this decentralisation that raises questions about firstly, how capable municipal 
governments are in performing their designated functions and secondly, whether 
some of  them are in fact too small to make use of  the economies of  scale and 
scope that are potentially available in managing the health system. Measuring 
performance on a scale of  0 to 1, a study undertaken by the National Council of  
State Secretaries of  Health (Conselho Nacional de Secretários de Saúde, CONASS) 
to assess the government’s infrastructure, institutional capacity, processes, and 
outcomes in performing its essential functions found that, at the state level, mean 
overall performance was just 0.55, and varied from 0.43 to 0.63.  Though the study 24
only covered five states, and may not therefore represent the Brazilian picture fully, 
the results are at least indicative of  a lack of  government effectiveness in the 
delivery of  health services. 
Government effectiveness may be weak for the delivery of  health services generally 
but for specific functions it may be even weaker. If  government effectiveness 
captures the quality of  public services, the quality of  policy formulation and 
 Brasil. Conselho Nacional de Secretários de Saúde. “A Gestão da Saúde Nos Estados: Avaliação e 24
Fortalecimento das Funções Essenciais.” (2007)
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implementation, and the credibility of  the government’s commitment to such 
policies, the provision of  sanitation services in Brazil provides an exemplar of  
government ineffectiveness. With so many claims to sanitation services persistently 
going unmet, it is inevitable that some will have made their way to the Brazilian 
courts. So, by tracing these claims from start to finish it is possible to gauge the 
degree of  such ineffectiveness. One recent study has attempted to do precisely that.  
The study reviewed sanitation-related cases across 32 Brazilian courts between 
January 2003 and March 2013. The review identified 258 cases that had resulted in 
decisions that had adjudicated requests for the provision of  sanitation services 
made against the government, public agencies, or publicly-controlled companies 
responsible for providing them. As an aside, it is worth mentioning that the number 
of  claims arriving in the courts must represent only a tiny proportion of  the unmet 
need given the scale of  the problem. Nevertheless, in 76 percent of  these cases, the 
court favoured the plaintiffs’ requests, granting sanitation services. Crucially, 
however, the records show that just 4 percent of  the courts’ decisions, which 
granted the requests for sanitation services, were fully implemented.  25
It appears, then, in spite of  the Brazilian courts’ commitment to ordering the state 
to provide sanitation services, a court order does not necessarily result in sanitation 
services being provided. And, it seems that the most plausible explanation as to why 
this is the case boils down to a political unwillingness to mobilise resources for 
health generally and for sanitation services specifically. In 2010, just R$1.12 billion 
was spent on sanitation, which accounts for a mere 1.66 percent of  the health 
 Paula de Barcellos, A. “Sanitation Rights, Public Law Litigation, and Inequality: A Case Study from 25
Brazil.” (2014)
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budget.  But exacerbating this problem of  scarcity is the backdrop political 26
economy of  budgeting for health in Brazil. Generating more resources for 
sanitation through the tax base is likely to be problematic since those that are most 
affected are also generally the most politically marginalised.  A comment made by 27
the Chief  Justice of  the Brazilian Superior Court of  Justice in 2011 captures the 
essence of  this point: “In a country where there are no sewage systems because it is 
an invisible service that, therefore, does not pay with votes, we cannot lose the 
opportunity of  avoiding damage to public health and environment.”  Sanitation 28
services do not pay with votes. There is very little immediate political incentive to 
provide them.     
B. Factors outside of  the state’s control 
Expanding access to health services obviously requires good quality financial 
resources. But, even in the case that financial resources are of  sufficient quantity 
and quality, expanding access may also require the removal of  various other 
constraints. Amongst these will be constraints on demand, i.e. factors that dissuade 
or prevent people from taking up the services that have been provided by the state, 
and constraints on delivery, i.e. factors that limit the capacity of  the health system to 
supply the appropriate level of  service. An unravelling of  these factors is an 
important aspect of  any assessment of  compliance because if  these demand and 
delivery factors are large, the measure of  non-compliance could be significantly 
overestimated. The state may be doing all it can but, for factors outside of  its 
control, health fails anyway.    
 IPEA. “Políticas Sociais: Acompanhamento e Análise, N. 20.” (2012) p. 10526
 Even amongst the access-to-sanitation cases that did reach the courts, the majority affected areas 27
within cities with the same or higher Human Development Index than the regional average. Paula de 
Barcellos, A. Supra n. 25
 SETEP construções S.A. v. Companhia Catarinense de Águas e Saneamento – CASAN (Brazilian 28
Superior Court of  Justice, AgReg na SS 2418, March 16, 2011). Quoted in Ibid
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The first constraints to be considered are those at the individual and community 
level. The uptake of  effective services offered through the public health system can 
be constrained by a number of  factors on the demand side. This could be a 
particular problem with respect to the treatment for TB in Brazil. Although TB has 
had an effective treatment for decades, it remains as one of  the world’s deadliest 
communicable diseases and one of  its major health problems. In 2014, Brazil has 
once again been categorised as one of  the 22 countries with high burden of  the 
disease worldwide.  The high incidence of  the disease in Brazil could be due, at 29
least in part, to the obstacles to eradication posed by low awareness, stigma, and the 
demographic profile of  TB patients. 
Many Brazilians, including those most vulnerable to TB infection, are unaware the 
disease is still a problem in Brazil. This lack of  awareness also stretches to such 
basic issues as how TB is spread and the fact that the disease is curable.  Even 30
many public health workers, despite their greater knowledge about TB, have been 
shown to make basic conceptual mistakes when asked about vulnerability when 
sharing objects.  Stigmatisation, including self-stigmatisation, is also common. 31
People who have been infected with TB often feel ashamed of  their TB status and 
actively seek to avoid being identified as a TB patient.  They often choose to 32
receive treatment outside of  their own neighbourhoods, which increases the 
 WHO. Global Tuberculosis Report. 2013c29
 In one study on the knowledge of  the Brazilian population about TB, only 34% of  the 30
respondents reported that they had knowledge of  the disease, were acquainted with someone who 
had or had previously had the disease. Boaretto, M.C. et al. “The Knowledge of  the Brazilian 
Population on Tuberculosis.” (2010) 
 Maciel, E.L.N., et al. “O Agente Comunitário de Saúde no Controle da Tuberculose: 31
Conhecimentos e Percepções.” (2008); Souza, N.J., and M.R. Bertolozzi. “A Vulnerabilidade à 
Tuberculose em Trabalhadores de Enfermagem em um Hospital Universitário.” (2007)
 Dias, A.A.L. et al. “Life Experiences of  Patients Who Have Completed Tuberculosis Treatment: A 32
Qualitative Investigation in Southeast Brazil.” (2013)
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likelihood of  treatment dropout.  Treatment dropout is also a major challenge 33
amongst those groups most vulnerable to TB in Brazil. For example, young males, 
drug and alcohol users, patients co-infected with TB and HIV/AIDS, prisoners, and 
homeless people.  Low awareness and stigmatisation, particularly within these 34
vulnerable groups, may therefore be a barrier to the uptake of  services even when 
they are being provided. Although it could reasonably be argued that in 
acknowledging this fact the government should be doing more to address the social 
foundations of  these barriers, prioritising the mitigation of  factors that contribute 
to increased vulnerability, and promoting actions that facilitate treatment adherence, 
these issues are less tractable, at least in the short-term. 
The second level constraint is at the health service delivery level. The most 
important of  which being staff. Health workers have to be based where they are 
needed in the quantities they are needed. They also have to be trained appropriately. 
Brazil is faced with two specific challenges in this regard: the first involves the 
appropriate training of  health workers, particularly for some specialities, and the 
second involves the attraction and retention of  health workers in remote areas.    
Though Brazil, on average, has 1.8 doctors for every 1,000 inhabitants, the regional 
variation in the doctor-to-inhabitant ratio is wide. For instance, there are more than 
3 doctors for every 1,000 inhabitants in the state of  Rio de Janeiro whilst there are 
less than one or very close to one doctor per 1,000 inhabitants in most of  the 
Northern and Northeastern states.  One index on doctor shortages in Brazil 35
estimated that there were 1,304 municipalities experiencing such a shortage in 
 Santos-Filho, E.T. “TB Policy in Brazil: A Civil Society Perspective.” (2006) p. 4533
 Pinto de Oliveira, G. et al. “Tuberculosis in Brazil: Last Ten Years Analysis, 2001-2010.” (2013)34
 Organização Pan-Americana da Saúde. Indicadores Básicos para a Saúde no Brasil: Conceitos e Aplicações. 35
2008
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2010.  The scarcity problem not only exists in the number of  health workers 36
available but also in the type of  skills available. There has traditionally been an over-
focus on the scale-up of  one professional group (doctors), at the expense of  family 
health and primary care, which are the areas where shortages tend more often to 
exist. The Ministry of  Health has put measures into effect in an attempt to deal 
with these acute regional and skill shortages. Programmes such as the Programme 
for Valorisation of  Basic Healthcare Professionals (Programa de Valorização do 
Profissional da Atenção Básica, PROVAB), the “More Doctors” programme, and 
the Family Health Strategy have had some initial success in attracting health workers 
to underserved areas. However, these measures have proven unsustainable for the 
retention of  workers in the longer term. Increasing the supply of  appropriately 
trained workers to areas where they are needed is vital to relaxing the delivery 
constraint. The Brazilian government is more than aware of  this. But it appears 
there is an inherent mismatch between health service need and health workers’ 
preferences and expectations. Again, this is an issue that has proven less amenable 
to control and therefore very difficult to overcome.     
C. Distribution in health basket attainment 
Non-discrimination is a fundamental human rights principle and one that should 
form part of  any assessment of  the the degree to which the right to health has been 
fulfilled. In terms of  assessing the extent to which the non-compliance indicator is a 
good measure of  actual non-compliance, it is necessary to go beneath the aggregate 
and investigate firstly, for whom the health basket has not been attained, and 
secondly, whether there is any systematic discrimination in this non-attainment. 
Because economic, social and political inequalities tend to manifest along racial and 
 Dal Poz, M.R. “The Health Workforce Crisis.” (2013)36
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social status lines in Brazil, the assessment of  who attains the health basket will be 
framed with respect to racial and class discrimination.   
Figure 6.3: Proportion of  the Brazilian population served by an adequate sanitation 
system by race and region, 2001-2009  
 
Source: IBGE (2010) The National Survey of  Households (Pnad) 
Brazil’s long historical experience with slavery has doubtlessly shaped the current 
geographical distribution of  populations of  different races across the country. And, 
the pervasiveness of  slavery, the lateness of  its abolition, and the following lack of  a 











































the inequalities that persist. In the 2010 census, around 50 percent of  Brazilians 
identified themselves as either black or brown and 48 percent identified themselves 
as white.  But, despite being in the majority, evidence of  racism’s pervasive 37
character is still found in the exclusion of  non-white groups from accessing 
services, including health services, on equal terms with whites. This can be seen in 
the data on access to sanitation disaggregated by race and by region in figure 6.3.  
Although figure 6.3 reveals a general picture of  discrimination in attainment of  the 
health basket (or at least part of  it) across Brazil, the aggregate national estimates 
are likely masking even greater disparities in attainment across regions, 
municipalities and districts. As a means of  bringing these disparities to light, the 
following discussion will analyse differences in attainment of  the health basket at 
the most granular level, using disaggregated data from the administrative districts of  
the city of  São Paulo as an example.    38
The proportion of  the population with access to sanitation services varies widely 
across districts. Almost all people have access in some districts, such as República, 
Consolação, and Bela Vista, whilst in Parelheiros, as few as 37.3 percent have access. 
It is worth mentioning, however, that this low figure is an outlier. The next lowest 
figures are 72.7 percent and 78.1 percent in Grajaú, and São Rafael, respectively. 
The results are similar for the treatment of  TB with a variance in the treatment 
success rate of  48.8 percentage points, with a minimum of  41.2 percent in Barra 
Funda and a maximum of  90 percent in Alto de Pinheiros. But are these inequalities 
 Brazil Census, (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística Census, IBGE) População residente, 37
por cor ou raça, segundo o sexo e os grupos de idade, 2010 estimates
 With thanks to Marcos Drummond of  the Municipal Health Department for the Government of  38
São Paulo for proving this data and for his kind assistance and patience. A description of  the data is 
provided in Appendix C.1.
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to be considered automatically unfair? Specifically, are they confirmation of  a 
violation of  the right to health?    
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics, health basket attainment by class and race, São 
Paulo 
Figure 6.4 shows that attainment of  part of  the health basket is strongly related to 
racial and socioeconomic makeup. With regards to sanitation services, the whiter the 
district the more likely it is that this part of  the health basket is attained. Likewise it 
is attained more frequently in districts of  a higher social class. The Pearson 
correlation coefficients of  -0.58 and -0.66, shown in Table 6.2, indicate that class 
and race may explain 58 percent and 66 percent of  the variation in access to 
sanitation services, respectively. This suggests that the part of  the health basket 
occupied by sanitation is systematically being attained more for richer white 
Paulistanos than it is for poorer black Paulistanos. 
Table 6.2: Pearson correlation coefficients of  health basket attainment and class and 
race, São Paulo 
Min Max Mean SD
SANITATION 0.373 0.999 0.933 0.081
TB 0.412 0.900 0.690 0.091
CLASS 0.025 0.178 0.114 0.041
































































































































































































































































































































































































































With regards to successful treatment for TB, however, the data do not support the 
same hypothesis. There is no discernible relationship between TB health outcomes 
and class or race. This result may not be surprising given the issues discussed in the 
previous section concerning the countrywide demand and delivery constraints faced 
in the treatment of  TB. These data only add to the existing evidence that low 
awareness and stigma may be the biggest barriers to successful treatment and 
eventual cure, issues that appear in this case to have transcended class and race. 
Nevertheless, there is still a precarious gap in attainment of  the health basket as a 
whole between the two groups. 
How then should the picture engendered by results from these three tests be 
evaluated in terms of  the fulfilment of  the right to health in Brazil? Firstly, the 
revealed deficiencies in government effectiveness in the domain of  health generally 
and sanitation specifically, alongside the lack of  political responsiveness to the voice 
of  the majority of  Brazilians, give credence to the hypothesis that the Brazilian state 
has been unwilling to use its maximum available resources for the fulfilment of  the 
right to health. As far as willingness is concerned, the conclusion of  non-
compliance appears to hold. Secondly, however, there may be factors that are 
contributing to the shortfall in attainment of  the health basket that are not 
necessarily under the state’s direct control. Social and cultural issues, which result in 
a lack of  take-up of  effective treatments, alongside ingrained geographical 
preferences, which make universal service delivery difficult, may be biasing the non-
compliance estimator upwards. But thirdly, and above all, attainment of  the health 
basket is not distributed equally. The third test has indicated that there is systematic 
discrimination in the enjoyment of  the right to health and as such any 
overestimation generated by the second test is likely to be more than wiped out by 
an underestimation generated by the third. Accordingly, it appears that the overall 
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signal of  non-compliance is correct and that the degree to which Brazil is non-
compliant may even be qualitatively worse than estimated with respect to the 
preceding three tests. With this information in hand, what then are the next steps? 
Is there still a role for the courts in assessing and ultimately enforcing compliance?  
III. The role of  courts in assessing compliance 
A. Individualised enforcement 
The concluding signal that Brazil is not compliant with its obligation to fulfil the 
right to health now seems rather solid. To be precise, the state could be doing at 
least 8 percent better with the resources it has available. It follows, therefore, that 
there is indeed a role for the court in enforcing Brazil’s obligations, specifically 
wherever this shortfall in enjoyment of  the right rears its head. As far as the 
reigning jurisprudence of  the Brazilian courts goes, the right to health is seen as an 
absolute individualised entitlement to the satisfaction of  any health need that an 
individual can prove he or she has, regardless of  the high costs that could be 
incurred by the state. Ferraz calls this a right to “maximum health attention.”  On 39
this account, if  the court finds in favour of  the individual, then it will grant an order 
that requires the state to provide whatever health good, service or facility is being 
claimed to that individual. But even if  maximum health attention is constrained by 
the interpretation of  the right to health offered throughout this thesis: namely, a 
right to a basket of  minimal health goods, such an individualised model of  
enforcement still could pose a number of  significant problems.   
 Ferraz, O.L.M. Supra n. 11, p. 165839
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Firstly, orders that require the state to provide goods and services to individuals 
effectively prioritise those individuals who are the most able and willing to bring 
their claims to the courts: the “litigating minority.” This is problematic at both the 
principle and practical level. Successful individual litigants would be provided, 
through the court order, with state-funded access to whatever health goods or 
services they were claiming. Regardless of  who these individual litigants are such 
court orders would result in litigating individuals being better off  than other non-
litigating individuals thus leading to greater inequalities between these two groups. 
Inequality is always seen as a human rights bad, but to add to this, there is now 
sufficient evidence on the demographic make-up of  both the litigating and non-
litigating groups in Brazil to conclude that the beneficiaries of  litigation are 
overwhelmingly those who are already comparatively advantaged, socially and 
economically.  Admittedly, if  courts were implementing the interpretation of  the 40
right to health being defended in this thesis, the problem most likely would produce 
a better health situation than the one that operates currently. But the problem could 
nevertheless still be problematic. 
Accessing the courts in Brazil is, unsurprisingly, more difficult for individuals who 
lack financial resources, technical expertise, access to legal assistance, and awareness 
of  human rights. But such individuals are much more likely to predominate in the 
lower socioeconomic groups. Although cases claiming access to constituent parts of  
the health basket are likely to relate very differently to the inequality issue than 
claims to medicines, which have so far been the main focus of  litigation in Brazil — 
 See e.g. Ferraz, O.L.M. Supra n. 3, p. 88 (The study found that despite making up only 56.8% of  40
Brazil’s total population, the most developed states of  the south and southeast accounted for 85% of  
the 4,343 cases filed against the federal government between 2005 and 2009. Meanwhile, just 7.5% 
cases originated in the least developed states of  the north and northeast despite these states making 
up 36% of  the total population.) See also, Silva, V., and F. Terrazas. “Claiming the Right to Health in 
Brazilian Courts: The Exclusion of  the Already Excluded?” (2011); and Chieffi, A., and R. Barata. 
“Judicialização da Política Pública de Assistência Farmacêutica e Equidade.” (2009)
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the benefits from orders that grant access to medicines to treat chronic illnesses will 
be limited to the individual, whereas the benefits from orders that grant access to 
sanitation services and treatment for infectious diseases, for example, will be more 
widespread — the benefits from individualised orders that require the government 
to provide the health basket may still be realised disproportionally. For instance, 
resolving a sanitation problem in one house or street, although solving a problem 
for more than one individual, will not directly solve sanitation deficiencies in other 
houses or other streets that are geographically distant from the first. Though there 
is not yet a rigorous empirical base upon which to assess the socioeconomic status 
of  the individuals, houses, streets and/or communities that have already seen 
benefits from litigation with respect to claiming elements of  the health basket, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that the pattern that has so far manifested with respect 
to medicines, and the inequalities that have been produced as a consequence, would 
prevail.    
Secondly, with orders that require the state to provide access to health goods and 
services to particular individuals come significant inefficiencies. To take sanitation as 
an example, it could be the case that a number of  individuals living in one district 
of  a city each file a claim against the state petitioning for improved access to 
sanitation facilities. All individuals are successful in making their claims and the 
court grants separate orders requiring that these individuals are each provided with 
state-funded access to the services that have been claimed. It is easy to envision a 
map where small pockets of  the community within the district are served with 
sanitation facilities and where other parts of  the community within the district are 
not, necessarily without any kind of  coherence. If  not already obvious, as soon as 
the map is scaled up to the city, state and ultimately country level, the perversity of  
these ad hoc orders is undisguisable. The lack of  implementation coherence limits 
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any effort to develop policy coherence so that services can be provided for all. This 
is due not only to the increased direct costs associated with providing services on a 
piecemeal basis but to the opportunity costs of  doing so also. In this sense, the 
Brazilian courts only partially replace the bureaucratic branches of  the state in the 
delivery of  health services rather than help to improve bureaucratic action overall. 
Thirdly, and finally, even in an individualised model that is limited to enforcing 
provision of  the minimal health basket, the resources problem, which has been at 
the centre of  discussion throughout this thesis, cannot be forgotten. Although the 
measurement of  compliance has signalled that Brazil could be doing more to fulfil 
the right to health given its available resources, the room for improvement is not 
infinite. The estimate indicates that Brazil could be doing more to the tune of  8 
percent. Indeed it is possible that an improvement of  8 percent represents total 
provision of  the health basket for all in which case any claim to the health basket 
could be fulfilled within the existing resource set. In this case, 100 percent 
compliance with the health basket is affordable. There would be no resource 
dilemma. But it is also possible that a degree of  prioritisation in health basket 
allocation will remain necessary. Indeed this is in fact the case in the Brazilian 
context where Brazil has the ability to provide almost, but not quite, all of  the 
health basket.  Orders, which require the state to provide full access to the health 41
basket to individuals on an individual basis, may therefore eventually result in some 
form of  resource diversion and/or distortion, non-compliance notwithstanding.  
So, if  there is still a role for the courts in assessing and enforcing compliance but 
enforcement on an individualised benefit basis is problematic, what is the courts’ 
 Actual health basket attainment in Brazil is 0.879. Therefore, with the 8% room for improvement 41
that is possible with the resources Brazil has available, the total expected level of  health basket 
fulfilment is 0.95. Total fulfilment of  the health basket for all is not within Brazil’s ability.  
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role, particularly given the fact that human rights owe their very existence to the way 
in which they protect the minimal interests of  individuals? 
B. Holistic consideration 
Despite the problems associated with the individualised model discussed above, 
because human rights are fundamentally concerned with individuals and their 
otherwise unfortunate situations, litigation based on human rights should likewise 
be concerned with remedying injustices with respect to those unfortunate situations, 
faced by individuals. So perhaps what can be gleamed from the discussion is that the 
model of  enforcement, although still serving individuals, should not be overly rigid 
when it comes to granting orders that benefit particular individuals but instead 
should allow for a degree of  flexibility.    
There may well be instances when it is still appropriate for the court to grant 
individualised claims when there is a failure to fulfil an individual’s right to health: a 
failure to provide access to treatment for TB, for example. All Brazilians are entitled 
to free diagnosis and treatment for TB within the National Health System. Since 
1998, TB control has been the responsibility of  Brazil’s primary healthcare, the aim 
of  decentralisation being to deliver health services related to TB diagnosis and to 
institute DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-Course) for all TB patients. 
However, for many Brazilians, diagnoses and treatments remain centralised in TB 
reference centres (TRC), which has resulted in non-uniformity in access to, and 
performance of, health services between and within regions.  If  the state has 42
 In a study of  514 patients, amongst the Southeastern settings, 100% of  treatments in Ribeirão 42
Preto were carried out at TRC with DOTS coverage of  81%; 75% of  treatments in São José do Rio 
Preto were carried out at TRC with DOTS coverage of  83%; and 56% of  treatments in Itaboraí 
were carried out at TRC with DOTS coverage of  81%. Amongst the Northeastern sites, 70% of  
treatments in Campina Grande were carried out at TRC with DOTS coverage of  16%; and 100% of  
treatments in the state of  Feira de Santana were carried out at TRC with zero coverage of  DOTS. 
Villa, T.C.S., et al. “Health Services Performance for TB Treatment in Brazil: A Cross-Sectional 
Study.” (2011)
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unjustly excluded particular individuals from the TB treatment programme, then it 
may still be appropriate for the court to grant separate orders so that the 
programme covers these particular individuals. It is more likely in this case, 
however, that individuals have been excluded from treatment due to a lack of  
strategy for service delivery at the primary health care level. The court then, rather 
than granting orders to benefit particular individual litigants, should order the state 
to develop a scheme for ensuring treatment is provided for all individuals who are 
similarly situated. All individuals can then claim access to treatment under such a 
scheme. Both means of  redress ultimately benefit individuals: the former directly, 
the latter indirectly. But importantly, in either case, orders must not be made in a 
vacuum. Courts must instead consider claims holistically, taking account of  all 
individuals who are likely to have similar needs so that it can be determined whether 
the state can indeed bear to satisfy them.   
In assessing and enforcing compliance the Brazilian courts must therefore consider 
what the potential 8 percent of  improvement amounts to. Whether the claim being 
brought, and the programme it will give rise to, is affordable within the 8 percent 
leeway or whether granting the order is likely to lead to some kind of  resource 
diversion and/or distortion. In some cases the court will be able to make this 
assessment by looking at the existing health budget allocation: has the existing 
health budget been allocated according to human rights priorities? In Brazil, where a 
significant proportion of  the population do not have access to the health basket, 
either in total or in part, the existing budget supporting the public health system 
should prioritise these minimal needs since human rights take priority. Because a 
large proportion of  the health budget in Brazil is currently directed towards the 
procurement of  expensive medicines for the treatment of  chronic diseases, the 
argument that the budget should be organised according to different, more urgent, 
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priorities is a persuasive one. At this level, the court’s holistic consideration will be 
limited to considering only competing micro and meso health needs. Both of  which 
can be more easily informed by the weight given to human rights. In other cases, 
however, holistic consideration will require the court to look beyond this level; 
specifically, to consider whether the total government budget adheres sufficiently to 
human rights priorities. Obviously, this involves consideration of  competing macro 
needs, which extend far beyond health. 
It may appear that this argument is just a restatement of  the approach taken by the 
South African Constitutional Court in its decision in the Grootboom case, which is by 
now famous for its finding and remedy. In Grootboom, the Court found the South 
African government in violation of  its constitutional obligation to develop and 
implement a housing programme that would meet the needs of  those most in need 
of  assistance, like Grootboom.  But the real reason for this case’s celebrity lies in 43
its decision not to order an individualised remedy; that Grootboom be provided 
with housing, for instance. Instead it merely stated that the government must 
“‘devise and implement a coherent, coordinated programme’ and that a ‘reasonable’ 
part of  the total housing budget had to be reserved for those in desperate, 
immediate need of  housing.”  The decision was the point of  some excitement in 44
the academic Constitutionalist world. For Cass Sunstein, the decision established “a 
novel and promising approach to judicial protection of  socio-economic rights … 
without mandating protection for each person whose socio-economic needs are at 
risk,” and it “suggests that such rights can serve, not to preempt democratic 
deliberation, but to ensure democratic attention to important interests that might 
 Government of  the Republic of  South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 116943
 Ibid, at 66, 92, 95. Quoted in Landau, D. “The Reality of  Social Rights Enforcement.” (2012) p. 44
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otherwise be neglected in ordinary debate.”  It is what Mark Tushnet describes as 45
“weak-form review.”  In the more measured Grootboom approach, the Court 46
pointed out failures by the political branches of  the state to fulfil economic and 
social rights, but left the detailing of  the remedies to those same political branches. 
Supporters of  the approach saw this as a way of  balancing the avoidance of  
usurpation of  executive power over budgets and policy priorities on the one hand 
whilst still enforcing these rights on the other.  
But, unfortunately, the Grootboom approach did not work for the actual fulfilment of  
economic and social rights in South Africa. As noted by Theunis Roux, the 
approach fell short because the Court failed to oversee compliance, even with 
respect to the very general terms of  its order, and as a consequence no housing plan 
was ever developed, never mind executed.  Likewise, David Bilchitz concluded that 47
the order made in Grootboom was “disappointing”  since the Court imposed “no 48
time limit on the state’s actions in regard to the development of  a programme to 
meet short-term needs,”  nor did it introduce “supervisory mechanisms for the 49
enforcement of  socio-economic rights.”  These are the reasons why a transplant of  50
Grootboom is not what is being advocated here with respect to the Brazilian case.  
 Sunstein, C.R. “Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa.” (2001) p. 12345
 Whereby the judiciary shares interpretive and enforcement authority over constitutional matters 46
with other branches of  the state but the judges’ rulings are open to short run legislative revision. 
Tushnet, M. Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law. 2008
 Roux, T. “Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of  South Africa.”  (2009)47
 Bilchitz, D. “Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and its 48
Importance.” (2002) p. 484
 Ibid, p. 50049
 Ibid.50
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In considering claims holistically, whilst still ensuring that the right to health be 
enforced, the court will be required to do more than merely point to where failures 
by the political branches of  the state have manifested and order the state to develop 
a plan. To fulfil its responsibilities, in its orders the court will need to place specific 
requirements on the state with respect to how it is to develop its plan to remedy the 
failure, when the benefits from the plan are to be realised, and what will be the 
processes for monitoring and scrutiny by the court. This approach is what Landau 
refers to as “structural injunctions.”  Structural injunctions issued by the court 51
order the political branches of  the state to make specific structural policy changes in 
the area where they have been found to fall short. Importantly, these injunctions are 
long-term. The court maintains supervisory authority throughout the case until its 
resolution. Though it has been used relatively sparingly in practice, according to 
Landau, the structural approach holds at least some promise. He draws upon a case 
study of  Colombia, and how the court intervened in the government’s policy 
regarding internally displaced persons, to substantiate this claim.  
Despite displaced persons accounting for around ten percent of  the Colombian 
population, public policy up to the point of  the court’s intervention had paid very 
little attention to their plight.  Needs relating to a number of  economic and social 52
rights (particularly housing and health) were increasingly being brought to the 
attention of  the court and, in response, the court ordered the state to institute a 
displaced persons policy, which would include the creation of  subsidy programmes 
to meet these needs alongside programmes to help solve more “particularised 
 Landau, D. Supra n. 4451
 Rodriguez Garavito, C., and D. Rodriguez Franco. “Cortes y Cambio Social: Como la Corte 52
Constitucional Transformo el Desplazamiento Forzado en Colombia.” (2010) pp. 40-44. (Providing 
evidence that no public policy existed on the displaced persons issue before the order) Quoted in 
Landau, D. Supra n. 44, p. 435
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problems,”  through holding public hearings on particularly affected groups, for 53
example. The result? Many more resources have been directed towards income 
support and subsidies for displaced persons throughout Colombia as well as 
towards funding an office of  public administrators working solely on this issue. 
And, a Compliance Commission, made up of  domestic NGOs, international 
organisations, and organised groups of  displaced persons themselves, has been set 
up to strictly monitor the actions of  those public administrators. Accordingly, 
considerable headway has been made in the enjoyment of  economic and social 
rights for these people.   54
The Colombian structural injunction approach in the internally displaced persons 
case appears to have been a success with respect to orienting remedies more in line 
with the minimalist idea of  human rights. In the case of  the right to health, the 
court’s orders have been targeted to address the basic health needs of  the most 
needy. But it cannot be concluded from this case, and even others similar to it,  that 55
a structural injunction approach will always yield these same positive results. As 
Tushnet notes in his reply to Landau, the matter of  successfulness in fulfilling 
economic and social rights is most probably less due to whether the approach taken 
by the court is of  the weak-form review or structural injunction variety, but rather 
boils down to the political context within which the courts’ orders are situated.  It 56
 Ibid, p. 43653
 Ibid.54
 Structural injunctions have also been successful in India where, for example, litigants in Delhi 55
claimed that their right to life and health was being threatened by the pollution emitted by the city’s 
buses and were granted relief  in the form of  an accelerated programme to replace gasoline-powered 
buses with ones powered by natural gas. Rajamani, L. “Public Interest Environmental Litigation in 
India: Exploring Issues of  Access, Participation, Equity, Effectiveness and Sustainability.” (2007) 
Another example involves the right to food in India where the government’s grain distribution policy 
was challenged, and as a result the government was ordered to create specific pro-poor food 
programmes. (People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of  India & Others.)
 Tushnet, M. “A Response to David Landau.” (2012) p. 16356
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is quite likely that the main reason as to why the displaced persons case was a 
success was in fact due to there being near consensus between all of  the 
stakeholders involved — the displaced people themselves, the court, and the 
bureaucracy — on both what was wrong in the first place and what needed to be 
done. Admittedly, Landau isn’t ignorant to this fact either.   57
So to anticipate the successfulness of  either approach in the Brazilian case the 
question that really needs to be asked is whether the Brazilian political context is 
likely to tolerate an order by the court, which requires the political branches of  the 
state to reshuffle its existing budget to prioritise health needs differently and/or 
reshuffle its overall budget to ensure that the health basket is being universally 
provided and fundamental interests are being universally protected. At least from 
the evidence already discussed regarding the Brazilian courts’ efforts in ordering the 
state to provide access to sanitation services, the answer may appear to be no.     58
In spite of  the proliferating number of  individualised right to health claims the 
Brazilian court has granted over the past ten years or so, by contrast, collective 
claims are few and far between. According to Hoffmann and Bentes, Brazilian 
judges decide upon individualised claims from a “purely individual civil rights 
perspective,”  which pays very little regard to the wider economic and social impact 59
granting these claims is likely to have. However, it is precisely for reasons of  the 
anticipated economic and social impact that judges are unwilling to make 
concessions with respect to collective right to health claims. This, according to 
 Landau, D. Supra n. 44, p. 44857
 To recall the results from Paula de Barcellos, A. Supra n. 25, just 4% of  the Court’s orders to 58
provide sanitation services were implemented.
 Hoffmann, F.F., and F.R.N.M. Bentes. “Accountability for Social and Economic Rights in Brazil.” 59
In Courting Social Justice, Gauri, V., and D.M. Brinks (eds.) 2008, p. 126 
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Ferraz, is because “enforcement of  such rights would demand a radical 
redistribution of  wealth for which there is no current normative or political 
consensus in Brazilian society. Neither judges, legislators, public administrators, nor 
probably even the poor would support such radical measures.”  60
So where does this leave redress for violations of  the right to health that have been 
identified? At least with respect to the legal route, it seems the answer must lie in 
“remedial innovation.”  If, like in the sanitation cases, the Brazilian courts’ more 61
general orders that require the state to develop plans to deliver health basket goods 
and services are not being adhered to, perhaps what is required is more substantive 
guidance as to what the obligations impose. For example, orders that direct the 
government more specifically on how its policies should be changed, what resources 
will be required, and how the new policies will be monitored to ensure that the 
orders are complied with. Yes, this approach may seem to constrain democratic 
discussion, but as Landau concludes, “courts may need to intrude more on 
democratic institutions in order to improve them.”  62
IV. Conclusions 
Brazil has fostered access to health by establishing a unified health system, guided 
by a principle of  universality. Average health in Brazil has improved rapidly over the 
past two decades. Yet, whatever achievements have been made in the health system, 
they have not been sufficient to guarantee equal access to health for all. There 
 Ferraz, O.L.M. Supra n. 11, p 166760
 Landau, D. Supra n. 44, p. 45961
 Ibid. 62
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remain vast disparities in health outcomes across and within regions and between 
socioeconomic groups. With respect to the fulfilment of  the health basket, Brazil 
could be doing much more with the resources it has available, particularly in the 
realms of  TB treatment and control and the provision of  sanitation services. The 
state appears unwilling to mobilise sufficient resources towards these basic 
interventions and, most importantly, denial of  these services appears to 
systematically manifest on discriminatory grounds. The white and wealthy generally 
have access whilst the non-white poor do not. Brazil, it seems, is not compliant with 
its obligation to fulfil the right to health. 
In what has become known as the judicialisation of  health in Brazil, hundreds upon 
thousands of  individuals have turned to the courts to claim health goods and 
services they believe should have been provided to them by the state. However, this 
judicialisation has essentially interpreted the right as an individual entitlement to 
whatever health need the individual can prove he or she has, with little regard for 
the costs satisfying the need may generate. These costs are potentially colossal.   
In light of  the fact that Brazil is not compliant, one claim this chapter makes is that 
enforcement on an individualised basis is not a good way to enforce right to health 
claims; it has perverse distributive effects and does not appear to do much if  
anything to improve the performance of  the governmental branches responsible for 
delivering health. More holistic remedies appear to be what is required to get the 
right fulfilled for all. But how likely is it that these remedies will work in the 
Brazilian political context? After all, there is no evidence to suggest that a structural 
order given by the court would result in the health basket being provided any 
sooner than it would otherwise have been without the order. Giving up on the idea 
at this point, however, I think would be a mistake. Though we shouldn’t expect the 
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structural approach to right to health enforcement to immediately revolutionise the 
Brazilian judicial system and secure the health basket for all, it could provide the 
initial clearing of  a path for political change. The court could help promote health 
basket-oriented policies by having a say in the political process in which health 
priorities are set, and then ensure that the rights of  the most vulnerable are met 






This thesis set out with the following challenge: to stick a stake in the ground for 
how one might go about measuring compliance with the obligation to fulfil the 
right to health. The challenge involves an unravelling of  the complexities that come 
with both determining the content of  the right and developing an approach for 
determining accountability that has teeth. What kind of  health does the right to 
health guarantee? What level of  this kind of  health do duty-bearers owe to 
individuals? And, how well are duty-bearers doing with respect to what they owe? In 
meeting this challenge, it is with these three questions that the thesis must grapple. 
How did the thesis do? 
This thesis has produced an analytical framework through which compliance with 
the obligation to fulfil the right to health can be measured. Section I of  this 
concluding Chapter recaps how the thesis got there and reiterates the central 
hypothesis: compliance with the obligation to fulfil the right to health is a function 
of  the duty-bearer’s ability and willingness to provide for a minimal basket of  
health goods, services and facilities. The implications for both the study and 
practice of  human rights are several. The latter two Sections of  this conclusion 
221
seek, therefore, to provide a brief  analysis of  the various questions upon which the 
thesis can shed light, as well as discuss those, which remain in its shadow.  
I. Recapping the main arguments and proposals 
A. What kind of  health does the right to health guarantee? 
I have proposed an account of  the right to health as a right that protects against 
significant threats to having and leading a life that is minimally decent. The right 
sets a minimal standard. By means of  its minimalism I have shown that doubts over 
whether health is amenable to being an object of  duty may be misplaced because 
the relevant, socially controllable factors that affect population health and its 
distribution can be provided for and those with the obligation to provide them can 
be identified: currently, this is the state. I have also shown that doubts over whether 
the obligations given rise to by the right to health won’t bear excessively on the 
bearer may be misplaced because the notion of  minimalism sets limits. The right to 
health does not demand full realisability and is conditional on the duty-bearer’s 
ability to fulfil it so that obligations are determined both by reference to the 
fundamental values that underpin the right and by consideration of  the economic 
and social circumstances in which the duty-bearer finds itself. The state therefore 
has an unconditional, or immediate, obligation to use the maximum resources it has 
available with a view to satisfying the minimal interests of  individuals first. In 
defining how these minimal interests might be satisfied, I have adopted a minimum 
core-type approach; namely, through the construction of  a basket of  health goods, 
services, and facilities that are each deemed to meet subsistence-type needs, are 
important, and can feasibly be scaled-up for delivery at the population level. Putting 
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these pieces together, this is the kind of  health I have argued the right to health 
guarantees. 
B. What level of  health do duty-bearers owe to individuals? 
The theoretical account of  the right to health I have offered lays the groundwork 
upon which the thesis’ central argument sits: if  the right to health is a right to a 
minimal basket of  health goods, services and facilities, but its attainment is 
conditional on the state’s ability to provide it, assessing compliance with the 
obligation to fulfil the right to health must be concerned with determining how able 
each state is and to what level of  health basket delivery it should be held 
accountable. In the latter part of  the thesis I have provided a methodology for 
doing just that. I have argued that, in the pursuit of  fulfilling the right to health, 
states are facilitated and limited by four measurable factors: their available financial 
resources, their available human resources, how densely their populations are 
dispersed, and the state of  their existing health environment. Once these factors 
have been accounted for, I have shown that it is possible to predict the level of  
health basket provision that is to be expected of  each state. This is what each state 
owes to individuals.           
C. How well are duty-bearers doing with respect to what they owe? 
The rhetoric that rings within the social rights community, that violations of  the 
right to health are widespread, gave part of  the impetus to embark on the project of  
measuring compliance in the first place. Many, too many, individuals throughout the 
world are afflicted with life-threatening diseases, which on the face of  it, could easily 
be avoided through the most basic of  health interventions. Yet, in spite of  this 
empirical observation, I argued early on that rarely is the evidence sufficiently 
sensitive to social rights-type complexities to identify such apparent unmet need as a 
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violation of  the right to health. However, now that this thesis has offered an 
evidential contribution in this regard, it is possible to give some materiality to this 
kind of  claim. 
Overall, the general global picture of  compliance has been shown to be one of  
remarkable underperformance. On average, the world should be able to improve the 
fulfilment of  the right to health to the tune of  16 percent. However, the variation in 
compliance across states is, perhaps unsurprisingly, sizeable with several states 
almost meeting their obligation to fulfil the right to health whilst the worst 
performing state, for example, falls short by 68 percent. This is how well states are 
doing with respect to what they owe.  
These results go some way to substantiating the ‘violation’ claim. But returning to 
the central hypothesis, when ability is already taken care of, the signal of  non-
compliance should correspond to unwillingness on behalf  of  the state to mobilise 
its maximum available resources to fulfil the right to health. In a bid to test the 
robustness of  this hypothesis, I have presented results of  the associations between 
the estimates of  non-compliance and several indicators of  willingness. Although the 
relationships were shown to be of  the expected sign, (higher non-compliance is 
associated with lower willingness) they were weaker than might have been 
anticipated, which throws into question either the indicators of  willingness, the 
indicators of  non-compliance, or both. I have argued, however, that quantitative 
analysis is an inappropriate tool for investigating this further. In response, I have 
provided a more in-depth qualitative case study, set in Brazil. In the Brazilian case, I 
have shown that there are further qualitative dimensions of  unwillingness that are 
certainly at play, but these cannot be captured quantitatively in any systematic form. 
Likewise, the inability to accommodate discrimination in the measure of  non-
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compliance could be showing Brazil’s performance in a more favourable light. As a 
result, the strength of  the willingness-side of  the hypothesis may be otherwise 
biased downwards. I have argued, therefore, that the hypothesis of  unwillingness is 
likely to hold.  
II. What are the takeaways? 
A. Strengthening accountability 
Accountability mechanisms are an essential component of  the human rights 
framework. They give effect to claims for redress; without them, human rights 
claims would be left dangling in the infinite rhetorical space. Accountability from a 
human rights perspective refers to the relationship between duty-bearers and right-
holders, in that the former have an obligation to take responsibility for the way in 
which their decisions, actions, or inactions affect the latter. Accountability means 
that duty-bearers are answerable to right-holders and are subject to some form of  
enforceable sanction if  and when their decisions or actions are deemed to have 
unjustifiably infringed on an individual’s human rights.       1
The principal accountability mechanism for monitoring the right to health at the 
international level is the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR). All parties to the ICESCR are required to submit reports to the 
Committee, which are narrative in kind, on how the rights covered by the ICESCR 
are being implemented. These government reports are supplemented with shadow 
 UN OHCHR. “Who Will be Accountable? Human Rights and the Post-2015 Development 1
Agenda.” (2013a) (“From a human rights perspective, accountability can be constructed around three 
clusters of  human rights standards: [responsibility, answerability and enforceability.] Together, they 
create conditions in which officials and institutions can be held responsible for their actions, 
answerable to those they serve and subject to enforceable sanction where appropriate.”) pp. 10-11
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reports submitted to the Committee by local civil society. The Committee examines 
each report when the State party appears in session, and its concerns and 
recommendations to the State party are addressed in the Committee’s ‘concluding 
observations.’ The state is then offered an opportunity to reply to each of  these 
concerns and recommendations.   
In the majority (if  not all) of  the country reports, the way in which implementation 
of  the rights under scrutiny is presented seldom strays from the enjoyment-only 
perspective. For example, on the implementation of  the right to health, the most 
recent report submitted by the Brazilian government to the Committee waxes 
lyrical: 
Progress in primary health care in Brazil has been due to the Family Health 
Strategy and to the Community Health Agents Program, which bring integral, 
constant health practices and initiatives closer to the families, thereby 
improving life quality in rural communities and in city outskirts. In 2000, a 
total 1,753 municipalities were covered by the Family Health Strategy; in 
2005, their number rose to 4,986. This increase expanded coverage from 
17.4% of  the population (28,581,244 people) to 44.4% (78,617,562 people). 
Between 2000 and 2005, the number of  municipalities that had Community 
Health Agents-ACS rose from 4,345 to 5,242, while the total number of  
ACS climbed from 134,273 to 208,104, which made possible the expansion 
of  coverage from 70,099,999 (42.8%) to 103,520,586 (58.4%). The 
implementation of  this strategy has reduced regional disparities with respect 
to access to health … as well as the disparities associated with the physical 
difficulty in gaining access to health establishments, goods, and services.  2
But whilst this potentially shows progress in the implementation of  the right to 
health, it reveals very little about whether the expansion of  the programmes 
identified has in fact had any positive impact on the health of  marginalised 
communities or, if  indeed there has been a positive impact, whether it is equal to, 
 UN Economic and Social Council. “Implementation of  the International Covenant on Economic, 2
Social and Cultural Rights: Second Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 
and 17 of  the Covenant, Brazil.” (2008) para 436
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less than, or more than should be expected, given the respective changes in Brazil’s 
ability to fulfil the right for all. In its consideration of  Brazil’s periodic report, the 
Committee had similar concerns. For example, on the issue of  health and 
marginalised communities, the Committee posed the following follow-up question: 
Please provide updated information on the State party’s National Health 
Service, including disaggregated statistical data on those covered by such 
system. Please also indicate the measures taken to guarantee effective access 
to health-care facilities, goods and services of  the most disadvantaged and 
marginalised individuals and groups, including members of  indigenous 
communities and persons of  African descent.  3
And, in its response to the Committee’s question, the Brazilian government replied: 
To eliminate racial discrimination in the access to health, the Brazilian 
Government established a National Policy on the Black Population’s Health. 
This policy encompasses actions aimed at expanding the black population’s 
access to SUS; improving basic sanitation infrastructure; strengthening 
assistance to Quilombola communities; promoting health in worship premises 
of  religious communities of  African roots; and at the adoption of  the 
National Program on Sickle Cell Anemia by the states with larger black 
populations.  4
Again, all that Brazil has provided is a list of  policy efforts that in theory should 
help to alleviate the concerns raised by the Committee. But how is the Committee 
to judge whether these efforts have been effective for the fulfilment of  the right to 
health? Without a systematic framework for assessing effectiveness and sufficiency 
with respect to actual health delivery, the Committee’s concerns remain just that: 
concerns. However, if  this thesis’s measure of  non-compliance was available to the 
Committee, it could provide the systematic framework the Committee desperately 
needs for the turning of  its concerns into a firm assertion of  inadequacy. The non-
compliance score of  0.0808 for Brazil, presented in Table 3 of  Appendix B, shows 
 UN Economic and Social Council. “Replies by the Government of  Brazil to the list of  issues to be 3
taken up in connection with the consideration of  the second periodic report of  Brazil.” (2009) 
Question 30, p. 83. 
 Ibid, para. 3104
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that Brazil is only fulfilling 92 percent of  the level of  right to health enjoyment that 
could potentially be achieved with the resources Brazil has available. On the 
simplest interpretation, Brazil is in violation and could be doing 8 percent better.   
In responding to the claims that violations of  the right to health are widespread, 
clearly, assessment through the self-reporting by states is insufficient. In their 
reports, states are always going to attempt to paint a more favourable picture of  
their human rights landscape than may otherwise be the case. Even allowing civil 
society and other stakeholders to contribute to the evidence stream, although 
tempering the state’s account, is unlikely to offer the Committee a sufficient basis 
upon which to judge the overall status of  right to health fulfilment. There remains an 
information gap; what level of  right to health enjoyment do states owe to 
individuals and how well are they doing with respect to what they owe? The 
measure offered in this thesis helps to plug that gap. It is an approach for 
determining accountability that has teeth. It speaks to the claim of  violations by 
systematically identifying that some unmet health needs are violations of  the right 
to health. But it also gives specificity to the types of  claims that qualify as violations. 
In the case of  Brazil, these violations are more likely to manifest as denied access to 
water and sanitation services and facilities, than denied access to medicines: a 
conclusion that is likely to call for a reexamination of  the way in which these issues 
are dealt with both in the Brazilian courts and in Brazilian policymaking.  
B. Directing action appropriately 
The indicator of  non-compliance provides evidence of  instances where the state 
has failed to use its maximum available resources to fulfil the right to health. It also 
indicates the extent of  the problem and indicates where the potential scope for 
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improvement lies. It can, therefore, be used to help set health policy-related 
priorities with respect to making that improvement happen.   
Women dying during pregnancy or childbirth, children suffering with diarrhoeal 
diseases, and young adults afflicted by infectious disease, in many countries are 
often not isolated events. They are instead widespread health deprivations that come 
about as a result of  policy failures, engrained inequalities, and the mismanagement 
of  resources. In Brazil, for example, 40,225 deaths from causes related to water and 
sanitation were recorded in 2004,  which in large part, can be attributed to avoidable 5
child mortality. The indicator of  non-compliance in Brazil provides evidence as to 
the government’s lack of  attention to its obligations in this regard and also signals 
the size of  the problem. Indeed the indicator signals Brazil has 8 percent more 
room in which to improve. This opens up questions on the existence, quality and 
efficacy of  the government’s existing policies with respect to water and sanitation 
service delivery and could help orient the direction towards which its policies must 
now head.     
However, before pinpointing where public policies may have been lacking and 
suggesting how they should as a result be made better, a human rights-based 
approach to policy reform first requires an investigation of  the root causes of  the 
problem. Who in the population has been most affected and why? If  there is 
discrimination in the way in which the adverse health outcomes have been 
produced, then there will be a need to address it, more specifically, in any policy 
recommendation that results. Has the problem been caused by the way in which 
 Pan American Health Organisation. Water and Sanitation: Evidence for Public Policies focussed on Human 5
Rights and Human Results. 2011, p. 17
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these services are delivered; privately or publicly, for instance? A policy that 
advocates more of  the same could perhaps be less likely to prove fruitful.  
Returning to the example of  water and sanitation in Brazil, the case study in 
Chapter 6 has already shown that the Brazilian population does not share shortfalls 
in access to these services equally. On average, non-white, poor Brazilians bear the 
bulk of  the burden. Indeed, it appears the exclusion of  certain population groups is 
non-compliance at its root; it is in eradicating these deprivations that the room for 
improvement lies. With a view to making this improvement happen, the poor, in 
both rural and urban areas, who have neither the means to access water and 
sanitation services in the first place nor the resources available to deal with the 
wider socioeconomic problems a lack of  access is likely to give rise to, should 
therefore be given priory attention in any policy reform. 
In Brazil, the issues of  access inequity do not seem to necessarily manifest 
according to who provides the services.  Regardless of  which type of  provider 6
provides water and sanitation services, the state has an obligation to ensure that all 
individuals enjoy the right to health. In the case of  public service delivery, basic 
sanitation infrastructure should be prioritised by the public administration. In the 
case of  private and public-private service delivery, the private sector should be 
subject to stricter or better enforced state regulation overseeing the cost and quality 
of  services, whilst the government should be required to reinvest any profit 
 In many instances, municipalities are the unit responsible for delivering water and sanitation 6
services. But more recently, a growing amount of  private capital is being invested to buy shares in 
publicly owned water and sanitation companies in the form of  Private Sector Participation (PSP). 
However, a summing of  the available evidence suggests that neither system has been particularly 
successful at reducing the types of  inequalities already discussed. See, e.g. Heller, L., S.C. Rezende, 
and S. Cairncross. “Water and Sanitation in Brazil: The Public–Private Pendulum.” (2014); and Clarke 
G., K. Kosec, and S. Wallsten. “Has Private Participation in Water and Sewerage Improved 
Coverage? Empirical Evidence for Latin America.” (2004) (shows that privatisation is not associated 
with an increase in service coverage in Brazil.)
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obtained back into the water and sanitation sector (as opposed to funding other 
state expenditures) for the universalisation of  these services. By association, if  and 
when these basic services have not been prioritised by the public administration, or 
if  and when the fees charged by private suppliers go unchecked, claims of  
individuals or groups, which call to rectify the situation should be those that form 
the substance of  right to health claims that then guide action and policy reform 
appropriately.  
Hopefully, I have shown how the results generated by this thesis can be used in 
context. Water and sanitation in Brazil is just one example. The indicator of  non-
compliance is the first step in identifying systematic failures that require priority 
attention and provides the basis for a right to health-based approach to health 
policy reform. But beware; the fact that the measure is just a first step is crucial to 
its use and interpretation. There are ways to make the measure itself  and its 
interpretation more elaborate. These are discussed in the Section that follows. 
III. What remains to be investigated? 
A. Adjusting for specific issues affecting the ability to provide for health 
One criticism of  the approach I have presented could be that it might seem odd to 
say that ability to satisfy a right is a necessary condition of  the duty to do so because 
this might depend on why the inability came about. This is what might be called the 
‘tracing problem.’ For example, at some point in history a state may have owned a 
valuable asset (call this α) that was appropriated by another state. The appropriating 
state then went on to transform α into an even more valuable asset (call this β). The 
appropriator is now much more ‘able’ than the appropriatee. By association, the 
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appropriatee’s ability to fulfil the right to health (and other human rights) is now 
limited and the level of  health to which the state has an obligation to fulfil, on the 
basis of  the argument presented in this thesis, is relatively low. But should the state 
be held accountable to providing this low level of  health, or should it in fact be held 
to the level that owning α  or β  would allow? This depends on whether the 
appropriatee has any claim on α or β. If  it does, then the state would be more able 
to fulfil the right to health and the level of  health to which individuals can expect to 
have guaranteed ought to be higher.  
In a similar way, third parties may affect both the basket of  health goods, services, 
and facilities the right to health guarantees as well as the state’s ability to provide for 
health, particularly in the arena of  access to medicines. Expenditure on medicines 
accounts for a significant proportion of  the health costs faced in developing 
countries. This means that access to treatment and fulfilment of  the right to health 
in these countries is heavily dependent on the availability of  affordable medicines. 
In the construction of  the health basket, only those interventions that are deemed 
feasible in the sense that they are economically amenable to population level scale-
up are to be included. This is not too problematic with respect to the interventions 
considered for inclusion at present, since they are the most basic of  interventions, 
which tend to be covered by, for example, the Global Fund to control such basic 
health issues as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.  As a result the associated 7
costs are maintained at an affordable level. But this hasn’t always been the case and 
may not be the case in the future.    
 The Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria is a partnership between governments, 7
civil society, the private sector and people affected by the diseases, which mobilises and invests nearly 
US$4 billion a year to support programs run by local experts in more than 140 countries.
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The WHO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), which entered into force in 1995, required WHO member states to 
provide 20 years worth of  protection for valid patent claims.  This protection, once 8
granted, gave patent holders exclusive rights to the production and distribution of, 
for example, a patented medicine. It essentially gave medicine suppliers monopoly 
power. What this means in practice is that the costs of  medicines could be higher 
than they likely would otherwise be since the patent holder is not subject to market 
competition and is free to set their own price. This obviously affects the level of  the 
medicine the state has the ability to buy and provide — and therefore the level of  
health the right to health guarantees — and could even affect whether the medicine 
meets the health basket criteria in the first place; it could fail the feasibility 
threshold. If  medicines were not subject to the TRIPS Agreement, (or any other 
mechanism that provides space for some form of  price setting by the supplier) the 
state would be able to provide for more health within its existing available resource 
set and, again, the level of  health to which individuals could expect to have 
guaranteed ought to be higher than this thesis’s framework would otherwise predict. 
Whilst the argument that setting the level of  health each state is expected to achieve 
requires consideration of  issues such as those discussed above is potentially valid, 
determining whether an appropriatee has any claim on α  or β, or untangling the 
degree to which laws that govern intellectual property produce unjustifiable 
differences in access to medicines, is a complex job that is highly controversial. It 
would require a normative account of  what appropriators owe to appropriatees, 
which is essentially an account of  what a globally just distribution of  resources 
might look like. It would also require careful normative consideration of  the 
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights, Agreement Establishing the 8
World Trade Organisation, Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, Annex 1C, Articles 27 and 33
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morality of  markets, specifically, whether there is a valid principled argument as to 
why particular public goods (e.g. medicines) should not be subject to market 
mechanisms. Both of  these questions are ambitious theses in their own right and as 
such cannot be tackled, at least with any integrity, here, (in a discussion of  whose 
resources count as being available, I have already argued in Chapter 3 why ability is 
determined with reference to those currently available to domestic states.) Instead 
the analysis is restricted here to less controversial ideals, specifically, the right to a 
minimum health basket whose main duty-bearer is the state. But what are the 
implications of  excluding these questions with respect to this thesis? If  indeed there 
are any. 
There might be various steps in measuring compliance with the obligation to fulfil 
the right to health. One of  those steps might be to measure compliance against an 
abstract ‘ideal,’ which conceptualises the right to health in a world where resources 
are distributed in a way that enables the minimal health basket to be fulfilled for all 
and where the market for medicines is perfectly adjusted for social desirability. This 
step most certainly has value as a normative benchmark towards which most social 
rights supporters would like to see right to health fulfilment heading. But, I would 
argue, even in seeking to measure compliance against such an abstract ideal, we 
must first understand compliance with respect to the empirical reality. Just as Uskali 
Mäki would suggest, surely the aim of  theorising is to understand the realm being 
theorised. Theories must be relevant and reliable. Therefore, adding ‘the way the 
world works’ constraint on theorising makes better the choice and assessment of  
the theory.  This essentially speaks to the current thinking in economics and ethics 9
 Mäki, U. The Economic World View: Studies in the Ontology of  Economics. 20019
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on the positive-normative dichotomy, which has at least lost substantial ground if  
not by now been already quashed.     10
The foregoing point notwithstanding, presenting an account of  what compliance 
with the obligation to fulfil the right to health ought to look like under ideal 
conditions is not what this thesis has sought to achieve. Rather, in facing the 
empirical reality that the right to health is increasingly being claimed in courts, and 
used as a policy tool to address the health needs of  groups and individuals around 
the world today, what has been sought is an understanding of  the ‘what is’ so that 
action in these arena can be directed appropriately. What is characterised as ‘ideal’ is 
likely to be some way away from ‘what is.’ Moreover, my version of  what is ideal will 
most probably be some way away from what the state of  Brazil or Botswana 
considers to be ideal, which in turn will differ from what is. That being so, any 
prescribed action resulting from the ideal is likely to differ significantly from what 
can actually be done now. Measuring compliance with respect to the status quo 
therefore produces a pragmatic signal with which immediate action can be guided 
and indeed as a by-product provides a base starting point upon which alternative, 
more ‘idealistic,’ long run scenarios could possibly be developed.       
B. Placing right to health compliance within the wider compliance context 
Another criticism of  the approach I have presented may be that ultimately, the 
appropriate level of  resources for a state to provide to its citizens with respect to 
health will depend on other projects that it seeks to advance, such as security, the 
arts, other human rights, and so on. In the absence of  some method to determine 
 See, e.g. Hands, D.W. “The Positive-Normative Dichotomy and Economics,” In Handbook of  the 10
Philosophy of  Science, Gabbay, D.M., P. Thagard, and J. Woods (eds.) 2012; Hausman, D.M., and M.S. 
McPherson. Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy and Public Policy. 2006; Putnam, H. “For Ethics and 
Economics Without Dichotomies” (2003); and Putnam, H. The Collapse of  the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 
and other Essays. 2002
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how many resources should be directed towards health given these other objectives, 
how meaningful is it then to talk of  measuring compliance with the obligation to 
fulfil the right to health?  
In the real world where resources are scarce, it could be the case that duty-bearers 
face trade-offs in the fulfilment of  different human rights and human needs in that 
allocating resources for the fulfilment of  one right or need is done so at the expense 
of  fulfilling another. If  this is indeed the case, a country that performs reasonably 
well with respect to fulfilling the right to health may only be able to maintain this 
position precisely because its performance with respect to other human rights is 
poor. For example, the non-compliance estimates produced in Chapter 5 reveal that 
Rwanda is the 6th best performing state with respect to fulfilling the right to health 
whilst Bangladesh ranks 174 out of  a possible 186. Although from this it may seem 
that Rwanda is much more successful than Bangladesh in mobilising the resources it 
has available for fulfilling human rights, what this doesn’t reveal is whether Rwanda’s 
health success has come at the expense of  zero investment in security, the arts and 
other human rights, for instance. Likewise, Bangladesh may have prioritised 
education, fair wages and the environment at the expense of  fulfilling the right to 
health. Therefore, if  we were to look at the two country’s total performance, the 
difference may not be as vast as it initially appears. This is a valid criticism. 
However, its sustenance depends on there being no way of  gleaming such an overall 
picture or a way of  testing for such trade-offs. I would argue that neither is 
necessarily the case.       
Because in Chapter 3 I argued that human rights as minimal standards have priority 
status and as such require that resources are directed towards fulfilling them first, 
the discussion of  trade-offs and how to deal with them can be limited to those 
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which operate between and amongst human rights rather than those which stretch 
to include other things. What I have presented throughout this thesis is a 
methodology for measuring compliance with the obligation to fulfil human rights. 
Although I have focussed on the right to health, this is not to say that the 
methodology’s use is limited to that right. Quite the contrary. By following the same 
analytical steps, it could quite easily be replicated for measuring a state’s 
performance in fulfilling other human rights. Returning to the information pyramid 
outlined in Chapter 1, so long as it is possible to qualitatively describe what is to be 
quantified, and quantitative indicators, which reflect that description can be 
identified, then the same type of  frontier analysis can be undertaken to produce 
estimates of  compliance for any human right. Aggregating all of  these right-specific 
estimates can then produce an overall human rights compliance estimate, which 
would give much greater precision to the health compliance versus wider 
compliance context question. For example, it would reveal whether the performance 
gap between Rwanda and Bangladesh seen in health is either maintained or 
diminished when other human rights are accounted for. Ultimately, measuring 
compliance with the obligation to fulfil human rights will involve an assessment of  
the duty-bearer’s ability and willingness to provide for them as a whole. The central 
hypothesis remains.      
However, it could still be argued that by implicitly assuming that states can fulfil 
each right to a potential maximum without compromising the fulfilment of  another, 
the trade-off  problem has not been sufficiently dealt with. But the availability of  the 
additional compliance estimates, which cover all human rights, would allow the 
opportunity for testing both the existence and degree of  trade-offs between and 
237
amongst rights through correlating and regressing each of  the estimates against one 
another. 
Obviously, replicating the analysis for every other human right is a task that far 
surpasses the limits of  this thesis, both objective-wise and resource-wise. So, 
whether or not trade-offs between rights exist is one empirical question that 
remains to be explored. However, since there is a long-standing traditional 
relationship in the development data that favourable outcomes in one dimension of  
development tend to be associated with favourable outcomes in others, (and vice 
versa)  it might not be unreasonable to speculate that if  there is a relationship 11
between a state’s performance in fulfilling one right versus its performance in 
fulfilling another, the relationship would be positive, rather than negative. 
IV. To end 
The human right to health and the legal obligations it gives rise to are important. 
When every day there are approximately 800 women who die from preventable 
causes related to pregnancy and childbirth,  and more than six million children 12
each year who don’t live to see their fifth birthdays,  ‘oh-dearism’ surely is not 13
enough. By means of  the fact that almost all of  the world’s states have voluntarily 
subscribed to some form of  formal legal mechanism, which protects the right to 
 See, e.g. the numerous papers produced by Sabine Alkire and others on multidimensional poverty. 11
The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) also featured in the UNDP’s Human Development 
Report 2010, UNDP. Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth of  Nations: Pathways to Human 
Development. 2010
 WHO. Maternal Mortality Factsheet 348, May 2014 (2014a)12
 WHO. Children: Reducing Mortality Factsheet 178, September 2014 (2014b) 13
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health, an assessment as to whether those states have lived up to their obligations 
with respect to averting such tragedies must instead be a guide to their reversal.      
But determining precisely when and under what conditions these obligations have 
not been lived up to is a tricky business. Given that each state bears the obligation 
to take steps, with a view to progressively realising the right to health subject to the 
maximum resources that are available, how many maternal and child deaths should 
states be expected to avert? They may not be able to avert all of  them.  
This means that vague appeals to the right to health will be insufficient for giving 
claims of  violation credibility. In order for the right to health to be transformed 
from a mere “rhetorical weapon”  into something capable of  “constraining, 14
guiding, and mobilising governments, individuals and other actors,”  an 15
understanding of  how the notions of  progressive realisation and maximum 
available resources are to be operationalised in relation to a sufficiently grounded 
formulation of  the right to health must be developed. This thesis has offered a 
proposal in meeting that challenge. 
From laying out the moral foundations for right to health claims to providing the 
basis for developing an approach to determining accountability that has teeth, this 
thesis has offered an analytical framework through which compliance with the 
obligation to fulfil the right to health can be measured. Through an understanding 
of  the normative and empirical relationships between health and the ability and 
willingness to provide for it, the concepts of  progressive realisation and maximum 
 Tobin, J. The Right to Health in International Law. 2012, p. 37514
 Ibid.15
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available resources have hopefully been treated with the care they call for. The right 
to health has been taken seriously. 
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Appendix A
1. Deaths by cause categories
Long List (GBD, 2011)
Tuberculosis Malignant neoplasms Cardiovascular diseases
STDs excluding HIV Mouth and oropharynx 
cancers
Rheumatic heart disease
Syphilis Oesophagus cancer Hypertensive heart 
disease
Chlamydia Stomach cancer Ischaemic heart disease
Gonorrhoea Colon and rectum 
cancers
Stroke
Trichomoniasis Liver cancer Cardiomyopathy, 
myocarditis
Other STDs Pancreas cancer Other circulatory diseases
HIV/AIDS Trachea, bronchus, lung 
cancers
Respiratory diseases
Diarrhoeal diseases Melanoma and other skin 
cancers
COPD
Childhood-cluster diseases Breast cancer Asthma
Whooping cough Cervix uteri cancer Other respiratory diseases
Diphtheria Corpus uteri cancer Digestive diseases
Measles Ovary cancer Peptic ulcer disease
Tetanus Prostate cancer Cirrhosis of  the liver
Meningitis Bladder cancer Appendicitis
Encephalitis Lymphomas, multiple 
myeloma
Other digestive diseases
Acute hepatitis B Leukaemia Other noncommunicable 
diseases
Acute hepatitis C Other malignant 
neoplasms
Kidney diseases
Parasitic and vector diseases Other neoplasms Hyperplasia of  prostate
Malaria Diabetes mellitus Urolithiasis




Chagas disease Mental and behavioral 
disorders
Infertility
Schistosomiasis Unipolar depressive 
disorders
Gynecological diseases
Leishmaniasis Bipolar disorder Skin diseases
Lymphatic filariasis Schizophrenia Rheumatoid arthritis
Onchocerciasis Alcohol use disorders Osteoarthritis
Leprosy Drug use disorders Gout
Dengue Anxiety disorders Back and neck pain
Trachoma Eating disorders Other musculoskeletal 
disorders
Rabies Pervasive developmental 
disorders
Congenital anomalies
Intestinal nematode infections Childhood behavioural 
disorders
Neural tube defects
Ascariasis Idiopathic intellectual 
disability
Cleft lip and cleft palate
Trichuriasis Other mental and 
behavioural disorders
Down's syndrome
Hookworm disease Neurological conditions Congenital heart 
anomalies












Multiple sclerosis Periodontal disease
Otitis media Migraine Edentulism
Maternal conditions Non-migraine headache Unintentional injuries





Sense organ diseases Poisonings
Birth asphyxia and 
trauma
Glaucoma Falls








Other vision loss Other unintentional 
injuries
Iodine deficiency Other hearing loss Intentional injuries
Vitamin A deficiency Other sense organ 
disorders
Self-harm







STDs excluding HIV Other neoplasms
HIV/AIDS Diabetes mellitus
Diarrhoeal diseases Endocrine, blood, immune disorders
Childhood-cluster diseases Mental and behavioral disorders
Meningitis Neurological conditions
Encephalitis Sense organ diseases
Acute hepatitis B Cardiovascular diseases
Acute hepatitis C Respiratory diseases
Parasitic and vector diseases Digestive diseases
Intestinal nematode infections Other noncommunicable diseases
Other infectious diseases Unintentional injuries






2. GDB level-specific avoidable mortality 















All Causes 0.0756 100.0% 0.0828 100.0%
I. Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional 
conditions 0.0686 90.7% 0.0755 91.2%
II. Noncommunicable diseases 0.0046 6.1% 0.0048 5.8%
III. Injuries 0.0024 3.1% 0.0025 3.0%















All Causes 0.0224 100.0% 0.0236 100.0%
I. Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional 
conditions 0.0156 69.8% 0.0156 66.1%
II. Noncommunicable diseases 0.0038 16.8% 0.0039 16.5%
III. Injuries 0.0030 13.3% 0.0041 17.4%















All Causes 0.0224 100.0% 0.0236 100.0%
I. Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional 
conditions 0.0156 73.5% 0.0156 68.7%
II. Noncommunicable diseases 0.0038 21.1% 0.0039 18.1%
III. Injuries 0.0030 5.4% 0.0041 13.2%















All Causes 0.0224 100.0% 0.0236 100.0%
I. Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional 
conditions 0.0156 39.4% 0.0156 56.0%
II. Noncommunicable diseases 0.0038 55.4% 0.0039 35.6%
III. Injuries 0.0030 5.2% 0.0041 8.4%
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Appendix B 
1. Data Descriptions 
Variable Description
BIRTHSKILL Numerator: The number of  births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, 
nurses or midwives) trained in providing life saving obstetric care, including giving 
the necessary supervision, care and advice to women during pregnancy, childbirth 
and the post-partum period; to conduct deliveries on their own; and to care for 
newborns. Denominator: The total number of  live births in the same period.
MSLS The percentage of  children under one year of  age who have received at least one 
dose of  measles-containing vaccine in a given year. For countries recommending the 
first dose of  measles vaccine in children over 12 months of  age, the indicator is 
calculated as the proportion of  children less than 12-23 months of  age receiving one 
dose of  measles-containing vaccine.
SAN Improved sanitation facilities include: Flush or pour-flush to piped sewer system, 
septic tank or pit latrine, Ventilated improved pit latrine, Pit latrine with slab and 
Composting toilet.
TB The proportion of  new smear-positive TB cases registered under a national TB 
control programme in a given year that successfully completed treatment, whether 
with or without bacteriological evidence of  success (“cured” or “treatment 
completed” respectively). At the end of  treatment, each patient is assigned one of  
the following six mutually exclusive treatment outcomes: cured; completed; died; 
failed; defaulted; and transferred out with outcome unknown. The proportions of  
cases assigned to these outcomes, plus any additional cases registered for treatment 
but not assigned to an outcome, add up to 100% of  cases registered.
GNIC GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national 
income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. 
An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has 
in the United States. GNI is the sum of  value added by all resident producers plus 
any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of  output plus net 
receipts of  primary income (compensation of  employees and property income) from 
abroad.
HK Average number of  years of  education received by people ages 25 and older, 
converted from education attainment levels using official durations of  each level. 
Source: HDRO updates of  Barro and Lee (2011) estimates based on UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics data on education attainment (2012) and Barro and Lee (2010) 
methodology. Data in the tables are those available to the Human Development 
Report Office as of  15 October 2012, unless otherwise specified.
MORTDEN 191 Member States of  WHO have been divided into five mortality strata on the basis 
of  their levels of  child mortality under five years of  age and 15-59-year-old male 
mortality: A/1 Very low child,very low adult; B/2 Low child, low adult; C/3 Low 
child, high adult; D/4 High child, high adult; E/5 High child, very high adult.
POPDEN Population density is midyear population divided by land area in square kilometers. 
Population is based on the de facto definition of  population, which counts all 
residents regardless of  legal status or citizenship--except for refugees not 
permanently settled in the country of  asylum, who are generally considered part of  
the population of  their country of  origin. Land area is a country's total area, 
excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and 
exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of  inland water bodies 
includes major rivers and lakes.
CC Control of  Corruption captures perceptions of  the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of  corruption, as 
well as "capture" of  the state by elites and private interests. Estimate gives the 
country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of  a standard normal distribution.
GE Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of  the quality of  public services, the 
quality of  the civil service and the degree of  its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of  policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of  the government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the country's score 
on the aggregate indicator, in units of  a standard normal distribution.
VA Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of  the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of  
expression, freedom of  association, and a free media. Estimate gives the country's 
score on the aggregate indicator, in units of  a standard normal distribution.
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2. Summary of  missing values 
Variable 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
BIRTHSKILL 0.65 0.72 0.69 0.61 0.81
MSLS 0 0 0 0 0
SAN 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11
TB 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09
GNIC 0 0 0 0 0
HK 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
MORTDEN 0 0 0 0 0
POPDEN 0 0 0 0 0
CC 0 0 0 0 0
GE 0 0 0 0 0
VA 0 0 0 0 0
Values represent the rate of  imputation per variable
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1 Burundi 0.0120 6 0.7528
2 Oman 0.0122 4 0.9621
3 Gambia 0.0144 2 0.7731
4 Kyrgyzstan 0.0227 47 0.8831
5 Myanmar 0.0236 10 0.8105
6 Rwanda 0.0238 8 0.7564
7 Malawi 0.0246 18 0.7622
8 Algeria 0.0262 45 0.8837
9 Uruguay 0.0273 42 0.9342
10 Macedonia, FYR 0.0279 32 0.9624
11 Egypt 0.0291 21 0.8705
12 Turkmenistan 0.0298 74 0.9247
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0321 39 0.8430
14 Seychelles 0.0332 66 0.8609
15 Bhutan 0.0346 1 0.7347
16 Tonga 0.0347 60 0.9611
17 Jordan 0.0349 44 0.9497
18 Dominica 0.0354 26 0.9668
19 Mauritius 0.0358 24 0.9466
20 Mongolia 0.0368 61 0.8520
21 Bulgaria 0.0369 86 0.9424
22 Uzbekistan 0.0369 58 0.9011
23 Thailand 0.0379 19 0.9221
24 Slovakia 0.0380 108 0.9550
25 Iceland 0.0398 96 0.8962
26 Fiji 0.0398 81 0.9492
27 Botswana 0.0405 99 0.8443
28 Turkey 0.0408 17 0.9240
29 Vietnam 0.0419 13 0.8980
30 Serbia 0.0420 73 0.9327
31 Djibouti 0.0425 12 0.7984
32 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.0425 33 0.9144
33 Australia 0.0428 142 0.8806
34 Cuba 0.0431 59 0.9433
35 Albania 0.0431 77 0.9467
36 Andorra 0.0438 69 0.9896
37 Syrian Arab Republic 0.0456 15 0.8299
38 Burkina Faso 0.0488 3 0.5875
39 Iraq 0.0493 23 0.8586
40 Sri Lanka 0.0497 53 0.9353
41 Ecuador 0.0498 51 0.8618
42 Barbados 0.0500 52 0.9732
43 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.0506 37 0.6935
44 Cabo Verde 0.0530 5 0.8299
45 Montenegro 0.0545 97 0.9171
46 Mozambique 0.0553 11 0.5707
47 Sweden 0.0554 132 0.9350
48 Venezuela 0.0561 36 0.8860
49 China 0.0562 29 0.9081
50 Kazakhstan 0.0585 123 0.8410
51 Norway 0.0595 152 0.8737
52 Tunisia 0.0597 20 0.8968
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53 Morocco 0.0618 14 0.7825
54 Guatemala 0.0623 9 0.8226
55 Libya 0.0644 43 0.8203
56 Chile 0.0644 92 0.8724
57 Kuwait 0.0671 7 0.9711
58 Mexico 0.0680 54 0.9107
59 Slovenia 0.0708 121 0.9256
60 Guyana 0.0723 75 0.8430
61 Malaysia 0.0740 80 0.9029
62 Tajikistan 0.0740 72 0.8615
63 Canada 0.0747 160 0.8407
64 Brazil 0.0808 41 0.8790
65 Georgia 0.0822 126 0.8865
66 Honduras 0.0829 28 0.8464
67 Costa Rica 0.0831 55 0.9162
68 Belarus 0.0838 136 0.8310
69 Belize 0.0850 63 0.8344
70 United States of  America 0.0877 169 0.9054
71 Portugal 0.0883 30 0.8936
72 Korea, Rep. 0.0911 128 0.9219
73 Nicaragua 0.0917 40 0.7831
74 Romania 0.0928 109 0.8722
75 Lithuania 0.0937 139 0.8282
76 Colombia 0.0997 49 0.8588
77 Peru 0.1017 102 0.8048
78 Finland 0.1032 117 0.8665
79 Saudi Arabia 0.1038 57 0.8452
80 Greece 0.1070 98 0.8869
81 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.1082 64 0.7805
82 Maldives 0.1110 22 0.9041
83 Armenia 0.1125 119 0.8291
84 El Salvador 0.1158 48 0.8550
85 Paraguay 0.1159 65 0.7941
86 Brunei Darussalam 0.1161 56 0.8554
87 Palau 0.1169 155 0.8044
88 New Zealand 0.1170 164 0.7921
89 Netherlands 0.1183 133 0.9242
90 United Kingdom 0.1211 76 0.9105
91 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.1242 68 0.9759
92 Switzerland 0.1273 131 0.9100
93 Israel 0.1275 143 0.8871
94 Panama 0.1292 106 0.8423
95 Germany 0.1292 153 0.8812
96 Senegal 0.1293 35 0.7137
97 United Arab Emirates 0.1297 82 0.8836
98 Hungary 0.1298 158 0.8810
99 Czech Republic 0.1308 156 0.8790
100 Dominican Republic 0.1316 50 0.8370
101 Poland 0.1342 118 0.8237
102 Croatia 0.1346 104 0.9167
103 Estonia 0.1355 171 0.8279
104 Bahamas 0.1365 88 0.8126
105 Italy 0.1375 105 0.8830
106 Belgium 0.1377 125 0.9079
107 Moldova 0.1393 116 0.8165
108 France 0.1406 124 0.8968
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109 Latvia 0.1436 163 0.8349
110 Grenada 0.1468 87 0.9771
111 Sao Tome and Principe 0.1476 38 0.6929
112 Lebanon 0.1492 62 0.8482
113 Spain 0.1506 129 0.8601
114 Suriname 0.1510 90 0.8126
115 Qatar 0.1529 31 0.7838
116 Saint Lucia 0.1574 85 0.7584
117 Ireland 0.1595 159 0.8464
118 Bolivia 0.1657 146 0.7460
119 Russian Federation 0.1676 177 0.7599
120 Zimbabwe 0.1709 103 0.6859
121 Trinidad and Tobago 0.1723 110 0.8443
122 Indonesia 0.1732 46 0.7503
123 Samoa 0.1736 138 0.8083
124 Yemen 0.1764 16 0.6317
125 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0.1787 120 0.8560
126 Argentina 0.1852 140 0.7923
127 Namibia 0.1877 115 0.7014
128 Mali 0.1898 34 0.5219
129 Ukraine 0.1909 167 0.6789
130 Swaziland 0.1911 114 0.7486
131 Comoros 0.1932 27 0.4230
132 Singapore 0.1936 93 0.9308
133 Philippines 0.1998 113 0.7923
134 Eritrea 0.2072 84 0.5685
135 Cameroon 0.2086 94 0.6744
136 Guinea 0.2094 25 0.4988
137 Malta 0.2152 130 0.8056
138 Cambodia 0.2187 70 0.7324
139 Austria 0.2200 161 0.8344
140 Azerbaijan 0.2206 168 0.8201
141 Vanuatu 0.2284 100 0.6971
142 South Africa 0.2364 162 0.7479
143 Jamaica 0.2401 148 0.7264
144 Denmark 0.2407 173 0.7523
145 Kiribati 0.2515 127 0.6992
146 Zambia 0.2542 149 0.5835
147 Liberia 0.2600 112 0.5572
148 Luxembourg 0.2610 157 0.7763
149 Solomon Islands 0.2613 71 0.6408
150 Antigua and Barbuda 0.2665 150 0.5349
151 Japan 0.2687 178 0.7748
152 Cyprus 0.2720 166 0.8362
153 Nepal 0.2849 67 0.5656
154 Benin 0.3074 78 0.5589
155 India 0.3075 79 0.6379
156 Niger 0.3143 91 0.3934
157 Pakistan 0.3144 101 0.6342
158 Angola 0.3173 107 0.5982
159 Lao PDR 0.3174 95 0.7208
160 Central African Republic 0.3193 144 0.4878
161 Sierra Leone 0.3232 111 0.5528
162 Côte d'Ivoire 0.3236 122 0.5439
163 Lesotho 0.3264 154 0.5870
164 Uganda 0.3268 135 0.6096
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165 South Sudan 0.3345 89 0.5175
166 Guinea-Bissau 0.3349 83 0.5188
167 Kenya 0.3443 172 0.6299
168 Congo 0.3579 170 0.5799
169 Mauritania 0.3804 137 0.5360
170 Equatorial Guinea 0.3932 134 0.6355
171 Afghanistan 0.4044 141 0.5219
172 Bahrain 0.4136 180 0.6922
173 Ghana 0.4139 179 0.5905
174 Bangladesh 0.4206 145 0.5919
175 Tanzania 0.4273 175 0.4948
176 Gabon 0.4346 185 0.5687
177 Haiti 0.4367 165 0.5411
178 Togo 0.4475 174 0.5086
179 Sudan 0.4605 147 0.4182
180 Madagascar 0.4745 182 0.5032
181 Somalia 0.4786 186 0.3512
182 Nigeria 0.4802 176 0.5485
183 Timor-Leste 0.5321 151 0.5248
184 Papua New Guinea 0.6037 181 0.4621
185 Ethiopia 0.6070 183 0.3232
186 Chad 0.6777 184 0.3317
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Appendix C 
1. Data Descriptions 
Source: Municipal Secretariat of  Health, São Paulo (Secretaria Municipal da Saúde) Social Environmental and GIS 
information (Informações Socioambientais e Geoprocessamento)
Variable Description
SANITATION The percentage of  the population who are covered by flush or pour-flush to piped 
sewer system. 
TB The proportion of  new smear-positive TB cases registered under a national TB 
control programme in a given year that successfully completed treatment (“cured”)
CLASS The percentage of  the population ten years or older that earns less than or equal to 
one times the minimum salary 
RACE The percentage of  the population ten years or older that describe themselves as non-
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